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ABSTRACT 
Quest for Quotidian: A National Survey of 
Non-Heterosexual Attitudes Toward Marriage 
by 
Troy A. McGinnis 
Dr. Andrea Fontana, Examination Committee Chair 
Professor of Sociology 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas 
Marriage equality remains a legal impossibility for same-sex couples in most states, and 
opponents are concerned that expansion of marriage to include gays and lesbians would 
radically redefine the institution. Findings from an online survey of lesbians, gays and 
bisexuals— a non-random sample of 466 adult men and women age 18 to 74 in 37 states— 
strongly suggest that many non-heterosexuals' attitudes reflect neither a radical departure 
from core definitions of marriage, nor a rejection of traditional "family values," but instead 
signal an assimilationist position favorable to traditional marriage norms rather than a 
liberationist position critical of the institution. 
To explain commitment to assimilation among gays, lesbians and bisexuals, a "Pro-
Marriage Attitudes Scale" (PMAS) was developed from items currently used in various state 
surveys that measure values and attitudes indicating support or lack of support for more or 
less traditional marriage. Sequential regression on the PMAS yielded a model wherein the 
most powerful predictors of attitudes favorable to marriage were personal religious belief, 
a commitment to monogamy in practice, an expectation that marriage to a partner would 
improve quality of life, and a negative view of divorce (adjusted R2=37.5). Neither visibility, 
community participation, nor queer community integration appeared to influence scores on 
the PMAS. 
in 
Younger, less educated respondents tended to hold stronger pro-marriage attitudes. 
Assimilationist attitudes are more prevalent among homosexuals and men, while liberationist 
attitudes are more pronounced among bisexuals and women. Significant differences between 
bisexuals and individuals who are strictly "homosexual" emerged at all stages of analyses. 
In regression, "bisexual woman" predicted lower PMAS scores until education and political 
orientation were controlled in the final model. 
Results support the "conservative case" for same-sex marriage, which calls for assimilation 
of gays and lesbians into the US family system by extending the right to marry to same-sex 
couples. Findings suggest that assimilationist ideology already drives the movement toward 
marriage among gays and lesbians, and might be a latent function of the decades-long 
conservative promotion of traditional familism that idealizes marriage. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE QUEST FOR QUOTIDIAN 
Because some people have sex with people of the same sex, an entire 
culture has been created, broadly speaking, out of oppression. Which in 
a rational world would not be an issue. We hope we are moving toward 
a world where [sexual orientation] is not an issue, because we hate the 
idea of a gay ghetto. I think that it's a real shame that people become 
restricted by their sexuality or define their whole lives by their sexuality. 
—Neil Tennant of the pop duo, Pet Shop Boys, 
interviewed in The Advocate (Pope 2001) 
In the past several years, the question of whether to expand the definition of civil 
marriage to include same-sex couples has come to dominate political and cultural debates 
over discrimination against non-heterosexual people as well as the future of marriage and 
the family across the United States. Indeed, same-sex marriage appears to be a political 
and cultural lodestone, drawing gays and lesbians out of invisibility to fight for marriage 
equality while simultaneously pulling anti-gay activists into the streets in protest and 
pushing everyday Americans out of their lethargic and uncritical acceptance of marriage as 
an exclusively heterosexual privilege. At issue is the definition of marriage, insofar as that 
definition would specify who may marry whom, and whether such a union is deserving of 
the benefits associated witli being married. Unfortunately, same-sex couples in most states 
are treated as if their inclusion in marriage would radically redefine the institution, although 
the early 2000s have seen an increased willingness to recognize gay and lesbian relationships. 
Some believe that gays and lesbians should be satisfied with informal or limited recognition 
1 
of their intimate lives and loves—e.g., "living together," registered domestic partnerships, 
civil unions, etc.—but even the most generous interpretation of this position falls short of 
addressing the central issue of equality on which the case for same-sex marriage is built. 
Working from a basic definition offered by Wedgwood, marriage as a social institution is 
essentially a relationship characterized by "(1) sexual intimacy; (2) domestic and economic 
cooperation; and (3) a voluntary mutual commitment to sustaining" itself (1999:229). 
Loved ones and strangers alike arguably recognize marriage when they see it—even if they 
do not particularly approve—because it is "generally expected that couples participating in 
this institution would typically have a relationship of this kind" (Wedgwood 1999:230). 
Wedgwood argues that for gays and lesbians, marriage already exists if their relationships 
meet this basic definition, independent of any particular benefit from employers or the state. 
While social benefits may not be essential to a basic definition of marriage, in Wedgwood's 
view, it is not enough for couples who have sex together, live together, share finances, and 
intend to be together for the foreseeable future to simply say they are married and hope 
everyone accepts their claim. Wedgwood believes in the social power of that "little piece 
of paper." Marriage law specifies who is or can be married, lays out the responsibilities 
and obligations of spouses to one another and to the community, demands public 
acknowledgement of such relationships, and protects the families such relationships create— 
all of which fall outside the ability of an individual couple to define on their own in modern 
societies. 
Marriage must confer " marital status itself in order to activate the institution of marriage, 
its incumbent meanings and good intentions (Wedgwood 1999). Without legally recognized 
same-sex marriage, lesbian and gay relationships might be marriage-//^ in practice, but will 
remain inadequate substitutes for socially meaningful marriage, the institutionalized web 
of social bonds that has consistently integrated unrelated individuals, families and groups 
into stable, just communities. Without equal marital status, there is no marriage equality, 
and without marriage equality, full integration into the community or society is simply 
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not possible for lesbians, gays or other non-heterosexuals who might form non-traditional 
households. 
The Distance from Queer to There 
To date, marriage equality is a legal impossibility for same-sex couples in more than 
four-fifdis of the United States that make up 21st-century America, and the struggle for the 
right to marry remains an uphill battle everywhere. History and experience suggest there 
is a trajectory in the life course that all of us—straight and gay and otherwise—have been 
socialized at least to recognize, even if we do not all follow it to the letter. That trajectory 
is the "normal life," the cultural narrative that promises to us that sometime while we are 
going through our education, our careers, our lives, we will at some point meet someone, 
fall in love, live together, perhaps have children, and share a life. For heterosexuals (and 
many bisexuals), this narrative is called marriage. For gays and lesbians, it is a politically and 
historically elusive "red-letter day." 
For all of us, it is what I call the quotidian: the "normal" life we imagine for ourselves. 
Lesbians and gay men in several countries around the globe have been welcomed into 
the privileged club of the legally married, with little sustained fanfare or negative fallout 
for the family institution in those societies. Yet, in the United States, non-heterosexuals 
continue to be demonized for living outside traditional family structures as adults, for not 
conforming to the rules of compulsory heterosexuality (Rich 1983), for somehow being 
socially irresponsible or selfish because they are not straight and therefore undeserving of the 
pleasures and comforts of state-sanctioned family life. They are seen by many as perpetually 
single, even when they have been in long-term relationships for years, relationships that 
have been rendered invisible by homophobia and discrimination throughout the modern 
history of the United States. Today, lesbians and gays still face serious obstacles to starting 
families, regardless of where they live. Gay and lesbian people cannot legally form marriages 
or legitimate families in most states, which leaves them and their children vulnerable to 
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stigmatization and legal harassment, or even violence, than other citizens. Alternative 
paths to parenting are expensive if not illegal for many homosexual couples, although these 
obstacles are not necessarily faced by cohabiting heterosexual couples who can opt to legally 
tie the knot. 
The explicit exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage and other family-building 
processes arguably opens members of these families to greater threats of social, political 
and physical violence based on culturally-embedded prejudice against non-traditional and 
especially non-heterosexual identities. Despite these problems, the number of gay and lesbian 
families has been growing more or less steadily since the 1960s, along with other alternative 
family forms in the United States (Rosenfeld 2007). In these families today, many lesbians 
and gays already live their intimate lives in ways that mirror learned beliefs, values, and 
expectations traditionally associated with marriage. 
Visibility and Family Politics 
Compared to conditions three and four decades removed, the early years of the 21st 
century have been marked by dramatic changes in gay culture and in US culture at large. 
The increased visibility and tolerance of non-heterosexual individuals and couples in US 
society (Avery et al. 2007; Bernstein 2002; Green 2002; Loftus 2001; Seidman 2001) has 
precipitated a shift in political and cultural priorities among gays and lesbians for whom 
social acceptance as opposed to political tolerance is within reach. This study aims to provide an 
empirical account of these changes and the observed shift from a broad liberationist political 
program—which has characterized queer politics in the gay community for decades—toward 
a more narrow personal and political strategy of assimilation evinced by the struggles in 
various states over the right to legal marriage. I set out to discover whether non-heterosexual 
attitudes toward marriage and family would explain why legal marital status has become so 
desirable, and to determine which non-heterosexuals are most inclined to sympathize with 
the movement toward assimilation through marriage into the US family system. 
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Assuming the door to the closet is more or less permanently ajar, Americans can finally 
look past queer family politics into the private family lives of non-heterosexuals, their 
partners and dieir children (Lambert 2005). The openness of non-heterosexuals has blurred 
the once rock-hard line separating a devalued queer subculture from a dominant culture 
that privileges heterosexuality in all its institutions, including marriage and family. I will 
demonstrate that it is not clear at all that non-heterosexual people hold radically different 
values or concerns about family life than their heterosexual neighbors, friends, or family 
members. In fact, a number of non-heterosexual people hold values similar to those held 
by the majority of heterosexuals, and thus are concerned about many of the same issues 
regarding family life and public policy as their heterosexual siblings, friends and neighbors. 
Values, beliefs, and structure influence decision-making, stability, health, satisfaction 
and quality of life for individuals in families. More importantly, marriage itself has been 
demonstrated to be a relatively effective and highly desirable social arrangement that brings 
benefits to adult partners, their children and communities. The claim that gays and lesbians 
should be denied full marriage rights is often based on an assumption about an inherent 
and unalterable difference in values between the heterosexual majority and non-heterosexual 
minorities. More vehement and malicious opponents of same-sex marriage characterize this 
purported difference as moral deficiency on the part of non-heterosexuals and fuel anti-gay 
sentiment by decrying the "homosexual agenda" as a master plan to undermine the value 
structures and normative expectations that form the foundation of family life. 
There is no organized, anti-family "homosexual agenda" driving the same-sex marriage 
movement; rather, gays and lesbians are more visible in public life, more open with and 
about their families, and more vocal in their desire for legal and social equality. Collectively, 
lesbians and gays in the United States appear to be leaning toward assimilation, moving 
toward an understanding of marriage as an expression of both individual love and a 
human right (Howard-Hassmann 2001). Although marriage is not a universally popular 
goal among non-heterosexuals, the backlash against gay rights and same-sex marriage in 
5 
particular observed recently in California and across the country makes casting any trend 
toward assimilationist politics as "surrender" or "capitulation" tantamount to ignoring the 
cultural climate and political changes that have encouraged lesbians and gays to stand up and 
demand equality, to conceive personal futures more broadly, and in many cases to imagine a 
world where marriage and family-making is desirable, acceptable and finally, truly possible. 
Perhaps those who have welcomed their friends, sisters, brothers, daughters and sons into life 
"beyond the closet" have already recognized the pronounced similarities between the family 
headed by "Eve and Lillie" and the more traditional family of "Roger and Evelyn," and have 
come to understand that the practical differences between "Adam and Steve" and "Adam and 
Eve" are probably more imagined than real. 
A Test of the Conservative Case 
"Same-sex relationships have been an integral part of the kinship system, household 
economies and iconography of many societies," writes Barry D. Adam, but "In the 
contemporary advanced industrial societies of the West, the conceptualization of same-sex 
relationship is remarkably underdeveloped, both in scholarship and the public imagination" 
(2004:267). Few researchers have tested the "conservative case" for same-sex marriage (see 
Sullivan 1995), that is, whether the movement toward integration into the traditional family 
system through the well-established institution of marriage is a result of a demonstrated 
commitment to traditional US familism, or to values that have long been deemed "traditional 
family values." The dearth of empirical research on the attitudes and values of lesbian and gay 
individuals—and particularly those in families and intimate relationships (Allen and Demo 
1995)—has encouraged sympathetic advocates to rely, perhaps too heavily, on historical 
analogy, appeals to common sense or norms of justice to fashion arguments in favor of same-
sex marriage. Consider comments by Jonathan Rauch: 
For eons, human communities have favored more marriage over less. 
They have believed that marriage is a powerful stabilizing force: that it 
disciplines and channels crazymaking love and troublemaking libido; that 
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stability and discipline are socially beneficial, even precious. Communities 
everywhere believe this, and everywhere they have been right. (2004:80) 
There is little empirical evidence to suggest that same-sex marriage will not bring many of the 
same social and individual benefits as heterosexual marriage, although in fairness, sociologists 
and other social scientists do not yet know whether this is true. Research on what marriage 
actually means to those who are affected by its unavailability, or those who would be affected 
if marriage were among their choices for giving meaning to their lives and loves is in short 
supply. While we know that marriage implies a host of government and social benefits 
unavailable to the unmarried generally and unavailable to same-sex couples specifically, 
we do not know with any degree of precision how the non-heterosexual population in the 
United States actually sees marriage. Are members of this population really "anti-family," as 
opponents claim, or do they hold attitudes toward marriage that closely resemble attitudes 
held by heterosexuals? If their attitudes toward marriage are similar to heterosexuals', then it 
is necessary to explain that similarity. Differences in attitudes toward marriage also warrant 
empirical investigation and explanation. Both might help predict the shape of family and 
family policy in the future. 
Sociological understanding of the shift from liberationist rhetoric and ideology to a 
strategy of assimilation into the US family system through marriage is critical to securing 
full equality for lesbians, gays, bisexuals and others whose status as non-heterosexuals has 
been the basis for denying them not only the civil rights inherent in citizenship, but the 
human rights to which they are entitled by nothing less than their existence. It is not enough 
to assume that individuals and groups with shared values or customs simply have those 
things in common; better to acknowledge that people purposefully generate the realities and 
relationships in which they live (Morgan 1996), including families. If homosexuals who want 
to marry hold values more similar than not to those held by their heterosexual peers, and 
if they are living their family lives based on those same normative values to the extent it is 
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possible, then it makes very little sense to continue to deny members of this group access to 
marriage equality (Wedgwood 1999). 
Overview of the Study 
Marriage rights for homosexuals have been the subject of intense political activism and 
discussion among pundits, commentators and scholars for several years. While "the heated 
debates about same-sex marriage are focused largely on the probable social effects of same-
sex marriage, civil unions, and similar legal recognitions of homosexual pairings" (Glenn 
2004:25), there may in fact be little cause for alarm. What research there is on same-sex 
families tends to confirm that at this point in history, there are few practical differences 
between heterosexual couples and same-sex couples (Kurdek 2004, 2005, 2006; Patterson 
2000; Carrington 1999) even when these couples have children (Peplau and Beals 2004), and 
regardless of whether the couples are married or cohabiting. In his review of the literature 
on same-sex couples, Kurdek (2005) points out that apart from negotiations of domestic 
division of labor and perceptions of relationship support, married couples and same-sex 
couples are more similar than not when it comes to satisfaction, stability and conflict in 
relationships. While their families might be isolated from key support systems, and they may 
manage their households based on a logic other than gender, it seems clear that same-sex-
headed households operate more or less the same way as the households of their different-sex 
counterparts who have the benefit of socially and legally recognized marriage. 
My research is designed to augment previous research, to help explain why same-
sex couples appear to be so similar to heterosexual couples in die first place, and to offer 
a prediction that the movement to embrace assimilationist values might result in more 
such findings in future research on lesbian and gay families. I use survey data to describe 
relationships and family structures, social networks and community integration of non-
heterosexuals and to measure values and "pro-marriage" attitudes among gays, lesbians and 
other non-heterosexuals. I attempt to identify the forces and experiences that influence 
individuals to embrace the movement to secure marriage rights for same-sex couples after 
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decades of liberationist politics that put marriage far lower on die list of priorities. I want 
to understand why marriage has become so important, and to whom among the diverse 
population of gay, lesbians and bisexual people marriage really matters. Why has this human 
community decided that more marriage is better than less, and what does that mean for the 
future of the family in the United States? 
The Quest for Quotidian Online Survey 
Quest for Quotidian is based on data collected via an online survey conducted between 
January and May, 2006, after approval of the research protocol (OPRS# 0510-1773) on 
December 8, 2005, by the Social/Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board at the 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Subsequent modifications to the protocol to adjust the 
sampling methods were approved in January and March. Data collection began January 17 
and ended May 31, 2006, when the online survey was closed to new respondents. 
The Quest for Quotidian survey was a custom-designed multi-path, response-driven 
online interview hosted on at http://www.socioscape.com/research behind a Secure Server 
Link (SSL) certificate. The programmed questionnaire included more than 150 substantive 
questions—including matrix questions to accommodate multi-item scales—displayed 
across more than 100 individual pages or "screens." Unlike self-administered paper surveys, 
the online questionnaire is flexible and responsive to participants, and allows researchers 
to simulate an interview survey by probing respondents for additional and clarifying 
information when their responses require it. For instance, when respondents reported having 
been married before, the survey displayed questions pertaining to prior marriages and 
captured whether the prior partner was of the same or different sex, how long the previous 
marriage lasted, and whether the marriage ended in death or divorce. Similar paths were 
constructed to capture alternative relationship histories, including civil unions and domestic 
partnerships. Single, never-married respondents did not see such questions. 
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Among the measures taken were relationship status, relationship history, relationship 
quality (e.g., Booth, Johnson, and Edwards 1983), relationship satisfaction (Winston 
et. al 1999), commitment (Stanley and Markman 1992) and expectations for marriage 
(McLanahan et al. 2003) for coupled individuals. I collected data on parental status and 
the children of gay and lesbian parents, including children's ages, the nature and quality 
of relationships between respondent and children, custody arrangements and children's 
residence, and satisfaction with parent-child relationships. The survey captured living 
arrangements and household structure, as well as power relations within households (e.g., 
by determining home ownership or primary financial responsibility for home or apartment). 
Items measuring levels of family support for the respondent and, when applicable, his or her 
primary relationship (adapted from the questionnaire used in Johnson et al. 2001), social 
support from friends and the community, die size and character of friendship networks 
(Social Capital Benchmark Community Survey, 2000), neighborhood and community 
characteristics and levels of satisfaction with home and community (Milligan et al. 2006; Pew 
Research Center 1997; Perkins 1985) were also included. Several measures of physical and 
psychological wellbeing were included in the questionnaire. Frequency of smoking, alcohol 
and drug use, exercise, and quality of diet were measured to develop a "healthy lifestyle" 
scale. To assess psychological well-being, I measured self-esteem (Rosenberg 1965) and 
mastery or empowerment as well (see Pearlin et. al 1981). 
In addition to standard demographic data (age, gender, education, race, ethnicity, 
income, etc.), items also capture religiosity (currently, and in family of origin), a limited 
marital history of respondents' parents, education of respondents' parents, current political 
orientation, and current or past military service. The design view of the online survey 
questionnaire shows all survey items, and is included in its entirety in the appendix. 
Individual respondents saw only those questions and screens applicable to them based on 
prior responses. Depending upon the answers the respondent provided, the survey took 
between 35 and 50 minutes to complete. 
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Online data collection strategies and web-based surveys are both popular and relatively 
inexpensive, have other advantages over more traditional surveys, including lower response 
times, flexibility in presentation and format, richer information about participants' 
interaction with the survey, and in many cases increased efficiency and accuracy because 
respondents enter data directly into databases, thereby eliminating intermediate data 
processing steps increase the chance of errors (see discussion in Granello and Wheaton 
2004). Web-based surveys of various types are especially useful to gaining access to hard-
to-reach or marginalized populations, including lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender 
groups, who arguably might "use the Internet in disproportionately greater numbers" than 
heterosexuals generally (Riggle, Rostosky, and Reedy 2005:2). Although there are limitations 
to web-based research, particularly with regard to sampling procedures, response rates and 
representativeness (Granello and Wheaton 2004), some researchers have found that when 
these limitations are adequately addressed in research design, findings from web-based 
research appear to be consistent with findings from traditional research (Gosling et al. 2004; 
Whittier, Seeley, and St. Lawrence 2004). 
Research urges caution, however, when using established measures in internet 
research. Psychologists and sociologists must be cognizant of sample differences as well as 
measurement equivalence when translating scales and other measures from traditional paper-
and-pencil formats to web-based questionnaires. Barbeite and Weiss (2004) demonstrated 
that some measures might need to be modified for the online environment and internet 
samples to preserve the validity of some scales. In a specific example addressing measurement 
equivalence, Vispoel, Boo and Bleiler (2001) found that results from the Rosenberg Self-
Esteem Scale used in this survey were not significandy influenced by the mode of delivery; 
that is, the web-based version of the scale worked as well as the traditional paper-and-pencil 
version. Although more research is needed on the efficacy of measurement and ultimate 
utility of online data collection strategies and procedures, the web-based survey remains in 
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my estimation a powerful tool for gathering information from lesbian, gay and other non-
heterosexual individuals. 
Sampling and Recruitment 
The ubiquity of non-heterosexual characters and themes in mainstream media 
representations—such as television's "Ellen," "Will & Grace," "The L-Word," "Queer as 
Folk," "Six Feet Under" and the more recent "Brothers & Sisters;" or popular films like 
"Milk," "Brokeback Mountain," or "TransAmerica"— overstate the degree of integration 
of gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender people into American social life. Ironically, these 
representations often elide the marginalization experienced by non-heterosexual individuals 
in the United States at the same time lesbian and gay people are increasingly visible precisely 
because of the public struggle to secure equal rights for themselves and their families. It is still 
largely true that "lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals are outnumbered and despised" (Sherrill 
1996: 469) by many, and for many reasons remain a uniquely marginalized, relatively hard-
to-reach population for survey researchers: 
Gay people, by virtue of being born into a diaspora, are not highly 
concentrated geographically. More important, identity is not transmitted 
within the family. Unlike almost all other demographic groups, gay people 
are unique by virtue of being minorities within their own families and by 
virtue of going through childhood socialization experiences designed to make 
them the opposite of what they are. That is, almost all gay people are born 
into heterosexual homes, are imbued with heterosexual norms—including 
the belief that heterosexuality is superior to homosexuality and, perhaps, 
the belief that homosexuality is deviant and morally inferior behavior—and 
are expected to act as if they were heterosexual. (Sherrill 1996:469) 
Non-heterosexuals remain, in the 21st century, a "hidden" population to demographers 
and social researchers, both as a consequence of historical prejudice and institutional 
discrimination, and because of the tendency of researchers and ethics boards to perpetuate 
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stereotypes of lesbians, gays, and bisexuals as criminal or deviant, to relegate them to the 
margins populated by straight men on the "down low" (men who have sex with men), IV 
drug users, homeless people with HIV or other maladies, and other groups usually deemed 
to be suspect because they might engage in behaviors that have an adverse affect on public 
health or safety. Under the guise of "protecting" non-heterosexuals, we often force them back 
into the closet where research is concerned, and in doing so fail to recognize that many gay 
and lesbian individuals are not living on the margins, but are living publicly, in the open, and 
without the shame or stigma implied by tlie status of "hidden population." Nevertheless, this 
study proceeds from the assumption that non-heterosexuals technically constitute a hidden 
population, which largely determined the sampling techniques used. 
Hidden populations present unique problems for survey researchers, primarily because of 
the inability to construct a sampling frame from which to draw a random sample that allows 
estimation of population parameters. Consequently, most studies of hidden or hard-to-reach 
populations rely on some form of chain-referral or "snowball" sample, which are non-random 
and usually convenience samples. Initially, Quest for Quotidian was designed to incorporate 
a version of "respondent-driven sampling," or RDS (Salganik and Heckathorn 2004; 
Heckathorn 2002), adapted for use with a web-based survey, an approach that has since been 
validated (Wejnert and Heckathorn 2008). In RDS, network ties between respondents are 
specified and captured in the data, which allows researchers to generalize from the sample to 
the social network, and from the social network to the population with a higher degree of 
statistical validity than in similar studies relying on other non-random sampling techniques 
(Salganik and Heckathorn 2004:200). This approach was used in this research design to 
bolster die defense of my findings about non-heterosexuals against common criticisms of 
sampling bias that plagues most studies based on non-random samples. Unfortunately, 
I was unable to resolve the conflict between the data requirements of RDS and a dictate 
of the Institutional Review Board at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas, that effectively 
prohibited me from linking cases to one another without putting an undue burden on survey 
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participants. The attempt to follow the recommendations of the IRB caused the recruitment 
chains to collapse altogether, and without the ability to capture social network data, RDS was 
abandoned in favor of more traditional non-random sampling techniques. 
Participants were recruited in a number of ways. The earliest respondents were recruited 
directly by email after having agreed to serve as "seeds" for the chain-referral sample. Once 
the RDS strategy was retired, these seed participants were sent another email asking them to 
pass along a call for participation to friends they believe might be interested in completing 
the survey. Flyers calling for participation in the research were distributed alongside free 
publications placed in gay-owned or gay-friendly businesses in various locations in southern 
California and in Nevada. Flyers were also distributed by volunteers during the Gay Pride 
celebration in Las Vegas in 2005. Online, I obtained permission from forum moderators 
to post calls for participation in gay-oriented discussion groups on social networking sites, 
including the popular MySpace.com and Friendster.com. In addition to social networking 
sites, I sent email invitations to openly gay or lesbian authors of various weblogs, or "blogs," 
asking them to participate and pass along the request to people they knew or to their friends. 
Many bloggers chose to post a link to the online survey on their blogs, although I did not 
ask them to do so, and a number of respondents came to the survey via those links. All 
respondents who attempted the survey and entered an email address were sent a request to 
pass along the link and call for participants to their friends, but there is no way to track the 
success of that initiative. Whenever possible, I contacted participants whose responses were 
incomplete via email and urged them to complete the survey. Several did in fact return and 
completed the online questionnaire. When the survey closed on May 31, 2005, a total of 699 
attempted responses had been entered into the database, including more than 50 responses 
from individuals in ten countries outside the United States. The final sample analyzed in this 
work includes 466 cases, exclusive of responses from outside the US, incomplete responses, 
and disqualified cases. 
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Measuring Attitudes Toward Marriage 
At the heart of the survey were items taken from various surveys about marriage 
conducted by researchers seeking to establish the strength of marriage in the United States 
(Glenn 2005; Hawkins et al. 2002; Johnson et al. 2001). Also included in the survey are 
items modified from accepted measures of support for marriage. They were adapted to 
measure attitudes toward specifically homosexual relationships and the contexts in which 
they exist. 
Assessing attitudes toward marriage as positive or negative requires a starting point, 
namely the assumption that marriage is in fact "good" for men, women, children and 
society. This starting point is provided in popular and scholarly discourse by advocates 
for the defense of traditional marriage, who tend to believe that marriage—and by 
extension, the family system—has been weakened by changes in the cultural and political 
landscape (Blankenhorn 2007; Nock 2005; Cherlin 2004; Wake and Gallagher 2000; 
Whitehead 1998; see also Whitehead and Popenoe 2004-2008). Some of these changes 
have long histories. For example, the ascendance of individualism in US culture and society 
(particularly in jurisprudence) has long been viewed by many as a development detrimental 
to traditional marriage (see Bellah et al. 1996), and indeed to the bonds that ought to 
exist between married people (see Blankenhorn 1996, 2007). Associated with the rise of 
individualism are the changing status of women and consequent changes in domestic and 
work role expectations for women and men, the turn toward no-fault divorce, the increase 
in single-parenting and out-of-wedlock childbirth, increasing acceptance of cohabitation 
over marriage, and the acceptance of non-heterosexual people in increasingly visible public 
and private social roles. Logically, we can assume that attitudes favorable to marriage are 
somewhat conservative attitudes that more or less reflect a commitment to or belief in the 
historical and traditional functions of marriage and family. Such "pro-marriage" attitudes 
would not be radically divergent from traditional norms, nor from definitions of what we 
might call traditional family values. 
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Among those studying the strength of support for marriage in the general population, 
there is a relatively clear consensus about which attitudes are more or less favorable to the 
institution (Brumbaugh et al. 2008; Herzog 2008; Cherlin 2004; Glenn 2001; Whitehead 
1998; Johnson et al. 2001; Nock 1995, 2005; see discussion in Stacey 1996). For example, 
strong support for monogamy or fidelity is interpreted as more favorable to marriage than 
weak support of same (Glenn 2005; Wake and Gallagher 2000). An expressed or implied 
preference for marriage over cohabitation is likewise viewed as more favorable to marriage 
(Bowman 2004). Attitudes that imply or express belief in marriage as an "ideal" family 
structure—the best structure in which to raise children, or the best way to ensure social 
support for families—clearly fail to challenge either the role of the institution or the promises 
marriage makes to the family system. Dissatisfaction or discomfort with divorce, either as an 
individual choice or a social problem, might also be interpreted as an attitude favorable to 
what we understand "marriage" is or ought to be. 
These attitudes tell a somewhat one-sided story about marriage in die United States, 
however. First, most researchers examining attitudes toward marriage are concerned about 
the health and stability of the institution as it is traditionally understood, e.g., an institution 
that legitimizes heterosexual sexual activity through norms of monogamy, and organizes 
childrearing, economic activities and social responsibilities more or less according to the 
negotiated gender ideology shared by participants. Working from such a definition, it 
makes sense to survey only those individuals who are already married, as well as those who 
can reasonably expect to marry in the future. Thus, participants in survey research on the 
strength of marriage are almost certainly overwhelmingly heterosexual, and very likely will be 
currently married or divorced from a previous marriage. 
Given that non-heterosexuals constitute a relatively small minority in the population, 
the dominance of heterosexuals in such surveys is neither surprising nor problematic, at 
least at first glance. What is problematic is the potentially systematic exclusion of non-
heterosexuals, and gay and lesbian people in particular: individuals who do hold attitudes 
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toward marriage but whose inability to marry now or failure to marry earlier in their lives 
might necessarily disqualify them from full participation in such research. Even when their 
voices are included, it seems likely that lesbian and gay attitudes toward marriage will be 
"less favorable" on average than those of heterosexuals either because (1) they have never 
been married or experienced the benefits, community recognition and affirmation, or family 
support associated with married life; (2) they cannot foresee or even seriously imagine legal 
marriage in dieir future; or (3) they have already left or came out within an unsatisfying or 
unhappy heterosexual marriage. By assuming that "traditional" marriage—which excludes 
most non-heterosexuals—is the measuring stick for a "strong" marriage culture, researchers 
are likely, if not bound, to interpret attitudes that express ambivalence toward this definition 
as evidence that marriage is becoming "weaker," or as Cherlin (2004) argues, increasingly 
"deinstitutionalized." Attitudes of gays and lesbians, if they are counted at all, are thus more 
likely presumed to be "less favorable" toward marriage and family. If they are not counted, 
non-heterosexuals are assumed to hold less favorable attitudes toward marriage simply 
because they are not participating in it. This situation would suggest that much research 
might enable and exacerbate scapegoating among anti-gay activists, who use findings from 
such studies to bolster claims that non-heterosexuals are at least partially to blame for the 
steady "deinstitutionalization" of marriage observed in the US family system over the past 
several decades. 
Rather than misrepresent the strength of non-heterosexual attitudes toward marriage, 
or dismiss out-of-hand the very idea that lesbians, bisexuals or gay men might value certain 
key aspects of traditional marriage, in this study I isolate and measure values and attitudes of 
non-heterosexuals that indicate support for marriage as we know the institution today, that 
is, as it is defined for heterosexuals in the general population. This attitudinal "support for 
marriage," however, is not the same as support for same-sex marriage, or for extending the 
rights and responsibilities of marriage to a sexually marginalized segment of the population. 
Some members of the non-heterosexual population might accept the basic principles and 
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definition of the institution as a guiding set of ideals for the conduct of intimate relationships 
in their own lives, but many of these same people might reject these values and beliefs if they 
interpret same-sex marriage as an imposition of social control onto non-heterosexuals as a 
group. In this study, I attempt to correct at least a few of the possible deficiencies in studies 
of attitudes toward marriage by focusing on the attitudes held by gay, lesbian and bisexual 
people. That the degree of support for the ideologically "traditional" marriage is probably 
lower among non-heterosexuals than among heterosexuals is not in dispute. Neither would I 
deny that a significant segment of the "queer" population might find marriage undesirable or 
unpalatable, politically or personally—such positions are well articulated in the literature and 
in contemporary cultural discourse (Stacey 2004; Weeks, Heaphy and Donovan 2001; Lehr 
1999; Struening 1999; Warner 1999; Berlant and Warner 1998; Ettelbrick 1992). 
Analyses 
The analyses of survey data was conducted using the Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS), version 11.5. The results of my research include a detailed profile of 
single individuals and people in both different-sex and same-sex relationships—intimate 
partnerships and unions tliat are "marriage-like" in all ways but one. One of the elements of 
that profile is a description of the values held by gays, lesbians and bisexuals toward marriage, 
values which opponents of marriage equality often claim are fundamentally different 
from the values held by the majority of heterosexuals. Because political debates and ballot 
initiatives across the country often center on whether "the gays" and the culture they enact is 
worthy of the benefits of marriage, a major contribution of this research is the identification 
of some of the characteristics and social forces that distinguish non-heterosexuals who hold 
strong "pro-marriage" attitudes from those who hold weaker attitudes toward the institution. 
The Organization of this Book 
This book is organized into eight chapters, including this introductory chapter and the 
concluding chapter in which I discuss implications of my findings, themes tfiat emerged in 
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the research, ways to improve research on same-sex couples and their families, and questions 
warranting future research. 
Social Contexts 
Chapters Two and Three address in more detail the ideological and legal contexts in 
which debates over same-sex marriage and the family are occurring. Chapter Two explains 
the intellectual and political divides between assimilationist and liberationist ideologies, as 
well as the divisive influence of anti-gay rhetoric from the "religious right" and other social 
conservatives that has influenced the cultural discourse on gay rights generally and marriage 
rights particularly. I examine familism in the United States, specify the elements of "pro-
marriage" ideology, and outline concerns about the changing structure and culture of family 
life in die United States. These include sexual concerns about monogamy and commitment, 
the concern over stability of two-parent families, the negative effects of divorce, the 
differential benefits and detriments of marriage and cohabitation. In Chapter Three, I 
examine the recent history and evolution of gay and marriage rights in the US law against the 
backdrop of resistance enshrined by fundamentalist Christian activism in anti-gay rhetoric 
and propaganda, or the so-called "homosexual agenda." Despite repeated attempts by anti-
gay forces to spark moral panics in various states and communities, social acceptance of gay 
people and same-sex marriage appears to be progressing steadily in the courts, legislatures 
and in public opinion. Overall, these chapters describe the various ways by which historical 
change in the family institution is interpreted by scholars and public opinion leaders, and 
suggests that while critiques of same-sex marriage from both the right and the left are still 
relevant, it is assimiliationist ideology that is carrying the day, and generating a new model 
for understanding the current state of family in the United States. 
Descriptive Data: The Quest for Quotidian Sample 
Chapters Four and Five describe the sample in some detail, beginning with a discussion 
of how non-heterosexuals identify themselves and are identified by researchers. In Chapter 
Four, I describe the geographic distribution of the sample, and trace patterns in the data 
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regarding age and "coming out," or disclosing sexual identity, to friends, family and the 
community. Data on the family lives and family histories of non-heterosexuals are examined 
in Chapter Five. In this chapter, information about respondents' childhood—including their 
parents' marriage, education levels, and religiosity—is discussed, along with current religious 
belief and practice, relationship and parental status, friendship networks and family support, 
and community and political involvement. 
Assimilation or Liberation? Analysis 
of Attitudes Toward Marriage 
In Chapter Six, I report descriptive findings from the survey on various attitudes 
considered "pro-marriage," namely that marriage is socially relevant, permanent and 
enduring; that marriage is essential to rearing healthy children, and that children derive 
benefits from marriage; that marriage is a serious commitment; that monogamy is central 
to marriage; and that divorce is a social problem that ought to be addressed. Patterns and 
frequencies in the data are reported. The attitude measures described independently in 
Chapter Six are combined to form a Pro-Marriage Attitudes Scale (PMAS), which captures 
the strength of support for more or less traditional marriage among members of the sample, 
and serves as a proxy for commitment to assimiliationist ideology. In Chapter Seven, I 
explore several hypotheses about the social forces and conditions that predict PMAS scores, 
and develop a regression model that partially explains the strength of marriage expressed by 
non-heterosexuals, as well as the impetus behind the movement toward assimilation among 
lesbians and gay men. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
IDEOLOGICAL POSITIONS ON 
SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 
The arguments for and against expanding marital rights and benefits to same-sex couples 
and their families fit neatly into established models of family change and family politics that 
fall along continua variously described as "conservative" to "liberal" (Glenn 2000; Benokraitis 
2000), "prohibitionist" to "liberationist" (Sullivan 1995), "assimilationist" to "liberationist" 
(Seidman 2001, 2002), "assimilationist" to "radical" (Yep, Lovaas and Elia 2003), and even 
the less charitable "suits" and "sluts" (Shepard 2002). Conservatives continue to argue against 
changing the definition of marriage, claiming that doing so would only further weaken the 
moral fabric of the country and create a larger economic burden on the state to support 
what some have called the "special rights" of homosexuals and other marginalized groups. 
In this research I follow Seidman's relatively benign characterization of the ideological 
positions in public opinion and policy debates, and describe support for same-sex marriage as 
assimilationist, and opposition to same-sex marriage as liberationist among non-heterosexuals. 
The relatively recent emergence of real possibilities to extend marriage rights to 
homosexuals was somewhat an historical and political surprise, marking a significant shift in 
priorities within the queer body politic: 
Since the Stonewall rebellion of 1969, two generations of gay activists 
have pushed for a variety of policies to benefit LGBT Americans— 
including laws against employment discrimination, the abolition of 
sodomy laws, hate-crimes statutes that explicitly protect LGBT people, 
resources to prevent and treat breast cancer and AIDS, and domestic 
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partner benefits. By contrast, the right to a state-sanctioned marriage 
had until recently only rarely appeared on the agenda of either grassroots 
activist groups or the so-called boardroom gay rights organizations 
like the Human Rights Campaign. (Egan and Sherrill 2005:229) 
Despite its seemingly sudden appearance in the 1990s, same-sex marriage is not quite 
the dark horse on the queer political horizon some would have us believe. Rather, the surge 
of interest in marriage among gays and lesbians is better understood as the ascendance of 
an assimilationist political goal long abandoned by leaders of the gay liberation movement 
to languish while a more workable public agenda formed around liberationist ideologies. 
Seidman's (2002) discussion of the political debates within the gay and lesbian community 
reveals familiar contradictions and divisions among activists that undercut the stereotype of 
a unified "queer nation" with a purely liberal or "anti-family" agenda. Seidman notes that 
activists have historically taken one of two positions on gay marriage (see also Lehr 1999). 
A relatively conservative assimiliationist position, reminiscent of liberal feminism, advocates 
full legal recognition of gay and lesbian equality, citing the right to marry as a path toward 
integration, and away from economic exploitation (see Eskridge 1996), alienation and 
discrimination (see Sullivan 1995, 2004). Alternatively, the liberationist position interprets 
marriage as an inherently flawed heterosexist institution better abandoned than embraced 
by a sexual minority whose relative powerlessness and collective identity are maintained 
respectively by exclusion from and resistance to normative notions of marriage and family. 
Warner (1999) questions why marriage rights appeared on the gay political horizon at 
all, when for so many years leaders and organizations had ignored the sticky question of gay 
marriage based on earlier criticism of marriage and family by activists and scholars in the 
gay civil rights movement, as well as more pressing contemporary issues in the 1980s such 
as HIV/AIDS prevention and treatment, and legal persecution on sodomy laws. In her read 
of Carl Wittman's liberationist-oriented A Gay Manifesto (1971), Lehr notes the hostility of 
early homosexual activism toward "family values," which were viewed as "harmful to gay and 
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lesbian lives" and "remain now harmful to other social groups as well, because these family 
values are embedded in maintaining a social organization that privileges a few" (Lehr 1999: 
45). Maintaining a sense of difference—sexual and social—is crucial to the gay liberationist 
project, according to Warner, who characterizes marriage as granting "selective legitimacy" 
to some couples at the expense of others (1999:82), a limiting and limited social institution 
based on heterosexist norms of prejudice and discrimination, which queer politics can 
and should continue to resist. Goss (1997) speaks of "appropriation of the term family" to 
describe what Weeks, Heaphy and Donovan (2001) interpret as reluctance to abandon the 
liberationist critique among even "the most passionate theoretical advocates" (Weeks et al. 
2001:16) for gay marriage rights. 
Weeks et al. (2001) describe assimilationist political activism aimed at guaranteeing 
partnership and family rights for same-sex couples as an international phenomenon, the 
goals of which Stonewall, a British lobby, codified as part of their mission in the late 
1990s. "Two of the 'five key challenges of [Stonewall's] equality agenda focus on equal 
recognition and respect for same sex partners; and equal recognition and respect for lesbian 
and gay parents and their children" (Stonewall 1997, cited in Weeks et al. 2001:3). What 
is important about the rise of assimilationist queer politics is its relatively conservative slant 
on a classically liberal problem: full citizenship in participatory democracy. Sullivan (1989) 
argue even earlier, for instance, that "much of the gay leadership clings to notions of gay life 
as essentially outsider, antibourgeois, radical. Marriage, for them, is co-optation into straight 
society," a position that Sullivan contends ignores the subject position of the gay or lesbian 
people as citizens, or as Seidman (2002) puts it, sexual citizens. Gays and lesbians, from 
Seidman's perspective, live within a state-sanctioned sexual hierarchy that punishes alternative 
sexual identities and practices perceived to be "immoral and dangerous to society. Bad 
sexual citizens become the targets of social control, which may include public stereotyping, 
harassment, violence, criminalization, and disenfranchisement" (Seidman 2002:172). Not 
surprisingly, "sex laws and policies are guided by a norm of the good sexual citizen," writes 
23 
Seidman, and "the good sexual citizen was most definitely heterosexual" (Seidman 2002:172-
3). Except in terms of entitlement to basic human rights associated with citizenship, how else 
is the contradiction of pro-marriage activism on the part of gay assimiliationists explained? 
Seidman offers that so many among the most "libertine" groups of individuals wish to 
partake in one of the most "conservative" forms of social interaction and structure in order to 
transform themselves from bad to good sexual citizens, but full citizens overall. 
Liberal Gay Politics as Resistance 
Liberationists, however, were not silent on family issues or on what were perceived as the 
dangers of trying to effect change from within institutional structures. Moral panics, some 
warned, were an ever-present threat to the cautious gains in social status and acceptance 
credited to assimilationist politics (Warner 1999), precisely because sexual politics were 
only palatable when they were divorced from the lived reality of the sexual practices of 
marginalized groups: 
Theodor Adorno, the great German philosopher who spent many 
years in America after fleeing Nazi Germany, was able to say as early 
as 1962 that attempts to reform the regulation of sex had "something 
venerably suffragette-like about them." But, he went on, people fool 
themselves about progress. Sexual taboos have not fallen away at all. 
"Whereas sexuality has been integrated, diat which cannot be integrated, 
the actual spiciness of sex, continues to be detested by society." In 
fact, Adorno thought that this was true not despite the new premium 
on sexual expression, but because of it. (Warner 1999:21-22) 
Warner is among those critics who suggest that assimilation of queer identities requires 
subordination of those identities—expressed through sexual practices and emotional 
orientation toward members of die same sex—to the same institutionalized norms and 
patterns that serve as the bases for discrimination against non-heterosexual people. Read 
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this way, the "don't ask, don't tell" policy in the US military is not just a bump on the road 
to a more tolerant future. From the liberationist perspective, such policies are the future of 
assimilationist activism: the institutionalization of the closet for queer individuals. 
The fears of liberationists are similar to those from the ranks of radical and socialist 
feminism, whose criticisms of both conservative and liberal positions on social change 
point insistently toward the failure of classical liberalism to acknowledge the persistent 
prejudice and inequality embedded in social relations and power structures, including those 
in contemporary democratic societies. "The extension of marriage and family rights" in 
particular, according to Lehr (1999:14), "to gays and lesbians would serve to foreclose serious 
questioning of the values embedded within current understandings of marriage and family. 
Such foreclosure would mean that the extension of rights will have taken away the possibility 
of enhancing freedom." Lehr calls for recognition that progress does not come free, while 
Warner pessimistically reminds us that a discourse of dissent continues to exist, even within 
social systems moving toward progressive changes. As Cell (1999) observed regarding the 
reactionary emergence of racial segregation and apartheid, it appears the closer gays and 
lesbians get to securing equality for themselves and their families, the more palpable the risk 
of devastating backlash from the enemies of a family culture redefined by freedom. 
Conservative Perspectives on Family Change 
Mobilization for and against family change has been active for years, and certainly 
predates current particular controversies, including same-sex marriage. Throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s, the family was a contentious topic among scholars and policymakers worried 
about high divorce rates, non-marital cohabitation, domestic violence, single motherhood, 
and the welfare of children. Broadly speaking, family reforms and implementation of 
progressive policies were proceeding apace during this period, often tempered by the rational 
criticisms emanating from scholars farther to the right. 
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There was by no means a simple "bifurcation" of the debate, however. Glenn notes 
that "no division into conservatives versus liberals or any similar dichotomous distinction 
fully captures the complexity of the factions and schools of thought" on the causes and 
consequences of family change (2000:2). Benokraitis (2000) offers a helpful typology 
summarizing the perspectives that dominated "family wars" in recent decades. Benokraitis' 
four models of family change—conservative, centrist, liberal and feminist—serve as a basis 
for understanding how interpretations of family problems and their proposed solutions 
might be distributed across the political and sociological spectra. 
The conservative and centrist models, which offer more pessimistic interpretations of 
family change, are often characterized as a backlash, a yearning for maintenance of traditions 
that perpetuated inequality and which were no longer workable or desirable solutions to 
the problems of contemporary family life. Historian Stephanie Coontz in particular argued 
in her influential book, The Way We Never Were: American Families and the Nostalgia Trap 
(1992), that the popular history of family is largely imaginary, and that the comfort derived 
from what was perceived as the "traditional family" of the past is no more than an ideological 
illusion: 
Like most visions of a "golden age," the "traditional family" ... evaporates 
on closer examination. It is an ahistorical amalgam of structures, values and 
behaviors that never coexisted in the same time and place. The notion that 
traditional families fostered intense intimacy between husbands and wives 
while creating mothers who were totally available to their children, for 
example, is an idea that combines some characteristics of the white, middle 
class family in the mid-nineteenth century and some of a rival family ideal 
first articulated in the 1920s. The first family revolved emotionally around the 
mother-child axis, leaving the husband-wife relationship stilted and formal. 
The second focused on an eroticized couple relationship, demanding that 
mothers curb emotional "overinvestment" in their children. The hybrid idea 
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that a woman can be fully absorbed with her youngsters while simultaneously 
maintaining passionate sexual excitement with her husband was a 1950s 
invention that drove thousands of women to therapists, tranquilizers, 
or alcohol when they actually tried to live up to it. (Coontz 1992:9) 
Those who disagreed with feminist or liberal interpretations of family change, who 
argued that decline in morality or values was the cause of family problems, or who argued 
that some changes to the family might be detrimental or even dangerous to individuals and 
society were seen to be suffering from a politically-motivated form of "nostalgia." Scholars 
like David Popenoe and Norval Glenn, and social critics like Barbara Dafoe Whitehead and 
David Blankenhorn, were cast as ideologues (Stacey 2004) whose critiques of family change 
from both institutional and developmental perspectives—analyses of benefits of marriage 
to men and women; deleterious effects of divorce on individual and family well-being, and 
on children's outcomes; the changing meanings of parenthood and the diminution of the 
importance of fathers; negative consequences of an emergent "divorce culture," etc.—should 
be dismissed by "progressives" as uptight indictments of feminist understanding of family 
issues, reflecting the conservative values and patriarchal commitments of the ruling cultural 
elite. 
It is true that scholars and commentators leaning to the right tended to advocate some 
restraint in the implementation of some progressive family policies; criticism of no-fault 
divorce is an example. Many have advocated policies that would make divorces more 
difficult to obtain, thus creating disincentives for divorcing couples. "Covenant marriage" 
is one example of such a policy (Hawkins et al. 2002). Generally, however, the writing and 
research of centrist and conservative critics reflects a genuine concern for the family as an 
institution, and for the well-being of families and family members themselves. Many policies 
advocated by conservatives or moderate centrists, particularly those designed to prepare 
potential partners for marriage, strengthen existing marriages, and reduce couple conflict 
and avoid divorce, found their way into programmatic repertoires in a number of states. This 
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occurred even while the historical prejudices and social-structural problems that affect men, 
women and their families continued to be criticized by those who believed that the family 
was showing evidence of positive change—increasing diversity to accommodate changing 
patterns of intimacy, increased egalitarianism in family and marital relationships, and a 
growing tolerance of alternative families and identities. The debates in the 1990s over the 
future of the family were healthy ones, despite the gulf that was perceived to exist between 
the various factions. 
Debate within the various ideological factions, too, was healthy. The centrist position 
provided a foil to more hardline conservative positions by acknowledging that changes 
observed in family structure and behavior were linked to larger shifts in the social 
environment and culture. Women's increased participation in the workforce, for example, 
was seen by most centrists neither as reversible nor inherently "bad" for the family. Rather, 
ways to accommodate the change in gendered patterns of employment for the benefit of 
society—and children in particular—were more the focus of moderate centrist thinkers on 
women, work and family. The dissatisfaction with the relatively slow pace of change voiced 
by left-leaning scholars and activists suggests that what changes were occurring would likely 
have eventually occurred anyway. The goal from the centrist perspective, then, is to minimize 
the possible negative consequences of family change. More extreme conservative approaches 
often seek to reverse those changes entirely, and are often characterized as "backlash" driven 
by the argument from nostalgia. As I have demonstrated, within the liberal and feminist 
camps that generally welcome family change, ambivalence was no less evident than in the 
conservative and centrist camps, particularly on the issue of civil marriage. 
According to some defenders of traditional heterosexual marriage, the increasing demand 
for same-sex marriage is a consequence of the "privatization" of marriage that rewards adult-
centered, individual interests over the public interest communities have in marriage and 
children. Blankenhorn (2007) cleanly summarizes this argument by defining traditional 
marriage as a public contract obligating couples to reproduce and rear children, and thus 
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fulfill an essential social function: procreation. Gay advocate Rauch (2004) has argued that 
too much emphasis is placed on the private character of intimate relationships, including 
same-sex partnerships, and rues the prevalence of divorce and its negative social effects. 
Rauch, however, interprets the public nature of marriage as a catalyst for the expansion and 
strengthening of the institution of marriage through inclusion of gay and lesbian couples. 
While Rauch focuses on the idea that marriage would create families among same-sex 
couples, families empowered to care for and nurture children, and thus fulfill the social 
responsibilities associated with marriage and family life, Blankenhorn uses rights rhetoric to 
justify criticisms of divorce, single-parenting and same-sex marriage, basically claiming that 
every child has a right to a mother and a father. The presumption that rightful mothers and 
fathers are the married biological parents of children is the basis upon which Blankenhorn 
rejects the possibility of marriage between gay men and between lesbian women. He argues 
that alternatives to marriage, and same-sex marriage in particular, rely on an understanding 
of marriage as a private relationship rather than a public responsibility, which ultimately fails 
children and society, in his view. 
The changes in the family system that have occurred over the past four decades have 
undeniably diminished the presumed importance of marriage in defining relationships 
between adults and children. For example, a man may be a father to a child—and not just 
a progenitor, but a "dad" or social father—without being bound through marriage to the 
child's mother. Certainly divorced men and women who share custody of their children 
understand that their parenting roles (dad and mom) are no longer intertwined with 
marital roles (husband and wife). Indeed, women may choose to become mothers without 
giving a second thought to becoming someone's wife. Such issues trouble advocates for 
traditional marriage, because they clearly suggest that parenting is no longer integrated 
into the "natural institution" of marriage (Blankenhorn 2007). Blankenhorn describes his 
perspective as a "conjugal conception of marriage," a phrase borrowed from Ryan Anderson's 
2006 article, "Beyond Gay Marriage," in which the author accuses gay activists of trying to 
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undermine American families and values. The expansion of marriage to include same-sex 
couples, Anderson claims, will result in "a culture, a legal system, and a government that 
considers a monogamous, exclusive, permanent sexual relationship of child-bearing and 
child-rearing nothing more than one among many lifestyle choices. The claim that marriage 
is normative for the flourishing of spouses, children, and society—not to mention any 
attempt to enshrine in law this unique human good—would be considered bigotry. In other 
words, marriage as a social institution would be destroyed." Anderson's shrill fear-mongering 
is muted in Blankenhorn's work, but this position nevertheless reflects an ideology based on 
sexual complementarity and an all-too-often problematic gendered division of labor which 
"naturally" creates the "proper" context in which to rear children—heterosexual, and only 
heterosexual, marriage. 
There is, of course, no such thing as a "natural" social institution. Social institutions 
seem natural precisely because they are institutions—organized rituals and practices, learned 
norms and behaviors, and valued relationship forms deeply embedded in a shared culture, 
and passed from generation to generation as a sort of collective habit. "Marriage" is the 
name given to the structure of relationships and patterns of interaction that solve certain 
problems in society. Blankenhorn insists that monogamous heterosexual marriage is natural, 
inevitable and unassailable, and cannot be separated from having children. Other forms of 
intimacy that are not immediately expressive of "natural" procreative potential are assumed 
to be inadequate to the tasks society has assigned to marriage and family, e.g., regulating 
sexual access and behavior, procreation, socialization of children, economic cooperation 
and financial support, emotional support and companionship. In only the oldest and most 
primitive societies would procreation and childrearing be the only recognizable functions 
of marriage, and even under the most primitive of social conditions, it would be absurd to 
assume that the institution of marriage evolves as a precondition to the natural processes of 
procreation that supposedly define it, which is precisely what the conjugal conception of 
marriage does. 
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If we follow Blankenhorn's implied line of reasoning, then cohabiting heterosexual 
couples who have children together are already functionally and privately married, and there 
is little need for the public social rituals associated with marriage. Notably, this precisely 
describes arguments that favor civil unions rather than legal marriage for same-sex couples. 
It is an argument that demonstrates that civil marriage is actually unnecessary, which leaves 
Blankenhorn and others who in the same breath decry same-sex marriage and the rise of 
cohabitation in the United States in the position of defending only heterosexuality, not 
marriage itself, as the institutional basis for public family and community life. In short, the 
private lives of non-heterosexual people simply do not measure up to the public standard, 
which is nothing more or less than a presumption of the moral and social superiority of 
heterosexuality. 
The conjugal conception of marriage is a fancy way to say that marriage is about 
heterosexual procreation, which conveniently (and inaccurately) denies the existence of 
gay and lesbian families, and justifies the persistent denial of marriage rights to lesbian and 
gay couples. Same-sex couples challenge this traditional ideology (Demo and Allen 1996). 
The historical "evolution" of marriage is better understood as a process by which groups 
have adapted (and often rejected) the norms governing intimate and family relationships 
in response to social, demographic, technological, economic or political change. In a pure 
theoretical form, marriage would reflect what people actually do and how people actually 
live, even as it delimits the public and private boundaries of the family institution. 
Fear of Assimilation 
Most agree that the moderately conservative assimilationist perspective—aimed at 
integration of gays and lesbians into mainstream social institutions—has carried the day in 
queer politics. Despite disappointments—the "don't ask, don't tell" policy, a Clinton-era 
compromise that allows homosexuals to serve in the military provided their sexual identity 
remains hidden; and the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA, 28 USC 1738Ca.) passed in 
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1996 allowing states and directing federal agencies to discriminate against same-sex couples 
in marriage or legal marriage-like unions (Cahill 2005; Smith 2001)—assimilationists saw 
them as temporary setbacks that would be redressed as queer communities and activists 
continued on a path of convergence with the liberal and centrist models of family change 
that were generally if not consistently successful in the political arena. 
Through the first two or three years of the new millennium, it was possible to distinguish 
extreme social conservatives from centrists (see Benokraitis 2000). Today, that distinction is 
less clear, as conservatives and centrists share the conviction that expanding marital rights 
to non-heterosexuals somehow cheapens the value of marriage and undermines some of the 
family's basic functions, including procreation and socialization of children. Moderate social 
conservatives, for their part, have not been wholly uncomfortable with granting limited 
recognition, legal rights and privileges to committed same-sex couples in the past. Likewise, 
because they see strengthening existing heterosexual marriages and promoting the benefits to 
children of stable marital relationships as keys to repairing the family's damaged reputation 
in civil society, centrists usually stop short of endorsing full civil marriage for homosexuals. 
Instead, many (but by no means all) have argued that civil unions are more than adequate for 
co-resident, committed gay couples whose families will probably not fulfill the procreative 
and socializing functions traditionally assigned to heterosexual marriage. Moderates also tend 
to resist the reduction of marriage to an expression of individualism with reminders that 
marriage is a social contract that defines not only privileges, but responsibilities to the larger 
society. Marriage, for centrists and moderate conservatives, is reserved for those who would 
take on the social responsibilities associated with reproducing culture—individuals, families 
and communities bound together through relatively stable value systems. It should be noted 
that the moderate conservative position was endorsed by most of the Democratic candidates 
for president in 2008. 
To many opponents of inclusive rights for homosexuals—social and religious 
conservatives, and a number of public intellectuals who claim to be moderate or centrist— 
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allowing same-sex marriage heralds the full normalization of queer life in the public sphere, 
which would come only with the devaluation of heterosexuality and traditional family 
forms. On the other hand, the suspicion of many gays and lesbians is that accepting same-
sex marriage means abandoning the structural critique of heterosexism, queer political 
commitments to resist gender- and race-based injustice and homophobia, and ultimately 
the very notion of a "queer" identity or culture, only to surrender to the hegemonic systems 
of oppression that defined gay and lesbian political existence in the first place. In each case, 
the danger is the end of difference, with the questionable promise of a politically secure and 
socially unremarkable—dare I say quotidian—existence for lesbians, gays, and their families. 
Opponents of same-sex marriage on both ends of the ideological continuum cast integration 
and assimilation of gay and lesbian people into family life as a threat to the family, a kind of 
evil masquerading as "normal." But queer lives are normal, and not so different from the lives 
of others where marriage and family are concerned. 
Pictures from a Normal Life 
Until we get married, or enter into a permanent, long-term committed relationship, 
we all share a common personal history marked by repeated failures—perhaps because of a 
nagging sense of dissatisfaction with the conversation or the sex, the discovery of infidelity, 
an episode of violence, a feeling of dismay over the possibility of having to look at his or her 
face every morning for the rest of your life, or a sudden jolting insight that the person sitting 
across the table from you is just not "the one." This is normal for everyone. Everyone has a 
story, an account of his or her own personal quest for a quotidian existence that illustrates 
how utterly pedestrian the desire for love, or the secret wish for marriage, can be. 
It was 2003. My mother was visiting Las Vegas from the small Texas town where I grew 
up, and was unaccustomed to shelling out more than $100 for dinner for three. I wanted her 
to meet the man I had been seeing for several months—Jay, the dashing local attorney with 
the exceptionally sweet smile who had only come out last year—so she was taking us out. I 
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was his first "official boyfriend," and he often told me he felt lucky that he met me right out 
of the gate. Smartly outfitted in black, he joined us at an Italian restaurant at one of the local 
casinos. As I introduced him to my mom, I felt lucky, too. 
Out of the corner of my eye, I watched him talk animatedly with my mother, who was 
chuckling at his jokes, and telling a few of her own. For her part, she wore a sort of shrewd 
smirk most of the evening, sizing up the person I insisted she meet. Her eyes would dart 
toward me occasionally, and because I am her son, I recognized the tiny lines of reluctant 
approval that framed her green-eyed gaze. The three of us spent a pleasant hour and a half 
together, but as I sat there beside him toying with my fork, my excitement about the evening 
slowly and inexplicably dissipated. I just could not shake a growing feeling that something 
was wrong with this picture. I had met his parents a few weeks prior, he and my son had 
gotten along famously once I got them together, and here I was introducing him to my 
mother. This is how it is supposed to happen, is it not? Date for a while, meet the parents, 
then... what? Why was this so uncomfortable? I found myself fidgeting, and looking at my 
watch. 
After dinner, I steered my mother toward a bank of nickel slot machines, and asked Jay to 
walk with me for a coffee at the kiosk down the way. I do not remember if we said anything 
important during that short stroll, except that he probably said he liked my mother. 
"Listen," I started, after we got our coffee. "I don't know where this is going. I do know 
that I ..." I brought my cup up to my face, taking a deep breath, pretending to appreciate 
the aroma wafting from it. "I want something more. We need to graduate.. .to something 
else, or we need to stop this." I looked up and held his eyes, held that breath, the expectant 
puff of air that was all the hope I had in me. 
His face relaxed. I had not even noticed that it was tense. 
"I'm so relieved," he began, through a sincere grin and an explosive sigh. He'd been 
holding his breath, too, apparently. "I didn't know how to tell you." 
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I tightened my lips and blinked once, slowly, and lowered my eyes. I needed two seconds 
to stare pointlessly at the tile floor. "Okay," I said jovially, brightly pushing my best face 
forward, "It's over, then." 
There was no anger, no drama. For about fifteen minutes, Jay and I cordially discussed 
why we could not and would not become more than we were. We said the usual things, 
reminisced fondly about the usual memories—the hot tub, the time I had too much port, 
the excellent Valentine's Day date, the weekend we spent in the Texas Hill Country attending 
my best friend's wedding—and made the usual excuses. Although we had planned that night 
to return with my mother to my place after dinner so I could give him the tour of my new 
house, we agreed that it might be awkward and somewhat sad. With a brief hug, already 
distant, and a whispered goodbye, I left him at the coffee counter, and grabbed my mother 
on the way out. 
"Where is Jay?" She asked, as I pulled her away from "Sizzlin' Sevens," her favorite lucky 
machine. 
"He's not coming," I said neutrally, trudging purposefully toward the exit. Without 
speaking, I led her along the rows of slot machines—the synthesized bells and electronic 
chords mockingly urging players like me to take just one more shot—and out into the dimly-
lit parking lot. I had hidden my disappointment well enough from him, but I could not hide 
it from her. I opened the passenger door of my truck, and as she eased herself into her seat, 
my mother found her voice. 
"If I had known you were going to break up with him," she said, just a litde too wisely as 
she pulled the door closed, "we would have eaten at McDonald's." 
It did not occur to me until later that this experience was not at all special or unusual. 
My mother, having accepted my identity, simply acknowledged my romantic interest and 
signaled her willingness to participate in clearing the path toward a more or less permanent 
and durable family life for me. She would have done, and has done, as much for any of my 
heterosexual siblings. This is traditionally what families do, but until very recently, lesbian 
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and gay people could expect neither acceptance nor support from their families, much less 
for their desire to find a partner with whom to share a life. 
Times are changing. As part of an effort to understand that change, this research provides 
an empirical account of the cultural shift within the non-heterosexual population toward 
assimilationist ideology marked by the sustained public discourse and concern about die 
political possibility of a "red letter day"—the day when homosexuals have the unrestricted 
right to marry in American society. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE: SODOMY, 
PRIVACY, AND THE RIGHT 
TO MARRY 
Identity politics is permeated by ambivalence. We are members of the dominant society 
and yet we are not really members. This contradiction is our fate. We face a constant 
challenge to develop apolitical strategy that nourishes and protects the many ways of 
being homosexual. It may be easy to recognise what is inauthentic in this twilight %one of 
ambivalence and contradiction, but slowly it dawns on us that there may be no "authentic" 
solution at all. (Escoffier 1998:28-29) 
As of this writing, a few people have seen dawn of that red-letter day—the day when 
gays and lesbians can legally marry—in a small number of states, including Connecticut in 
2008 and most notably Massachusetts, where same-sex marriage has been legal since 2003. 
The November 2003 ruling of the Massachusetts Supreme judicial Court that forbade the 
state from excluding same-sex couples from the institution of civil marriage was a watershed 
event marking the beginning of a new and more vociferous round of public and scholarly 
debates about not just marriage, but the family more generally. In Goodridge v. Department of 
Health (798 N.E.2d 941 [2003]), the Massachusetts high court at once affirmed the traditional 
value of marriage as a "vital social institution" while expanding its practical definition: 
The exclusive commitment of two individuals to each other nurtures love 
and mutual support; it brings stability to our society. For those who choose 
to marry, and for their children, marriage provides an abundance of legal, 
financial, and social benefits. In return it imposes weighty legal, financial, 
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and social obligations. The question before us is whether, consistent with the 
Massachusetts Constitution, the Commonwealth may deny the protections, 
benefits, and obligations conferred by civil marriage to two individuals of the 
same sex who wish to marry. We conclude that it may not. 
Massachusetts was not the only state on the east coast whose high court was grappling 
with the same-sex marriage issue. Prior to the Goodridge decision that granted marriage to 
gays and lesbians in Massachusetts, Vermont in 2002 legalized civil unions, and was the 
first state to create a legal relationship status similar to marriage for non-heterosexuals. In 
Baker v. Vermont (744 A.2d 864 [1999]), justices in Vermont ultimately found that the state's 
marriage laws discriminated against gays and lesbians. The Court ordered the state legislature 
to correct the problem. In 2000, then-governor Howard Dean signed into law legislation that 
created in Vermont a separate-but-equal provision for recognizing same-sex relationships in 
the form of "civil unions," legally equivalent to marriage in all but name. 
Connecticut, New Jersey and New Hampshire soon followed their neighbor's example. 
California, Hawaii, Maine, Oregon, and Washington all moved steadily toward broadening 
the rights and responsibilities afforded people in domestic partnerships, bringing such 
relationships closer to marriage but stopping short of making them equal to marriage. These 
new civil unions and formalized domestic partnerships would gain even further protection 
when in Lawrence v. Texas (539 U.S. 558 [2003]) the United States Supreme Court narrowly 
struck down so-called "sodomy laws" across the country that prohibited sexual activities 
between people of the same sex in private. In striking down Section 21.06 of the Texas 
Criminal Code, the Court also overturned its long-standing ruling in Bowers v. Hardwick (478 
U.S. 186 [1986]), and established a right to privacy for same-sex relationships. 
In the earlier ruling in Bowers, the Court sidestepped the issue of privacy (Struening 
1996) and ruled instead based on an assumption that there is no fundamental right to 
practice sodomy, and therefore the state (in that case, Georgia) need not acknowledge nor 
protect such a right (Ruskola 2005). The Lawrence decision, however, seems to recognize that 
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sodomy laws had traditionally been used to reduce categorically the intimate interactions 
between people of the same sex to deviant sexual encounters that readily fall outside the 
realm of legitimate, intimate relationships. The Supreme Court found that sodomy laws 
exist to further no compelling state interest beyond sanctioning discrimination and justifying 
harassment by authorities, practices which impinge on a right to privacy established in 
several other cases in family-related law. With sodomy laws in place, the committed, long-
term romantic relationships of gays and lesbians could not possibly be interpreted as similar 
to marriage, nor could the households created by these unions be fully acknowledged as 
families. 
Privacy Protections for Non-heterosexuals 
The decision in the Lawrence opinion, penned by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, opened 
new possibilities for alternative families by sweeping away the criminalization of same-sex 
relationships. Not unexpectedly, a collective gasp of horror from various discontented 
segments of the population mobilized against same-sex marriage—or gay and lesbian civil 
rights more generally—punctuated the celebratory mood among lesbian and gay citizens 
who suddenly found themselves with a long anticipated right to privacy (Hohengarten 1994). 
The meaning of this gasp was articulated by Justice Antonin Scalia in his dissent from the 
majority in Lawrence: 
Today's opinion is the product of a Court, which is the product of a law 
profession culture that has largely signed on to the so-called homosexual 
agenda, by which I mean the agenda promoted by some homosexual activists 
directed at eliminating the moral opprobrium that has traditionally attached 
to homosexual conduct. I noted in an earlier opinion the fact that the 
American Association of Law Schools (which any reputable law school must 
seek to belong) excludes from membership any school that refuses to ban 
from its job-interview facilities a law firm (no matter how small) that does 
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not wish to hire as a prospective partner a person who openly engages in 
homosexual conduct, (lMwrence v. Texas 2003, Antonin Scalia, dissenting) 
Scalia's strident criticism of the majority opinion focuses mainly on the idea that the Court 
has abandoned traditionally-sound jurisprudence by finding rights where they do not exist, 
and that it ignores the will of the citizenry and lessons of tradition in capitulation to what 
we might call a "rights industry." Scalia's criticism of both his colleagues and the Court's 
decision-making process is abrasive, and not atypical of his tendency to sensationalize and 
politicize Supreme Court decisions. "Justice Scalia's twenty years on the Court have been 
marked by a harsh rhetoric that damages the reputation of the Court as a vital institution 
in American society," writes legal scholar Stephen Newman, "and that encourages and 
contributes to the 'judge-bashing' political agenda of the far right-wing of the Republican 
Party" (Newman 2006/2007:914). Scalia's dissent is less likely a benign registration of 
contrary legal reasoning than a pre-emptive political strike against social movements toward 
marriage and other human rights for lesbians and gays. Indeed, in his lMivrence dissent, Scalia 
"wildly predicted the judicial invalidation of laws against prostitution, bigamy, bestiality, 
adult incest, and same-sex marriage" (Newman 2006/2007:918), invoking the right-wing 
stereotypes that connect homosexuality to criminal deviance and sexual perversion. 
As public attention shifted uneasily toward the prospect of queer weddings, calls for 
new political responses were heard and new policies formulated. The most divisive of these 
was a proposed Federal Marriage Amendment that would constitutionally define marriage 
in the United States as between one man and one woman, and—despite proponents' claims 
to the contrary—undermine any alternative union that might confer substantively similar 
rights upon same-sex couples. A majority of states have already amended their own state 
constitutions in this way, but a federal amendment, if passed, would have destroyed the 
rights and privileges already afforded to married same-sex couples, and couples in civil 
unions, in the various states that recognize the family-making rights of non-heterosexuals. 
This is precisely what the California Supreme Court will address in 2009, after the passage 
40 
of Proposition 8 called into question the validity of existing same-sex marriages performed 
legally in that state. The Federal Marriage Amendment failed to make it out of Congress in 
2004, but the threat it poses is by no means dead. 
Political Backlash Against Expansion of Civil 
Rights of Gays and Lesbians 
The reactions of legislators, lobbyists and some jurists to the possibility of same-sex 
marriage across the United States over the past fifteen years testifies to both the enormous 
mobilizing power of homophobia among anti-gay forces and to the authentic momentum 
of the movement to secure family rights for those to whom they have been denied. The 
tremendous pressure on government entities to act on behalf of marriage—one way or 
another—represents a significant change in political opportunity structure, understood as "a 
set of clues for when contentious politics will emerge, setting in motion a chain of causation 
that may ultimately lead to sustained interaction with authorities and thence to social 
movements" (Tarrow 1998:20). The expansion of the definition of marriage by court order 
or legislation in at least two states would normally signal optimistic political opportunities 
for factions supporting structural change in the family institution across the nation. Tarrow 
might characterize the renewed urgency in the family debates as a recent iteration of an 
historically normative cycle of protest that has given way to a cycle of reform. Indeed, 
given the Baehrv. Lemn (74 Haw. 645, 852 P.2d 44 [1993]), ~Lawrence and Goodridge decisions, 
it would appear that there is a sustainable vitality in debates over whether public policies 
should recognize and support families as they ought to be or families as they are. 
It is the turn toward reform and the ferociously rapid political resistance to inclusion 
that requires closer scrutiny of the people and populations that struggle for equality. They 
struggle not just against the tyrannical exercise of power by a heterosexual and too often 
homophobic majority, but also against the stereotypes and cultural narratives that have 
painted gays, lesbians and bisexuals as deviant and "anti-family," in the traditional sense. In 
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1993—the same year that the Baehr was argued in Hawaii—Bruce Bawer described how 
"professional opponents of homosexuality" had unleashed a misleading, inaccurate and 
dehumanizing lexicon into public discourses on homosexuality, gay rights and same-sex 
marriage in order to undermine the legitimacy of civil rights claims from queer activists and 
solidify in the minds of a heterosexual public largely ignorant of what being gay, lesbian or 
bisexual actually means that non-heterosexuals constituted a social, political and sometimes 
even criminal threat to American society. Today, opponents to same-sex marriage draw upon 
that same lexicon, strengthened by thirty years of Christian fundamentalist intolerance, 
at least eight years of which have been more or less sanctioned by social conservatives, a 
reactionary Republican majority in the US Congress, and a president who has claimed he 
was called to serve by God himself. The result has been an administration committed to 
"orchestrating a political backlash against gay people in general, targeting lesbian and gay 
parenting, more limited forms of partner recognition such as domestic partnership, health 
research, and school anti-homophobia initiatives" (Cahill 2005:171) under the auspices of 
movements promoting fatherhood and marriage as goals for policy rather than people. 
The "HomosexualAgenda": Panics, Parties 
and Professional Homophobes 
The most persistent and ubiquitous concept named in that lexicon is the so-called 
"homosexual agenda," which has gained purchase as marriage rights have moved into the 
realm of political possibility for same-sex couples. The concept has remained virtually 
unchanged, however, from Bawer's description: 
Homophobes like to argue that gay-rights supporters have an "agenda." It's 
one of those words that politicians use in campaigns. They have a "cause"; 
their opponents have an "agenda." The word makes it sound as if you're at 
war with shady characters who have a sinister secret plan. (Bawer 1993:147) 
With his dissent in Lawrence, Justice Scalia arguably became the first professional 
homophobe to serve openly on the United States Supreme Court. In legitimizing the 
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mythical idea of a "homosexual agenda" (which in lay discourse is interpreted as "anti-
family") and suggesting that the court system has been corrupted (which translates into 
a judiciary full of so-called "activist judges"), Scalia lays the groundwork in his Lawrence 
dissent for reframing legal, scholarly and policy debates over the future of marriage and the 
family: a moral panic. 
Sociologists have defined moral panics as "a widespread feeling on the part of the 
public or some relevant public that something is terribly wrong in society because of the 
moral failure of a specific group of individuals" (Schneider and Jenness 1997:473; see also 
Goode and Ben-Yehuda 1994). Successfully reframing the debate over same-sex marriage 
requires creating enough fear to sustain a moral panic until it can be resolved either through 
the courts or legislative process. David Altheide studies the role of media messages in the 
creation of fear. "A story about fear is produced and packaged in a process that formulates 
social complexities as simplistic problems," writes Altheide, "The cumulative effect is to 
produce a discourse of fear that then becomes a resource on which the audience ma.j draw 
when interpreting subsequent reports" (2000:49). While it is true that a discourse of fear 
surrounding homosexuals existed prior to the Lawrence decision among some conservative 
groups, Christian and other religious groups, and a number of communities, Scalia's scathing 
dissent provided a rhetorical anchor in case law for the emergence of a more unified 
movement against same-sex marriage that proceeds from what Altheide calls a "problem 
frame," the logic of which is clearly evident in Scalia's dissent: 
• Something exists that is undesirable. 
• Many people are affected by this problem (it is relevant). 
• Unambiguous aspects or parts are easily identified. 
• It can be changed or "fixed." 
• There is a mechanism or procedure for fixing the problem. 
• The change or repair agent and process is known (usually the 
government). (Altheide 2000:49) 
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The problem frame is hardly the exclusive tool of opponents of same-sex marriage, 
however. Once the frame appears, it comes to dominate as the organizing logic of political 
discourse and social movements. The Goodridge decision begins, "Marriage is a vital social 
institution," something on which there is more or less consensus across political and 
social lines in this country. But agreement ends there. In "Lawrence, the "something" that is 
undesirable is homosexuality for Scalia and his political cohorts, while it is civil inequality 
for the justices of the Massachusetts high court. The people affected by the problem are 
heterosexual, "normal" people assumed to be in the majority on one hand, and a sexual 
minority with relatively little power on the other. The problem is unambiguously behavior for 
one camp, structure for the other. Homosexuality as a problem can be "fixed" by continuing 
to systematically stigmatize the people who practice it as immoral or deviant. Inequality, 
on the other hand, can be "fixed" by changing the structure of the social institutions that 
exclude such people. One party might argue that the mechanism for fixing this problem lies 
in legislation driven by majority interests, a sort of gross democracy, and non-interference 
by a meddling judiciary. Another party might interpret the solution to the problem to be 
the exercise of the judicial mandate to interpret the law in the interests of its marginalized 
citizens and occasionally against the interests of an overzealous majority or hostile 
legislature. 
Essentially, in Lawrence, Scalia successfully preempted the Goodridge decision of the 
justices on the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court by initiating a moral panic over 
homosexuality and same-sex marriage among social conservatives and moderates alike. 
By the time the Massachusetts court ruled in favor of allowing same-sex marriage some 
six months after Lawrence, their ruling was immediately interpreted as evidence of Scalia's 
charges of the "anti-family" nature of the "homosexual agenda." The Massachusetts 
justices were portrayed as "activist judges" forcing a new form of marriage on an unwilling 
population. By that time, same-sex marriage was already seen by many as a real and present 
threat to the fabric of the American family. 
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According to Bawer, the "homosexual agenda" is right-wing code for a list of biases 
that justify a virulent form of heterosexism and animate the fearful stereotype of the 
homosexual deviant out to undermine "the family" by promoting homosexuality as normal 
and "equivalent" to heterosexuality; by denouncing the civic responsibilities attached to 
heterosexuality in favor of an "unnatural," hedonistic, individualistic, and self-indulgent 
"lifestyle"; by "recruiting" young people to "choose" to adopt this "lifestyle," the "practices" 
and "behaviors" of which are judged to be antithetical to traditional or mostly Christian 
"values"; by "politicizing" sexuality and "endorsing" policies that would grant "special 
rights" to homosexuals, and accord a place of "special privilege" to homosexuality and gay 
culture; and of course, to create "special protections" for lesbians and gays (see Bawer 1993: 
140-152 for detailed discussion), such as hate crime laws, which generally mandate stiffer 
punishment for individuals who single out victims based on racial or sexual prejudices. 
The Radical Christian Threat: Discrimination 
or Death, Not Marriage 
By 2008, religious leaders had effectively translated this last item on the "agenda" to 
mean that granting equal rights to gays is tantamount to restricting religious freedom and 
abrogating First Amendment rights. In short, they are worried that they will not be able 
to denounce homosexuality or condemn lesbian and gay people from the pulpit. Anti-gay 
pastors argue that law enforcement might, sometime in the future, take it seriously when a 
church leader publicly—and sometimes laughingly—calls for violence against homosexuals, 
up to and including their extermination at the hands of homophobic bigots or misguided 
"Christian soldiers" such as Joel's Army (Sanchez 2008), or the murderous Watchmen on the 
Walls (Sanchez 2007). 
Most Christian gay-baiting is based on biblical verses in the book of Leviticus, 
specifically "Thou shalt not lie with mankind, as with womankind: it is abomination" 
(Lev.l8:22), and "If a man also lie with mankind, as he lieth with a woman, both of them 
have committed an abomination: they shall surely be put to death; their blood shall be upon 
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them" (Lev. 20:13). Many individuals and religious organizations interpret these verses 
literally. In 2001, for example, Larry Kilgore told a reporter covering an anti-gay protest, 
"We know punishing homosexuals by death would be extremely hard in today's society, 
but we hope we can drive it [homosexuality] underground so that in about twenty or thirty 
years, the punishment will fit the crime" (Lum 2001). Kilgore and other local members of 
the Constitution Party in Dallas advocating Texas' HB 496, a state-level defense of marriage 
bill, expressed more patience with regard to killing homosexuals than does small-time online 
evangelist Jim Rudd. 
Rudd is upset that American politicians will not adhere to biblical principles and 
carry out God's justice on lesbians and gays. In an article on his website entitled "Put 
Homosexuals to the Sword," Rudd (2006) echoed a somewhat widespread Christian 
reconstructionist claim that "civil officials have a God ordained dutv to execute sodomites," 
and included a set of "preaching points" that presumably help pastors make the case that 
state-sanctioned execution of gays and lesbians is a morally appropriate expression of God's 
love. Rudd's opinion of homosexuals reflects a prejudice that just will not die, and one that 
appears on various websites from time to time. The following is from a blog entry by a 
man named Matthew Stucky, dated December 16, 2008, who calls the mythical Santa Claus 
"satanic," and accuses the eight reindeer in his employ of being "queer" bullies who harass 
Rudolph, the only "straight" reindeer at the North Pole: 
According to the Bible homosexuality should be punishable by death. I 
would be overjoyed if every single queer in the entire world died today. The 
Bible makes it clear they are reprobates who are past the point of salvation. 
The Bible also makes it clear they are rapists & very wicked people. They 
have no chance to get saved and no saved person could ever become a queer. 
Therefore, I would be overjoyed if they all died tonight & our government 
would actually follow what the Bible states. The death penalty should be 
enacted for the queers. (Stucky 2008) 
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The silly pop cultural analysis aside, the author makes his views about homosexuality and 
gay people clear as ice, right after quoting Leviticus. Such is the message from religious 
homophobes, both professional and amateur: Death, not marriage, is the proper response 
of the government to demands for lesbian and gay family equality. If not death, then 
institutionalized discrimination will have to do. 
Marriage Rights and Family Rights: 
Federalism and Discrimination 
In 2005, the year this study was first conceived and the year after George W. Bush was 
re-elected to presidency after pledging his support to efforts to amend the US Constitution 
to exclude same-sex couples from marriage (Liu and Macedo 2005), Kansas and Texas 
passed constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage, joining 17 other states that 
had already taken similar steps to deny legal marriage to gays and lesbians under the guise 
of protecting "traditional marriage," including Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, 
Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon and Utah. By the end of the following year, Alabama, Colorado, 
Idaho, South Dakota, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia and Wisconsin had followed suit. 
Arizona voters that year rejected the proposal to limit legal marriage to one man and one 
woman, and Arizona remains the only state that resisted writing injustice and inequality into 
its constitution. That resistance would crumble in November 2008, when Arizona, Florida 
and California voters passed constitutional amendments banning same-sex marriage. 
The passage of California's Proposition 8 in the 2008 election banned same-sex marriage 
in California, and marked a major setback for the expansion of marriage rights to non-
heterosexuals. In 1999, California's domestic partnership law was already the most broadly 
inclusive in the country, and in early 2008, that state's Supreme Court ruled that lesbian and 
gay people had a constitutional right to form families: 
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...we conclude that, under this state's Constitution, the constitutionally based 
right to marry properly must be understood to encompass the core set of 
basic substantive legal rights and attributes traditionally associated with 
marriage that are so integral to an individual's liberty and personal autonomy 
that they may not be eliminated or abrogated by the Legislature or by the 
electorate through the statutory initiative process. These core substantive 
rights include, most fundamentally, the opportunity of an individual to 
establish — with the person with whom the individual has chosen to share 
his or her life — an officially recognized and protected family possessing 
mutual rights and responsibilities and entitled to the same respect and dignity 
accorded a union traditionally designated as marriage. (Re: Marriage Cases, 43 
Cal.4th 757 [2008]) 
The language of the Court's opinion is unprecedented and clear: Denying same-sex couples 
the right to marry violates the "fundamental right to form a family relationship." After the 
ruling was announced, religious and anti-gay rights groups organized the ballot initiative to 
circumvent the ruling of the court by amending the state constitution to exclude same-sex 
couples from marriage, and as of this writing, the effort has been successful. 
Bankrolled largely by religious and conservative political organizations that exploited 
anti-gay prejudices by rolling out the worst stereotypes and fears embedded in the 
"homosexual agenda" (gays threaten children, gays are diseased, gays are incapable of 
monogamy, etc.), Proposition 8 passed by a narrow margin, setting off weeks of protests 
both in California and across the country. By the end of 2008, anti-gay forces were 
celebrating a "mission accomplished": Laws either banning same-sex marriage or specifically 
defining marriage as a union of one man and one woman are now on the books in more 
than 40 states, a "success" largely attributable to the effective use of the "homosexual 
agenda" as a problem frame. Before the end of 2008, so-called "pro-family" groups were 
calling for the nullification of more than 18,000 same-sex marriages performed legally under 
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the California Supreme Court's ruling, arguing that if the state from recognizing same-
sex marriage, then no same-sex marriage could be treated as legal, regardless of when it 
was formed (Associated Press 2008). This and other controversies surrounding the ballot 
initiative will be addressed by the California Supreme Court in 2009, but at this time remain 
unresolved. A more thorough discussion of the significance of and reaction to the passage 
of Proposition 8 is beyond the scope of this project, but at a minimum, the election results 
in 2008 put to rest any presumption that the culture wars had been won, or that hostilities 
between religious conservatives and gay activists had ceased. 
The claim that homosexuals have a so-called "agenda" driven by "anti-family" values 
has not been adequately addressed by researchers, except perhaps by researchers examining 
the effects of same-sex parenting on children's outcomes (see Stacey and Bibliarz 2000) 
or the history of the gay rights movement (Bernstein 2002; Fetner 2001; Smith 2001; 
Eskridge 1993). The prejudices perpetuated by the anti-gay crowd in the name of fighting 
the "homosexual agenda" are politically motivated caricatures, unlikely to reflect with 
any accuracy the values, beliefs, desires, or experiences of non-heterosexual people in the 
family system. While the propagandist rhetoric of the "homosexual agenda" is hurtful to 
all members of the non-heterosexual community, it is especially damaging to the segment 
of the non-heterosexual population that most wants to be able to marry and form families. 
Indeed, given that many same-sex headed households include children, these families already 
exist. The "homosexual agenda" provides a skeletal structure on which hangs the slick and 
scary skin of homophobia; it is a sort of political zombie, a living-dead narrative designed 
to play on the fears of the ignorant, and nothing more. It ignores the voices and the lives 
of non-heterosexuals themselves, and focuses its attention on gays and lesbians as mythical 
monsters driven by a desire to conquer rather than conform. This is not reality. A more 
robust picture of contemporary and changing "queer culture" must include a meaningful, 
empirical description of the family practices, institutionalized support systems and social 
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networks that sustain everyday life for gay, lesbian and bisexual people in US society. 
Caricatures no longer suffice. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PORTRAIT OF A QUEER PEOPLE 
Until very recently—and in only a few states and countries—lesbian and gay people 
realized early in their lives that marriage was simply not an option, conceptually or 
practically, without subordinating or denying one's sexual identity. In the parks and primary 
school playgrounds where children first begin to learn public gender and sexual identities, 
who among us has not teased or been teased by playmates chanting, giggling and in unison, 
the seminal cultural lesson that marriage is both natural and inevitable? 
Rhonda and Charlie, 
sittin in a tree, 
K-I-S-S-I-N-G. 
First comes love, then comes marriage, 
then comes Rhonda with a baby carriage! 
The sing-song rhyme and rhythm of the childish limerick hides the powerful magic of 
the marriage message: that you will meet and fall in love with someone of a different sex, 
eventually get married, have sex, and have children, and that is how it is supposed to be. For 
some children, the social spell is of a darker, melancholy variety. Only later in their lives, 
when Rhonda finds herself hoping Charlie is a girl, and Charlie secretly wishes Rhonda 
were really Ronnie, does it become clear that the promise of love, happiness and order 
evoked in the old playground cantrip is wrapped in isolation and exclusion; it is an illusion, 
unattainable to those of us who are not heterosexual. Thus do so many gay and lesbian 
people grow up and grow into a world we understand through what Jonathan Rauch calls a 
"weird prism of marriagelessness" (2004:3). 
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In a short passage at the beginning of his book, Rauch recalls a day from his childhood 
when he became aware not of his sexual identity, but of the impossibility of his marriage. 
"As I sat on the piano bench in the family room," he writes, "it dawned on me that I would 
never be married....That day was a long time, I think about fifteen years, before I understood 
that I was homosexual" (2004:3). The idea of "being married" at some point in one's life is 
pervasive, and certainly all of us are socialized as children to believe that marriage ultimately 
will define us as real, as significant and of course as immutably heterosexual. Another 
advocate of same-sex marriage, Evan Wolfson, describes a similar epiphany in his youth, 
when he realized "there was something in the picture society showed me that I didn't fit into, 
before I could tell my mom or even fully understand that I was gay": 
One night—I couldn't have been more than eleven or twelve—my mother 
and I were watching something on TV and talking. Dad was out on his 
weekly bowling night and the other kids must have already gone off to 
sleep. I remember saying to my mom, in what must have seemed an out-
of-the-blue declaration, "I don't think I'll get married." I don't remember 
if, or how, my mom responded. But I do remember that I realized I 
might be excluded from the joys of married life. (Wolfson 2004:15-16) 
In the meditative epilogue in Virtually Normal, gay same-sex marriage advocate Andrew 
Sullivan addreses that sense of exclusion more expansively, suggesting that by adolescence, 
"Heterosexual marriage is perceived as the primary emotional goal for your peers; and yet 
you know this cannot be your fate. It terrifies and alarms you. While its form comforts, its 
content appalls. It requires a systematic dishonesty; and this dishonesty either is programmed 
into your soul and so warps your integrity, or is rejected in favor of—what? You scan your 
mind for an alternative" (1996:190). 
For those who might grow up to be gay or lesbian, this "prism of marriagelessness" 
bends perception like any other, and it is through this prism that gay subcultures and sexual 
countercultures begin to look orderly and meaningful without marriage, as indeed they 
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are as alternatives to an exclusionary heterosexist culture. It is also through the prism of 
marriagelessness that opponents of social and legal equality view the lives of lesbians, gays 
and their families. Because of the lack of institutional and social support, the unavailability 
of the stabilizing influence of marriage, and the stigma attached to same-sex relationships and 
families, it might be relatively difficult for gay and lesbian couples, compared to their straight 
peers, to see themselves in marriage, or to hold positive attitudes toward the institution. 
Despite these difficulties, it is clear that lesbians and gays do in fact form relationships and 
families (see Lewin 1998). For most, the only marriage-like option for family-building 
is cohabitation, considered by many a less-than-optimum alternative to state-sanctioned 
marriage, at least for heterosexuals (see detailed discussion in Wake and Gallagher 2000). 
Even where same-sex civil unions are available to same-sex couples, there is at least some 
evidence that such laws do not protect gay and lesbian families from discrimination (Faiola 
2007). Still, many same-sex committd relationships mirror marriage insofar as they are 
monogamous, feature long-term commitment, often include children and are a source of 
security and satisfaction (Lehmiller and Agnew 2006; Peplau and Beals 2004; Worth, Reid 
and McMillan 2002). 
My analysis begins with a basic assumption about homosexuals themselves: "They 
exist" (see Rauch 2004), objectively and legitimately. In this research, I take at face value 
the structure and character of same-sex relationships as they are, right now, as they are 
encountered in the field, recognizing that gay and lesbian communities are products of a 
unique and emergent culture (Weston 1991). By assuming non-heterosexual identity and 
existence is at once authentic and normal, I can also make assumptions about individuals 
in same-sex relationships that have long been made about heterosexuals. For example, it 
is common sense to assume that people who are married will generally be supportive of 
marriage as an institution (although the variability of that support is being studied). Making 
the same assumption about homosexuals is slightly problematic, but can still be expressed: 
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that gays and lesbians in committed, cohabitational relationships are more likely to be 
supportive of marriage. 
Just because many homosexuals have experienced a moment in their lives in which 
they realized that being gay meant not getting or being married does not mean that non-
heterosexual people choose a way of life built in opposition to the values associated with 
matrimony—love, companionship, sexual exclusivity, etc. Indeed, that finding a partner and 
building a life together continues to be an observable pattern among lesbians and gay men 
suggests that the ideology of marriage—even in the absence of its possibility—is as deeply 
embedded in gays and queer culture as it is in straight people and the dominant heterosexual 
culture. 
Quest for Quotidian: An American Sample 
This study relies on a final national sample of 466 adult men and women representing 
thirty-seven states across the country. Census data show that gay and lesbian residents 
could be found in 99.3 percent of all counties in the United States in 2000, compared to 
only about 52 percent of counties in 1990, although the increase likely reflects a significant 
undercount of gay and lesbian households in 1990 as well as increased willingness of gays 
and lesbians to identify themselves as partners in a same-sex relationship (Smith and Gates 
2001). Quest for Quotidian respondents are clustered in metropolitan areas across the 
various regions of the United States, with the heaviest concentrations in Los Angeles, San 
Francisco, Las Vegas, Portland, Tucson and New York, a modest reflection of the geographic 
concentration of lesbians and gays observed by researchers analyzing larger national data 
sources (Black et al. 2000). Most respondents live in urban or surburban areas, while a 
smaller proportion, 16.3 percent, reported that they live in small towns or "out in the 
country," in more rural settings relatively removed from urban life. 
In this sample, fewer than one in five respondents live outside of cities or metropolitan 
areas, and younger respondents are more likely than older respondents to live in rural 
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settings. About 30 percent of all respondents age 18 to 24 (n=108) live in rural areas, 
compared to 12 percent of respondents age 25 to 49 (n-300). Among respondents age 
50 and over (»=54), the proportion of rural to urban living is approximately 17 percent. 
That most non-heterosexual people tend to live in urban areas (Black et al. 2000) might be 
explained by a higher expectation of anonymity in urban settings, more opportunities to 
meet and interact with a wider variety of friends and partners who are also non-heterosexual, 
and perhaps more safe spaces for self- and sexual expression (Aldrich 2004). The presence of 
non-heterosexuals in almost all US communities, however, suggests at least the possibility 
that same-sex couples or gay families are already present as part of the larger family systems 
within those communities, and are not so "queer" at all (Stacey 1996:107). 
It is possible that many of the young adults in small towns or rural areas who responded 
to this survey have not yet acquired the resources or motivation to leave the hometowns 
of their childhood or adolescence for the more urbane milieu of the college or university 
campus, or the cosmopolitan intensity of the "big city (see Rushbrook 2002) Small towns 
do not remain small because of "queer flight"—lesbians and gays lighting out for more 
friendly territories—but because the local economies and opportunity structures are limited 
for everyone, including straights, who themselves often choose to seek opportunities outside 
rural America, in the cities and urban centers that are the economic and cultural hotspots in 
US society. It is too easy to argue simply that being gay is difficult in small towns. For many, 
it might be more difficult to be financially or professionally successful and gay or lesbian in 
small towns. 
Non-heterosexuals living in rural areas are probably underrepresented in this sample 
because of sampling techniques and the method by which the survey was delivered. It is 
reasonable to assume that gay, lesbian or bisexual individuals living outside cities have smaller 
"queer networks," and this, coupled with potential problems with internet access might mean 
people in rural areas were less likely to be invited to the survey by a friend or someone they 
know. Even if individuals were successfully recruited, the web-based questionnaire may have 
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been too time-intensive or demanding for some individuals with dial-up or slower internet 
connections. Rural area residents might not have ready access to the internet at home or at 
all, which would have further reduced their chances of being recruited and perhaps even 
eliminated any possibility of completing the online survey. 
Approximately 41 percent («= 190) of all respondents hail from the Western region of the 
US, including Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, New Mexico, 
Nevada, Oregon, Utah, Washington and Wyoming. Respondents from the American 
South—Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, 
North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia—make up 
about 27 percent of the final sample (n=\28). Nineteen percent of the sample («=87) come 
from the Northeast region of the United States—Connecticut, Massachusetts, Maine, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and the District 
of Columbia. The Midwest is the most weakly represented region in the sample. Only 13 
percent of respondents («=61) reside in states like Iowa, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Michigan, 
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio and Wisconsin. 
More than 85 percent (ra=397) of all Quest for Quotidian respondents reported their race 
and ethnic identity as "White, Non-Hispanic." Self-identified "mixed race" respondents are 
the second largest racial group in the sample at 6.9 percent, while the number of respondents 
who identified themselves as "Black/African American," "Asian/Pacific Islander" or "Native 
American/Native Alaskan" combined comprises less than three percent of the total sample. 
People who claim Hispanic ethnicity account for 5.6 percent of the total sample. Among 
these, more than half are "White, Hispanic," while yet another quarter claim a bi- or 
multiracial Hispanic identity. 
On average, the women and men in the sample have lived in their communities for about 
ten years, and one in four has called his or her neighborhood home for at least five years. 
They serve as public school teachers and administrators, office workers and managers, doctors 
and nurses, retail sales associates, pastors, accountants, writers, actors, college professors, 
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police officers and firefighters, librarians, real estate agents, musicians, veterinarians, 
computer programmers, market analysts, video game designers, airline pilots and flight 
attendants, CEOs and CFOs, lawyers and paralegals, lobbyists and politicians, chefs and 
food servers, architects, stay-at-home dads and moms, and yes, hairdressers and florists. Only 
one thing seems to make their lives less quotidian than anyone else's. 
They are not heterosexual. 
Gender: Bodies and Performance 
Physical sexual characteristics and gendered displays determine the social and behavioral 
expectations of others, and strongly influence how those others approach and interact 
with individuals. Respondents were asked to indicate their biological sex, which was 
unproblematic (female, «=231; male, «=233; intersex, n=2). A second question— "What 
is your gender identity? In other words, how would you say you live your life in the day-to-
day?"—was used to capture the gender performance strategy respondents used to fit into a 
social world constructed fundamentally around a dichotomous, "either/or" gender ideology, 
to determine how they "passed" in everyday interaction. Only a small minority (n=26) 
reported a gender identity different from that traditionally associated with their biological 
sex. For the overwhelming majority of respondents, biological sex and gender identity were 
one and the same thing (women, «=2l4; men, n=226). 
Initially, response categories were limited to "as a woman" and "as a man," but early 
in the data collection phase I noted that some respondents were skipping that question in 
what appeared to be a systematic way. I also received emails from respondents who were 
unhappy about their responses being "forced" into one or another category of what they 
considered a false binary. In response to these concerns, I added an "other" category and 
allowed respondents to self-define their gender performance in an adjacent textbox. Notably, 
those few individuals who reported gender identity as "other" than as a man or woman were 
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without exception biologically female («=10). Qualitative explanations from respondents 
included the following statements: 
• "I live as a woman, but am not always comfortable identifying 
as one; often I prefer to think of myself as neuter." 
• "neuter; sometimes male, sometimes female" 
• "I identify with neither, I'm a very masculine looking woman, but still 
clearly present as a strong woman. But I want to be seen as feminine." 
• "Without particular thought or reference to myself as a gendered entity" 
• "transgendered" 
• me 
• "Gender Fuck" 
• "genderqueer" 
• "still trying to figure this out myself, I'm afraid." 
Statements such as these appear to strongly suggest that these subjects are challenging the 
definition of gender, not reporting how they experience the social world through gender. How, 
for example, does one distinguish between "transgender" and the user-provided category 
of "neuter?" These terms are neither compatible nor equivalent. Sociologically, gender is 
never neutral. Despite the claims of "genderqueer" identity, it is unreasonable at this point 
in history to assume that any of these respondents have been socialized as "transgendered" 
individuals since childhood; rather, it is likely that adoption of a transgendered identity in 
adolescence or adulthood is an act of resistance against the hegemonic gender and sexual 
ideologies in contemporary society, a rejection of childhood socialization and normative 
pressures to "fit in" to a heterosexist society. Female respondents who defined their gender 
as "other" were coded as women in the final sample, because they most likely were socialized 
as women, and as adults are now challenging the gender binary that in their perception 
constrains them as people who happen to be women. 
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In recognition that gender is not static or essential, but lived and performed by 
individuals (Bornstein 1994; Lorber 1994; Butler 1990), respondents who reported a gender 
identity usually associated with a different sex were assigned to the gender category they used 
to describe how they live their lives, how they gender themselves (see Dozier 2005). Seven 
people who identified as male reported performing gender "as a woman," and seven others 
identified as female and reported performing gender "as a man." Both intersexed individuals 
reported their gender identity as "woman." In these cases, gender is based on performative 
strategy rather than physical sexual characteristics. I coded gender to be the same as reported 
sex—e.g., if sex is female, gender is woman—only when no response was recorded on the 
gender identity question. Physical sexual characteristics are not always a useful proxy for 
gender. Some non-heterosexual people challenge the rigidity of sexual categories, because 
they believe that the socially- and normatively-constructed categories themselves are unstable 
or oppressive. Put more directly, some individuals do not or cannot see themselves or 
their bodies in a limited list of sexual or gender identities. For this reason, when no other 
information about gender identity existed, respondents were assigned to a gender category 
based on their reported physical or biological sex. 
I do not wish to suggest that "transgender" identity is illegitimate or unworthy of 
scholarly attention, but I do want to point out that it remains conceptually amorphous, 
difficult to measure, and definitionally unstable outside the discourses of feminist activism, 
psychology and radical identity politics. Because Quest for Quotidian is essentially a study 
of how values shape the conceptualization of family life for non-heterosexuals, the powerful 
influence of gender (as a set of norms derived from values) or gender socialization (the 
process of attaching normative sanctions to the behaviors of sexed bodies) cannot be elided. 
In the absence of information about how gender is lived or performed in the day to day, I am 
inclined to follow the assumption in the literature, namely that individuals experience gender 
socialization on the basis of their physical sex, which would lead to a gender identity that falls 
within the man/woman binary, however uncomfortable or unsatisfying that identity might 
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be to individual respondents. At the same time, it is important to acknowledge members of 
the non-heterosexual population whose gender performance is readily familiar but cannot 
be assumed to be the direct result of gender socialization. For this reason, I have assigned 
subjects whose identity conflicts with their physical sex to gender categories based on their 
affirmative endorsement of a particular gendered social experience. 
Gender and Sexuality: Desire, Identity and Behavior 
To participate in Quest for Quotidian, respondents had to be non-heterosexual, that is, 
subjects were required either to claim an available sexual identity (gay, lesbian, bisexual), 
question his or her commitment to heterosexuality, or redefine heterosexual identity to 
include sexual behaviors normatively and usually proscribed by heterosexual norms. Unlike 
the questions regarding gender and sex in the survey, questions about sexuality and sexual 
identity did not illicit negative feedback from subjects, suggesting that these questions are 
much less problematic, or perhaps less politically charged within die non-heterosexual 
population. 
For analytical purposes, I divide the final Quest for Quotidian sample into two broad 
categories—homosexuals («=279) and bisexuals (»=187)—based on self-identification and 
self-reported behavior. I am aware that use of the term "homosexual" has been criticized in 
the academic literature since the late 1980s (see Risman and Schwartz 1988), but in this 
study, "homosexual" most clearly distinguishes self-identified gay and lesbian individuals 
from bisexual individuals in a sample limited to non-heterosexuals. I further subdivide 
these categories into "gendered sexual identity," namely bisexual women, bisexual men, 
homosexual men and homosexual women. Figure 1 shows the sample in terms of gendered 
sexual identity, e.g., bisexual man, bisexual woman, gay man, lesbian woman. The largest 
group in the sample is gay men («=190), followed by bisexual women (n=\44), lesbian 
women (n-89), and bisexual men («=43). Less than 20 percent of the entire sample is 
constituted by lesbian women, but the smallest sexual identity group is bisexual men, who 
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Figure 1. Gendered Sexual Identity, or Sexuality by Gender, N=466 
Bisexuals (n=187) Homosexuals (n=279) 
• Men O Women 
make up only nine percent of the sample. Four out of five men in the study are gay men, but 
only about one in three women are lesbians. 
Survey respondents identified themselves as gay or lesbian (n=279), bisexual (n=\69), 
straight (n=6) and "uncertain or questioning" (n=\2). For homosexual and bisexual 
participants, this measure is unproblematic. For the 18 individuals who identified as 
"straight" or "uncertain," however, I relied on a second, behavioral question to determine 
eligibility for participation in the survey. Individuals who identified as "straight" and who 
also described their adult sexual experience as "exclusively heterosexual" were informed that 
they were not part of the target population for the study, and were asked to exit the online 
survey. No such cases exist in the final sample. 
Many studies of gay, lesbian and bisexual people rely on behavioral measures alone to 
determine whether someone is non-heterosexual (Weinrich and Klein 2002; Rust 1999). For 
instance, asking about the number of sexual partners of the same sex someone has had in the 
past year might indicate sexual preference or orientation. A ratio calculated by dividing the 
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number of same-sex sexual partners by the total number of sexual partners a respondent had 
in a given timeframe might also be effective—albeit potentially inaccurate—at objectively 
determining sexual orientation. I am not convinced, however, that sexuality is so easily 
determined by behavior. 
For some, sexuality is fluid over the life course, and individuals might claim any 
number of identities as legitimate expressions of their personal sexuality. For example, the 
emerging literature on "men who have sex with men" notes that many of these men identify 
as heterosexual or "straight" (Rust 2002). It is also possible that straight-identified men 
and women with same-sex attractions express their sexuality outside the organizational, 
institutional and normative patterns that constitute a "gay" social existence—they are not 
and perhaps do not wish to be integrated into the gay community. Arguably, these men and 
women may be more conscious of permeable boundaries between hetero- and homosexual 
identities, practices and public spaces, much like the hazy boundary described by Chauncey 
(1995) as existing in New York between heterosexual and homosexual men prior to the 
organized crackdown on homosexual spaces in the 1950s. Many might argue that these 
"straight" men and women are objectively bisexual, but such a conclusion is based solely on 
behavior as opposed to identity. 
Because Quest for Quotidian is at root a study of meaning—how attitudes shape 
commitment to social institutions like family or marriage—then how non-heterosexual 
people identify themselves is relatively more important than how they might "objectively" 
be defined through behavior, e.g., the frequency of same-sex sexual contact or activity. For 
example, a woman who comes out several years into her marriage to a man might claim a 
lesbian identity and describe her adult sexual activities and desires as "mostly heterosexual." 
Based on her reported behavior and desire, we might conclude that this subject is bisexual, 
not homosexual. Doing so, however, ignores the historical narratives of sexual minorities, 
including the stories of lesbians and gay men who entered heterosexual marriages as a way 
to avoid rather than embrace a non-heterosexual identity, only to discover later that being in 
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a heterosexual marriage does not make one "straight," nor does engaging in heterosexual sex 
necessarily erase same-sex desire. Notably, too, parenting a child through heterosexual sex 
does not, by itself, indicate or secure a heterosexual identity. 
In the example here, the subject acknowledges her queer identity after several years of 
marriage. We can presume that most of her sexual activity has occurred within the context of 
her heterosexual marriage so it should not be surprising that she reports her sexual experience 
to be mostly heterosexual. In fact, it is likely that many (if not most) non-heterosexual 
people find it impossible to describe their sexual activity or desire as anything but "mostly" or 
"exclusively" heterosexual until after they come out as gay, lesbian or bisexual to others, or at 
least accept a queer identity themselves. This might be particularly true for older individuals 
who have lived closeted for a larger proportion of their adult lives. Unfortunately, this cannot 
be adequately addressed using data from this sample. 
Are there men and women who might privately see themselves as gay or lesbian or 
bisexual, but who have not been sexually active with someone of the same sex in the past 
year? Certainly there are. Closeted men and women might never act on their same-sex 
desires, but that hardly means that they are straight. Are there men and women who have 
had a same-sex intimate encounter in the last year or at some time in their adult lives who 
do not consider themselves gay, lesbian or bisexual? Again, the answer is probably yes. 
Experimentation with same-sex attraction, even if it occurs more than once, does not itself 
necessarily transform a person's identity. The six "straight" and twelve "uncertain" individuals 
whose responses are included in the final sample indicated that their sexual activity and 
desires were not exclusively heterosexual. We know they are not heterosexual, but what kind 
of non-heterosexuals might they be? 
All six "straight" respondents—five women and one man—reported that their adult 
sexual experience was "mostly heterosexual." The man and two of the women are currently 
in heterosexual marriages. The remaining three women are currently single: one is divorced, 
another has a steady romantic partner, and the remaining woman is unattached. That 
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these individuals demonstrate a degree of comfort with the conceptual dissonance between 
"straight" identity and not-so-straight sexual behavior suggests, albeit inconclusively, that 
they (are not comfortable with the "standard" non-heterosexual identities, that they do not 
see themselves as "lesbian" or "gay" or even "bisexual.") This might be a function of age, but 
with such small subsamples, there is no way to statistically test this. Straight respondents 
are all over 34 years of age. Three-fourths of the respondents uncertain about their sexual 
identity are age 32 or younger. The implication is that older people have lived their lives 
in a particular heteronormative way, structured their lives through marriage or long-term 
relationships, or lived closeted so long that they do not identify with non-heterosexual 
identity categories. They are unlikely to be uncertain about their identities because they are 
accustomed to them, comfortable with their lives, and do not feel motivated to adopt what 
they might see as a political label that will not, at this stage of the life course, enhance their 
existence. On the other hand, they may also feel compelled to maintain dieir "straight" 
personae in order to minimize the risk of losing the stability or security they have built over 
the course of their lives. 
Of the twelve people—seven women and five men—who report they are uncertain 
about their sexuality, half are currently in heterosexual relationships. Two of the women are 
married, and one man and three women are in different-sex domestic partnerships. Among 
the men uncertain about their sexuality, none reports that his sexual behavior or desire has 
been exclusively heterosexual. Two men, both under 30 years old, indicated that they have 
been "mostly homosexual." One man over thirty indicated he has been "bisexual," while 
two men described themselves as "mostly heterosexual" in adulthood. Among the seven 
women uncertain about their sexual identity, only one described her adult sexual activity as 
"mostly homosexual," and only one other described it as "bisexual." Four women described 
themselves as "mostly heterosexual," while the remaining woman indicated that her behavior 
has been "exclusively heterosexual." While age may play a role in determining uncertainty 
about sexual identity, since most of these women are currently in heterosexual relationships, 
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it is reasonable to conclude that they have had limited opportunities to explore their non-
heterosexual identities, or perhaps have chosen to forego such opportunities altogether. 
All eighteen individuals were coded as bisexuals in the final sample. This should not be 
interpreted as a statement about the nature of bisexual identity, i.e., that it is a transitional 
identity between straight and gay. Several scholars have challenged such claims (Rust 1996), 
and have convincingly demonstrated that bisexuality is a stable queer identity unique from 
other non-heterosexual identities (Johnson 2004). The six individuals who identify as 
straight are clearly not heterosexual under my strict definition, but are instead behaviorally 
bisexual and relatively untroubled by uncertainty or confusion that might be created by any 
contradiction between identity and behavior. It would appear that they have successfully 
redefined heterosexuality for themselves, broadened it to include pleasures, desires and 
relationships that for many "straight" people are sexually out-of-bounds. It is unclear, 
however, how this redefined heterosexuality is substantively different from bisexuality, and it 
is even less clear how stable these identities actually are. It is at least possible that as they age, 
some of the uncertain and bisexual people may adopt a recognizable gay or lesbian identity. 
Based on the available data, the twelve individuals who are unsure about their sexual 
identities are similarly not homosexual. Almost all of these respondents will arguably claim 
a queer identity eventually. A number will ultimately understand themselves as lesbians or 
gay men, and it is possible that others may come to identify themselves as bisexual. Some 
may find that they identify as straight, despite their same-sex attraction or sexual activity. At 
this point, available data do not allow me to speculate which individuals will adopt a given 
identity. The data do tell me, however, that these twelve individuals are at least behaviorally 
bisexual. 
It may appear that I have spent an inordinate amount of time discussing the disposition 
of eighteen cases, but I have done so in order to illustrate that while it is fluid or dynamic in 
theory, sexual identity is not so unstable in practical terms as many theorists might suggest 
Qohnson 2004). More than 96 percent of all respondents identified themselves as either 
65 
lesbian/gay or bisexual, including 14 percent representing the most closeted individuals in 
the sample, those whose homosexual or bisexual identity is known perhaps only to close 
friends or a family member. Clearly, the categories themselves are largely unproblematic, 
even less problematic than the more politically-charged gender categories. "Straight" or 
"uncertain" respondents generally have more in common with bisexuals in the sample than 
with homosexuals. Like a sizable number of bisexual respondents, many are in different-sex 
relationships. Most claim a more or less bisexual adult sexual history, not an exclusive history 
of heterosexual or homosexual desire or experience. What is undeniable, from the data, is 
that none of these respondents have claimed to be gay or lesbian—they are not homosexual, 
a distinction that will prove to be significant in this work. 
Coming Out and Coming of Age 
The sample of adult non-heterosexuals analyzed here (#=466) includes 233 men and 
233 women ranging in age from 18 to 74 (see summary of age distribution in Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Distribution of Age in the Sample, N=462 
160 
18 to 24 25 to 34 35 to 44 45 to 54 55 to 64 65 and older 
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The median age in the sample is 33; for women, 29; for men, 38. The sample mean for 
age is 34.95, although mean age is higher for men (M=37J4, SD= 12.22) than for women 
(Af=32.l6, SD= 10.95). Independent samples t-test results showed that the mean difference 
in age between men and women was significant and moderately strong [/(460)=5.167, 
p<.00l; T|2=.06], a finding that suggests a degree of bias in the sample, based on an 
interaction between age and gender. 
The age differences by gender might be explained by how individuals came to the survey 
instrument. Almost twice as many women than men found invitations to Quest for Quotidian 
on community or network websites, while about twice as many men than women reported 
they found the survey through references on online blogs. Young women who came to the 
survey via sites like MySpace.com or Friendster.com would have referred individuals within 
their own social networks, i.e., women who were similar in age and interests. Men and 
women who were referred to the survey via a gay- and lesbian-friendly personal or political 
blog are perhaps more highly educated than their counterparts on MySpace. If that is true, 
we can assume that blog readers are probably older on average than users of network sites 
that market to a younger crowd. Like younger respondents, older respondents are likely to 
share recruitment information or links to the survey with individuals in their own social 
network. If men were more likely than women to come to the survey via blogs, then it is 
likely that the mean age of men would be higher than for women based on the assumed 
homogeneity of social and friendship networks. The same assumptions would lead to the 
conclusion that if women were more likely than men to be recruited into the survey from a 
community forum or network website populated by younger people, the mean age of women 
in the sample would be lower. 
Clearly, age, gender and sexuality interact in meaningful ways. For example, women are 
more than six times more likely than men to claim a bisexual identity, and women under 
thirty are twice as likely as older women to be bisexual rather than lesbian. I turned again 
to t-tests to examine these interactions. Homosexuals tend to be slightly older (Af=36.58, 
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5D=11.97) than bisexuals [M=32.36, SZM1.48; *(462)=3.778,/<.0Gl], although the 
magnitude of the effect is small (t)2 = .03). Similar results were obtained when I compared 
ages of lesbian and bisexual women, excluding men entirely. Although the effect was small 
(T|2 = .02), the difference in mean age between lesbian women (Af=34.15, 5D=11.65) and 
bisexual women [M=30.92, SD= 10.34; *(229)=2.195,/=.029] was significant, and therefore 
likely to affect later analyses. The sample may contain other biases, but in examining the 
relationship between age and sexuality, or age and gender, it is clear that more complex 
analyses of this sample should take gendered sexuality into account and control for age. 
Visibility, Age and the Closet 
I asked respondents to indicate how long they had personally been aware that they 
might be homosexual, bisexual or otherwise not exclusively heterosexual. Most respondents 
indicated that awareness of their sexual identity as different from heterosexuality came 
early—in their teen years or before («=373). Fifteen percent became aware of their 
homosexual or bisexual identity in college or their early twenties, with 4.1 percent reporting 
they have known they were not heterosexual only since their mid-twenties or later. 
Being aware of one's sexual identity is not the same thing as being "out," or openly 
bisexual or homosexual to others. I asked respondents at what age they first came out, and 
their responses are summarized in Table 1. A number of respondents («=76) seemed to 
take issue with the question, and did not provide a specific age. For descriptive purposes, I 
estimated these missing ages based on the mean age of "coming out" within the specific age 
category that contained the case, making adjustments when the mean age was higher than 
actual age, or when it was clear that the respondent was not open about his or her sexuality. 
This is admittedly not very precise, but it does give us a general idea about when people make 
their non-heterosexuality known, their sexual personae more visible. The mean age at which 
individuals in this sample came out—whether I include the estimates or not—is 21, and the 
median age is 19. 
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Table 1. Age Respondent Came Out as Non-heterosexual (includes estimates) by Current 
Age of Respondent, N=462, missing=4 
Age at Coming 
Before age 18 
18 to 24 
25 to 34 
35 to 44 
45 to 54 
55 or older 
Total 
Out 18 to 24 
71 
37 
108 
Current 
25 to 34 
44 
73 
17 
134 
Age of Respondents 
35 to 44 
21 
67 
21 
12 
121 
45 to 59 
10 
36 
16 
8 
9 
1 
80 
60 and older 
4 
2 
8 
2 
1 
2 
19 
Because most people come out—at least to themselves, and perhaps to friends—before 
they reach the age of 25, it appears that once people become aware of their sexual difference, 
it is generally only a short time before this difference becomes die basis for a more public 
identity. The correlation between reported awareness of one's sexual identity and the age 
respondents report "coming out" is statistically significant, with stronger effects for women 
(r=.362,/><.001, «=229) than for men (r=.262,p<.00l, n=23l). Negative correlation 
between the age of awareness and the age at which respondents personally and publicly 
acknowledged their sexuality would have indicated that people tend to delay coming out for 
much longer periods of time, perhaps until another stage of the life course. 
It is unreasonable to assume that people immediately bolt out of the closet the moment 
they realize they are not heterosexual; some delay between realization and actualization is to 
be expected among almost all respondents. Coming out is intimately tied to coming of age, 
which is to say that becoming an independent adult, graduating from high school or college, 
or moving out to be on one's own (perhaps in an urban center where one might meet other 
gay, lesbian or bisexual people), appears to account for much of the delay between awareness 
and coming out among individuals in this sample. 
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Right-wing conservative opponents to gay rights, and particularly family rights for same-
sex couples, point to the increased visibility of non-heterosexual populations as evidence 
that homosexuals collectively engage in some form of "recruitment" in order to undermine 
heterosexuality and "traditional family values." This specious claim of a gay conspiracy is 
part of the mean-spirited "homosexual agenda" discourse. From the data here, visibility of 
non-heterosexual people is increasing, but not because young people are being convinced to 
join the ranks of the queer community—there is, after all, no unified effort on the part of 
any imaginary monolithic homosexual organization to dismantle the traditional family by 
encouraging young people to abandon their heterosexuality. Rather, it appears that as queer 
visibility increases, younger non-heterosexuals are more likely than were individuals in older 
cohorts to acknowledge and fully embrace their alternative sexual identities earlier in the 
life course. In other words, the "lag" between discovery and acceptance of non-heterosexual 
identity—between realization and actualization—appears to have shortened, so that younger 
may be just as likely as older non-heterosexuals to be "totally out" of the closet, to see and 
present themselves unapologetically and even proudly as gay, lesbian or bisexual. 
Figure 2 above shows how age is distributed in the sample, which includes only adult 
individuals at least eighteen years old. Unsurprisingly, the age distribution curve is steepest 
nearer the lowest value (18 years of age), and slopes down more or less uniformly from left 
to right as age—and mortality—increases. The variable yearsout is the difference between 
a person's age in years and the age at which that person first came out, and its value ranges 
from 0 to 61 years (where "0" is less than one year or not out at all). The sample mean for 
yearsout is 13.7 years, and the median is 11 years. The yearsout variable is summarized in 
Figure 3. Predictably, the number of years since coming out falls steadily at each ten-year 
interval until year 30, reflecting the age distribution in the sample. The sharper drop in the 
30 to 39 year category might indicate that individuals over 30 were more likely to delay 
coming out, and thus have been openly gay for a smaller proportion of their adult lives. 
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Figure 3. Distribution of Years Since Coming Out, N=464 
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Less than 10 years 10 to 19 years 20 to 29 years 30 to 39 years 40 years or more 
Being Out: Perceptions of Openness 
Coming out as a gay, lesbian or bisexual person is frequently described as a liberating 
process of self-realization leading to self-disclosure, which in turn can lead to acceptance 
and integration (Derlega and Chaikin 1977; Reis and Shaver 1988; Jordan and Deluty 
1998), and the resolution of the cognitive dissonance inherent in leading a "double life" 
as a non-heterosexual in a heterosexual world (LaSala 2000; Berger 1990; Johnson 2002). 
Alternatively, disclosure of sexual identity might have negative consequences, including 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Perceived Openness (howout), by Gendered Sexual Identity 
Gender/Sexuality Mean Median Mode 
Biexual men 
Bisexual women 
Gay men 
Lesbian women 
Total 
43 
144 
190 
89 
466 
4.26 
4.75 
5.84 
6.20 
4 
5 
6 
6 
2 
5 
7 
7 
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isolation and increased risk of discrimination and violence. To capture respondents' 
perceptions about their own degree of openness about their sexual identity, I asked, "How 
open would you say you are about your sexual identity today?" Responses were recorded on a 
7-point scale, where 1 indicated "not out at all" and 7 indicated "totally out." The higher the 
score, the more open about their sexuality the respondents perceive themselves to be. 
The mean score for the sample was 5-43 («=466), which falls on the high end of the 
scale. The modal response was 7, or "totally out," and represents 33 percent of the sample, 
but 122 of the 157 individuals who perceive themselves to be "totally out" are gay or lesbian, 
not bisexual. Indeed, the modal response for all bisexual respondents was 5 (see Table 2). 
The data clearly suggest bisexual and homosexual people differ with regard to how out or 
open about their sexuality they are or can be. Comparing mean scores on perceived openness 
revealed a significant difference in scores between homosexuals (Af=5.96, SD=1.29) and 
bisexuals [M=4.64, SD=\J9; *(312.92)=-8.707,/><.001]. Differences in sexuality explain 
more than 14 percent of the variance in the perceived openness variable, which strongly 
suggests that coming out as gay or lesbian might be easier—psychologically and socially— 
than coming out as bisexual. 
Across the sample, "how out" someone perceives himself or herself to be is not 
significantly correlated with age. Instead, self-perception of openness is negatively correlated 
with age at coming out (r =-.185,/><.001, «=464), and positively correlated with the number 
of years that have passed since subjects first came out (r=.136,/>=.003, «=464). Essentially, 
these findings tell a hypothetical story about the coming out process: The older people were 
when they first came out, the less open they are about their sexuality today, but as more time 
passes, the more strongly people see themselves as affirmatively queer. 
Given this story, I hypothesized that younger respondents would be less open about their 
sexuality, on average, than older individuals. In other words, I expected to find that older 
individuals were more secure in their identity and less likely to be ambivalent or tentative 
about their sexuality. I conducted a one-way between-groups analysis of variance (ANOVA) 
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to explore the relationship between age and the level of openness about their sexual identity 
reported by respondents. Subjects were divided into five age groups (Group 1: 18 to 24; 
Group 2: 25 to 34; Group 3: 35 to 44; Group 4: 45 to 59; and Group 5: 60 and older). The 
analysis revealed no statistically significant difference in perceived openness scores for the 
five groups. Contrast comparisons also failed to show significant differences. I conducted 
a second ANOVA wherein subjects were divided into five groups according to the number 
of years since they came out. While a statistically significant difference in means was found, 
closer analysis showed that the difference in question was between Group 1 (0 to 10 years, 
w=199) and Group 5 (40 or more years, w=8). The important finding here is that there is no 
statistically significant difference between those who have come out recently and those who 
have been out for longer. 
Being Out: Disclosure of Sexual Identity 
Empirically, being open about one's sexuality must be more than a subjective perception 
or attitude. Individuals should be able to demonstrate through some behavior that they 
are, in fact, open about their lives, loves and identity (that their lives are open to scrutiny 
and critique, as well as acceptance). On one hand, the item above is at least a measure of 
self-acceptance and level of comfort one personally feels with what might be a new but true 
sexual identity, but by itself it is not a reliable measure of integration. Lower scores on this 
measure of "openness" might just as easily be interpreted as levels of commitment to personal 
privacy, or more cynically, to a degree of secrecy (Cameron and Hargreaves 2005), shame or 
internalized homophobia (Herek et al. 1997). It is also possible that the measure of perceived 
openness overestimates how out people really are. For example, sample selection bias might 
explain higher scores on perceived openness: people who see themselves as very out are more 
likely to complete a survey like this one. To validate the measure, it must be calibrated against 
a more objective measure, one that captures patterns of self-disclosure. To be out, I argue, is 
to tell someone that you are. 
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To measure the degree of self-disclosure, I had to determine whether respondents had 
disclosed their sexual identity to others within their social networks. In response to the 
question, "To whom have you personally come out about your sexuality?" individuals 
identified groups in four social network domains—friends, family, work and community—to 
whom they had disclosed. Each domain is further divided into an "inner circle" and "outer 
circle." The four inner circle groups are assumed to include significant others, people who 
have more intimate ties with the subject, people with whom respondents interact more or 
less regularly, or people more inclined to be sympathetic toward non-heterosexuals: 
• Friends: gay, lesbian or queer friends 
• Family: immediate family (parents and siblings, spouse, children) 
• Work: coworkers (people you work with) 
• Community: neighbors (people and families who live close to you or in your 
neighborhood) 
The four outer circle groups include those whose relationship with the subject is more 
formal or institutionalized, people who might be less sympathetic toward self-disclosure of 
non-heterosexuality: 
• Friends: heterosexual friends 
• Family: extended family (grandparents, aunts/uncles, cousins, etc.) 
• "Work: employers (people you work for) 
• Community: community leaders (like pastors, teachers, business owners, 
politicians, etc.) 
• Community: community leaders (like pastors, teachers, business owners, 
politicians, etc.) 
Each of the disclosure variables is a binary variable coded " 1" for disclosure or "0" for 
non-disclosure. In each domain, I assume that it would be easier to come out to people in the 
inner circle than to people in the outer circle. To illustrate this idea, consider that one might 
be more comfortable coming out to his/her parents than to grandparents; to lesbian or gay 
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friends than to heterosexual friends; to the person in the next cubicle than to the executive 
in the office down the hall; or to the people living in the house next door rather than the 
president of the homeowner's association. 
People's perception of openness (howout) is positively and very strongly correlated with 
levels of disclosure (disclose), when level of disclosure is the sum of the number of groups to 
whom an individual has personally revealed his/her sexual identity (r = .778, n=466, jx.OOl). 
In this case, the range of possible scores for disclose is 0 (not out to any group) to 8 (out to 
every group within every domain). Twenty-one percent (n=99) of all respondents (N=466) 
indicated that they had come out about their sexuality to someone in each subgroup in each 
domain. 
For my purposes, respondents are considered "out" in a given domain if they admit 
they have disclosed their sexual identity to someone in the inner circle, someone in the 
outer circle, or both. To capture this, I created four binary variables where 1 = "out" and 
0 = "not out" for each domain. I summed these variables to obtain a different measure of 
disclosure (variable name: veryout) which yields the total number of social domains in which 
respondents live openly as non-heterosexuals. By this measure, 48 percent (n=224) are out in 
all four domains; 24 percent in three domains; 14 percent in two domains, and 12 percent in 
only one domain. Only six respondents (1.3 percent) have not disclosed their sexual identity 
to anyone in any domain. Their scores on perceived openness about their sexuality are 
correspondingly low (M=l.2 on 7-point scale). In contrast, scores on perceived openness are 
relatively high (Af=6.46) for respondents who have disclosed in all four domains. Veryout, 
like the disclose variable upon which it is based, is positively and strongly correlated with 
scores on perceived openness (r=.750, n=466,p<.001). 
Out to Friends and Family 
By a large margin, most individuals in the sample report to have come out to their 
friends (out to heterosexual friends, 88 percent; out to gay, lesbian or bisexual friends, 95 
percent). Respondents out in only one domain (ra=57) have generally disclosed their sexual 
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Table 3. Results of Logistic Regression of Bisexuality and Gender on Disclosure in Fewer 
than Two Domains (e.g., friends, family, work, or community) 
B Wald Chi-Square Odds Ratio 95% Confidence Interval 
for Odds Ratio 
Variables Lower Upper 
Bisexual 2.389 39.969** 10.904 5.199 22.868 
Gender (man=l) .556 2.841 1.743 -913 3.326 
Constant -3.509 80.210 .030 
**/<.001 
identity only to friends, but a small proportion are only out to family members. Among 
the 63 individuals who have come out in only one domain, 45 are bisexual and only 12 
are homosexual. The six individuals who are not out in any domain identified as bisexual. 
Logistic regression (see Table 3) showed that bisexuals are significantly more likely than 
homosexuals to be closeted or out only in only one domain. Bisexuals were more than ten 
times more likely to be out about their sexual identity in only one domain or not at all than 
were their homosexual counterparts, even when controlling for gender. 
Family is a somewhat different matter. While 79 percent of respondents have personally 
come out to their immediate families (which includes parents), only 42 percent are out 
to members of their extended family. About 19 percent of respondents report that their 
relatives (parents, brothers, sisters, etc.) disapprove of their sexual identity, a figure which 
may underestimate disapproval, given that in the same question an additional 16 percent 
indicated that their relatives were unaware of their sexual identity, and another 30 percent 
have "mixed feelings" about it. The potential disapproval from family members—whether 
actual, anticipated, or inferred—might limit disclosure to the inner circle, or immediate 
family, and encourage lesbian and gay individuals to treat their sexual identity as a "family 
secret" that need not be shared with more distant relatives. 
Out at Work 
Being out at work can mean either being out to coworkers—peers who themselves might 
be considered friends—and being out to employers, including supervisors, human resource 
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personnel, or other members of management with some degree of power over individuals or 
influence over employment status. While 73 percent of respondents indicate that they are 
out at work, only about 52 percent are out to both coworkers and employers. Fewer than one 
percent are out only to the people or organizations for whom they work, with the rest out 
only to coworkers (20 percent) or not out at work at all (27 percent). 
The workplace has historically been hostile to gay and lesbian people, a site of 
discrimination where disclosure carries higher personal and public risk of negative 
consequences (Schneider 1987). Until relatively recently, homosexuals—or even suspected 
homosexuals—could be fired, slandered, even arrested (Kaiser 1997, Chauncey 1995), and 
had few options, legal or otherwise, for fighting such discrimination. The optimum strategy 
for most of the 20th century was to take a Weberian approach to managing alternative sexual 
identities at work: namely, keep private matters at home, and labor in a sort of professional 
closet at work. Forty years ago, it would have been an unmitigated personal disaster for 
a homosexual in the United States if an employer or supervisor discovered that he or she 
enjoyed same-sex pleasures, or lived with and loved a person of the same sex. Today, non-
heterosexuals appear to be relatively comfortable discussing their private lives openly with 
coworkers and peers—the inner circle at work—but remain wary of revealing their sexuality 
to organizational leaders, managers or owners who populate the outer circle. This pattern is 
similar, both conceptually and numerically, to family disclosure patterns, strongly suggesting 
that being out at work is about as important to individuals as being out to family. By coming 
out to coworkers, non-heterosexuals transform the workplace into a queer space, by some 
accounts, much the same way as individuals who come out to their parents, brothers or 
sisters reveal not only their own sexuality but the entire family's status as a queer or gay 
family—a status the family holds by virtue of having at least one non-heterosexual member. 
That almost 80 percent of respondents in this sample are out on the job is an encouraging 
sign of increasing acceptance, even if the risk of stigmatization or discrimination remains 
relatively high for gay, lesbian and bisexual people. 
77 
Out in the Community 
To live openly in communities essentially requires disclosing sexual identity to strangers 
with whom public, semi-public and political spaces of the social landscape are shared. 
More than 40 percent of respondents are out neither to their neighbors nor to political 
or community leaders. For most respondents, it appears that being out to community or 
political leaders (56 percent) is easier than being out to neighbors (46 percent). 
Patterns of Disclosure 
Among respondents out in two domains («=67), twice as many are out to friends 
and family than are out to friends and at work («=44 and n=22, respectively). Only one 
respondent indicated he or she was out to friends and in the community. Individuals out 
across three domains (n=l 12) are most likely to be out to friends, family and at work («=74), 
although nineteen respondents are out in the friends, family and community domains, and 
another nineteen are out across the friends, work and community domains. While this is 
useful information, it does not tell us much about how the inner and outer circles work. 
Among those who did not come out to everyone (n=367), the configurations of 
disclosure vary markedly. In all, the sample features fifty different configurations of disclosure 
across the inner and outer circle groups, representing roughly a third of 169 possible 
configurations. As Table 4 shows, five configurations of disclosure capture one half of the 
entire sample, while ten configurations capture two-thirds of the sample. "All friends," "all 
work" and similar notations should be read to mean that the respondent disclosed to both 
inner and outer circle groups within the particular domain. 
The diverse patterns of disclosure provide some clues as what life outside the closet might 
actually mean for the majority of lesbian, gay and bisexual people, but they also seem to 
reflect larger historical changes in the family system and social conditions in communities. 
For example, the infrequent inclusion of "extended family" in the most common 
configurations suggests that family ties within nuclear families are strong, while ties across 
nuclear families in the same kin network are relatively weak. What is clearly important to 
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Table 4. Most Common Configurations of Disclosure of Sexual Identity, ranked by 
frequency of response, N=466 
"To whom have you personally Frequency Percent of Sample 
come out about your sexuality?" 
TOP FIVE 
1. All friends, all family, all work, all community 99 21.24 
2. All friends, immediate family and coworkers 42 9.01 
3. All friends, immediate family, coworkers, neighbors 40 8.58 
4. All friends 32 6.87 
5. All friends, all family, all work 20 4.30 
Top Five Totals 233 50.00 
TOP TEN 
6. All friends, immediate family 19 4.08 
7. All friends, and coworkers 18 3.86 
8. Queer friends, all family, all work 15 3.22 
9. Queer friends only 15 3.22 
10. All friends, all family, all work, neighbors 14 3.00 
Top Ten Cumulative Totals 314 67.38 
TOP FIFTEEN 
11. All friends, all family, all work, community leaders 13 2.79 
12. Queer friends, immediate family 13 2.79 
13. Queer friends, all family, all work, neighbors 12 2.58 
14. All friends, all family 9 1.93 
15. Immediate family 9 1.93 
Top Fifteen Cumulative Totals 370 79.40 
a person's sense of being out is disclosure to immediate family; how members of extended 
families respond to a person's coming out appears to be relatively unimportant in the larger 
scheme of things, a low priority. Non-heterosexuals and their families, like most in the 
United States, are increasingly disconnected from extended kinship networks by geographical 
or social distance, time, jobs, or ideology or beliefs. A similar pattern of isolation seems 
to exist in reverse in the community domain, wherein people report they are less likely to 
come out to their neighbors than they are to come out to more distant and impersonal 
administrators, politicians or other officials in the community. It is plausible to assume that 
non-heterosexuals seek to protect their privacy and their own nuclear families from potential 
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threats posed by "nosy neighbors" or neighbors with a political or ideological ax to grind, and 
thus are less likely to befriend their neighbors or risk exposure (or judgment) by interacting 
with them. The result is obvious: weaker informal ties between families and households in 
communities, reflecting the more general decline in community cohesion lamented by many 
sociologists and scholars (Putnam 2001). 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
LIFE ALONG THE QUOTIDIAN: FAMILY, 
FRIENDS AND COMMUNITY 
Children of Marriage 
As a point of historical fact, it seems clear and uncontroversial that heterosexual marriages 
and households have produced far more lesbians, bisexuals and gay men than same-sex-
headed households ever will. In other words, the vast majority of non-heterosexuals come 
from rather unremarkable families. In this sample, more than 93 percent of respondents 
are children of marriage, in the more or less traditional sense. Specifically, 429 respondents 
were born after their parents married one another, while another eight respondents (only 
1.7 percent of the sample) reported they were born before their parents married. Of the 
437 parental marriages reported, roughly one in three («=141, or 32 percent) had ended in 
divorce by 2005. Most respondents who experienced the divorce of their parents reported 
they were 12 years old or younger when the divorce occurred («=89). Thirty-two respondents 
experienced their parents' divorce during dieir teen years, age 13 to 18, and nineteen 
respondents experienced their parents divorce as adults. 
Across the entire sample, only one in four respondents to this survey experienced 
parental divorce before age nineteen, and half of these are currently between 18 and 34 
years old. That parental divorce is more common in more recent cohorts is consistent witii 
general divorce trends in die US population. Although the findings might be contested in 
political and cultural discourses, a significant family research literature indicates that children 
do best when their parents can avoid divorce (see Wallerstein et al. 2000). Three of four 
non-heterosexual respondents in this survey were reared by by two parents in a relatively 
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stable, long-lasting marriage. Put simply, non-heterosexual people in this sample were more 
likely than not to grow up within a family configuration that—according to conventional 
wisdom-—is best suited to children's development and long-term well-being: a married, two-
parent heterosexual household. 
Parents' Education 
Parents' education influences both social structure within the family (such as the division 
of labor) and socialization of children, and likely has some bearing on die values retained 
by adult non-heterosexual offspring and the norms and relationships to which they aspire. 
Table 5 compares mother's and father's educational attainment, and demonstrates how 
education is distributed within parental couples (n=450; sixteen cases are not included in the 
crosstabulation because one or both parents' education was either unknown or unreported). 
About 44 percent of fathers had obtained at least a four-year college degree, compared 
with only 37 percent of mothers. Mother's reported educational attainment is negatively 
Table 5. Mother's Education by Father's Education as Percentage of Sample (N=450) 
Father's Educational Attainment 
Mother's 
Education 
some high school 
high school diploma 
some college 
4-year degree 
Master's degree 
Ph.D., MD, JD* 
Totals (Fadiers) 
High 
some 
11 
(2.44%) 
i 21 
(4.67%) 
11 
(2.44%) 
3 
(0.67%) 
1 
(0.22%) 
— 
School 
diploma 
9 
(2.00%) 
57 
(12.67%) 
21 
(4.67%) 
8 
(1.78%) 
3 
(0.67%) 
— 
47 98 
(10.44%) (21.78%) 
College/University 
some BA/BS 
5 
(1.11%) 
33 
(7.33%) 
46 
(10.22%) 
11 
(2.44%) 
7 
(1.56%) 
4 
(0.89%) 
106 
(23.56%) 
-
17 
(3.78%) 
22 
(4.89%) 
35 
(7.78%) 
10 
(2.22%) 
3 
(0.67%) 
87 
(19.33%) 
Graduate Study 
MAIMS JD.MD.Ph.D.* 
1 
(0.22%) 
7 
(1.56%) 
11 
(2.44%) 
16 
(3.56%) 
14 
(3.11%) 
7 
(1.56%) 
56 
(12.44%) 
-
3 
(0.67%) 
8 
(1.78%) 
16 
(3.56%) 
21 
(4.67%) 
8 
(1.78%) 
56 
(12.44%) 
Totals 
(Mothers) 
26 
(5.78%) 
138 
(30.67%) 
119 
(26.44%) 
89 
(19.78%) 
56 
(12.44%) 
22 
(4.89%) 
450 
(100%) 
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correlated with respondent's age (r=-.196, «=461,^><.0005). While the correlation is not 
particularly strong, it does at least suggest that mothers of older respondents were more likely 
to encounter barriers to education, or to marry before they completed higher education. This 
is not surprising at all, but lends support to the contention that the families and parents of 
non-heterosexuals are not unusual or particularly unique. Rather, they formed and survived 
through basically the same social and historical circumstances as their neighbors, friends and 
other contemporary families. 
Growing up Christian—Or not 
More than 77 percent of the sample («=362) reported that they grew up in families that 
were at least nominally "Christian" families—that is, they called themselves "Christian," even 
while affiliation, church attendance and the intensity of Christian beliefs at home were all 
variable. About 35 percent of Christian respondents grew up in Catholic homes, compared 
to 55 percent who grew up under the influence of Protestant denominational beliefs. The 
remaining ten percent grew up in Mormon homes, in an unspecified "Christian" home, or 
in Christian interfaith households. "Christian interfaith" refers to households characterized 
by religious heterogamy. Such households or religious upbringing would be described by 
respondents as having at least one Christian parent, or parents who held different religious 
beliefs. For example, if respondent wrote in "Catholic and Atheist," the household would 
have been coded "Christian interfaith." Likewise, if a respondent indicated "Baptist and 
Jewish" or "Jewish and Lutheran," the response would be coded "Christian interfaith."As 
members of these "Christian" households, some respondents never attended religious 
services, but the majority did at least occasionally attend services with their parents and/or 
siblings. 
Among nominally Christian homes, respondents whose families were Catholic or 
mainline Protestant (Methodist, Episcopalian, Presbyterian, etc.) attended church services 
slightly more frequently than did respondents who identified their families as belonging 
to Protestant fundamentalist congregations (e.g., Baptist, Lutheran, Assembly of God, 
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etc.), suggesting that the intensity of religious belief predicts, to some extent, religious 
attendance patterns. I asked all respondents to describe the religious beliefs and convictions 
of their family of origin as liberal, moderate, orthodox or fundamentalist. Orthodox and 
fundamentalist beliefs were coded " 1 " for intense religious upbringing. All other responses 
were coded "0," assuming that liberal and moderate responses indicated less intense 
religious belief. Using this measure (fiindrelg), about 21 percent of the sample («=99; 94 
Christian, 5 non-Christian) are affirmatively identified as respondents who grew up in homes 
characterized by relatively intense religious belief. 
In addition to measuring intensity of belief, I also measured frequency of attendance. 
Attendance was coded " 1" when respondents report attending services at least two or 
three times per month to as often as several times per week (239 total, or 51.3 percent; 
among Christians, 214 total, or 59.1 percent), described here as "strong/regular." Religious 
attendance (churchfl) among respondents who never went to church (55 total, or 11.8 
percent, N=466; among Christians, 22 total, or 6.1 percent, ra=362), or who went to 
church no more often than once a month (172 total, or 36.9 percent; among Christians, 
126 total, or 34.7 percent), was coded "0" for "weak/irregular." Across the sample (N=466), 
slightly more tlian half of all respondents («=239) reported attending religious services 
with their families at least several times a month. This number includes some respondents 
who grew up in atheist or agnostic homes, as well as non-Christian, nominally Christian, 
non-denominational Christian, and Christian interfaith homes. One in four non-
Christian respondents attended religious services several times a month or more, a number 
that includes eight of 22 Jewish respondents and seven of eight Unitarian Universalist 
respondents. Five respondents who claimed their families were atheist or agnostic attended 
religious services fairly regularly during childhood. About 22 percent of respondents 
(«=102) grew up in non-Christian households, but a number of these households were still 
religious or at least influenced by religious practice. While half of these households (w=51) 
were described as "Atheist/Agnostic," the remaining half included Jewish («=30), Unitarian 
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Universalist (n=8), Pagan/Wiccan (n=4), Muslim («=1), Hindu (n=\), or other non-specified 
(«=6) religious households. Two respondents did not provide data for analysis. 
Current Religious Beliefs and Practices 
Most mainstream Christian denominations in the United States have explicitly rejected 
gays and lesbians and their families, ensuring through condemnatory rhetoric that non-
heterosexuals feel unwelcome in congregations, including those congregations to which they 
or their families once belonged. The attitudes and policies of Christian churches toward 
homosexuality, of course, differ little from those in other major religions, including more 
orthodox Judaism and Islam in general, neitlier of which is sympathetic to lesbians, gays or 
bisexuals. Not surprisingly, many gays and lesbians have responded to the criticisms from 
religion and religious leaders by changing their religious affiliation, or rejecting religion 
altogether. 
Sixty percent of all respondents report that their religious identity or affiliation has 
changed from that of their parents or the households of their youth. Most of the change 
in religion measured in the survey occurs among respondents reporting they grew up in 
traditional Christian households—Baptist, Catholic, Presbyterian, Methodist, etc. I define 
as "non-Christian" any reported religious belief or practice outside mainstream Catholic or 
Protestant denominations, including Unitarian Universalist congregations. Sixty-nine percent 
of respondents from mainstream Christian households (including interfaith households) 
reported a change in religious affiliation or belief, compared to only 30 percent of non-
Christians whose religious beliefs have changed since their youth. These data should not 
be interpreted as indicating an abandonment of religion or commitment to spirituality, 
however. Many respondents have apparently moved from one religious denomination 
to another, e.g., from Catholicism to one or another form of Protestantism; or from one 
religious tradition to another, e.g., from mainstream Christianity to Unitarian Universalism. 
Even though a substantial number of individuals from religious homes today report they 
85 
are atheist or agnostic («=101), a few individuals («=17) who grew up in atheist or agnostic 
households now report belonging to one faith or another, although usually not mainstream 
or fundamentalist Christianity. Only three of thirty Jewish respondents reported a change in 
religion, even though some forms of Judaism are hostile to gay and lesbian identity, which 
suggests that Jewish ethnic identity transcends religious practice. 
More than half of all respondents claim that they are at least slightly religious (n=266), 
compared to those who say they are not religious at all («=200), but current religious 
attendance is relatively infrequent among study participants. Only 66 individuals in the 
sample report attending religious services more or less regularly (at least two or three times 
per month), although more than twice that number report that they are currently at least 
moderately religious («=134). Of the 66 regular attendees, only 38 are self-identified 
Christians, despite the fact that 146 individuals overall currently identify as "Christian" of 
one stripe or another. The relatively strong reported religiosity coupled with low attendance 
suggests that individuals do in fact hold religious beliefs, and perhaps even retain the faith 
or affiliation of their parents and families, but are either unwilling to participate in religious 
activities, or they perceive they are unwelcome in traditional Christian communities. In 
other cases, Christian respondents have chosen to join alternative, more inclusive religious 
communities to fill their spiritual needs. Respondents who were adieist or agnostic, or who 
grew up in non-Christian or non-traditional religions, appear to feel little compulsion to 
change their religious affiliations or belief systems. 
Family Support 
Same-sex couples in committed relationships have to improvise, or come up with novel 
ways of organizing their romantic and practical lives together because their relationships exist 
outside the legitimizing support systems associated with heterosexual marriage (Adam 2004, 
2006). "They must do so," writes Blasius (1992:648), "in a cultural environment of extreme 
prejudice, which denies their existence outright, or, at best, allows them to exist by passing 
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. . . by adopting a heterosexual persona, or if openly gay or lesbian, by adopting a mode 
of relating to each other that mimics heterosexual 'couples.'" The online survey included 
an array of questions to measure family and community support for non-heterosexual 
individuals and their families. For example, I asked, "would you say that your relatives 
(parents, brothers, sisters, etc.) approve or disapprove of your sexual identity?" Coupled 
Individuals received a second question, "Would you say that your relatives (parents, brothers, 
sisters, etc.) approve or disapprove of your current relationship—your marriage, civil union, 
domestic partnership or dating relationship?" Both items were measured on a 5-point Likert 
Scale, from "strongly disapprove" to "strongly approve." 
To capture perceptions of social support from areas beyond the family of origin, I 
included a series of questions about relationship support from relatives, the relatives of 
spouses or partners, heterosexual and non-heterosexual friends, faith communities, the 
LGBT community and the workplace. For coupled respondents, the question wording was 
"Thinking about your own relationship situation, how much support do you feel for keeping 
your relationship healthy in good times and hard times from...." Respondents outside of 
relationships received a similar question: "If you were in a relationship, how much support 
for keeping that relationship healthy in good times and hard times would you expect 
from...." For both series of questions, response categories included "no support, very little 
support, some support, a lot of support," coded 1 through 4. 
Kurdek (2004) found that same-sex couples receive less support from their families, 
and tend to rely on their friendship networks more heavily, a pattern observed by many 
researchers (see Herek 2006; Weeks et al. 2001; Nardi 1997; Weston 1991). A similar pattern 
is present in these data. "Relationship support from friends" was calculated as the mean 
score of items measuring support from heterosexual and non-heterosexual friends, while 
"relationship support from family" was calculated as the mean score of items measuring 
support from respondent's family and support from spouse or partners family. Using a 
test value of 2.60 (the mean of all respondent support variables, which conceptually falls 
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between "very little" and "some" support), t-tests revealed that individuals in relationships 
in this sample perceive significantly stronger support for their relationships from friends, 
*(223)=16.31, Af=3.31,/»<.001. Support from families was weaker, *(223)=1.70, Af=2.70, 
but the mean difference from the test value did not reach statistical significance. 
Though most same-sex couples live outside the "official" or legally-sanctioned marriage 
system, they do not necessarily live in the absence of social supports for themselves or their 
relationships. Individuals perceive that their parents and siblings are committed to at least 
some support of their relationships, but they probably rely on their friends more for such 
support. Similar analyses showed that individuals may see the LGBT community and die 
workplace as less supportive of their relationships than might have been expected. Perception 
of support from the LGBT community was slighdy weaker than the test value [t(2l8)=-
2.89, M=2Al,p=.004], as was support for relationships from the workplace [?(220)=-2.93, 
M=2.40, p=.004]. Unsurprisingly, these results also indicate that individuals can expect 
significantly less support for their families and relationships from the faith communities in 
which they grew up, or from the religious organizations that populate their cities and towns 
today [/(205)=-6.31, M=2.09,p<.00\]. 
Coupling and Parenting 
Whether they live in cities, suburbs, or out in the country, non-heterosexuals have been 
busy building families, marriage inequality notwithstanding. Of the 466 respondents in this 
sample, 58.8 percent («=274) are currently in some kind of romantic relationship—a steady 
dating relationship, domestic partnership, civil union or legal marriage. Only 30.7 percent 
(«=143) are in committed same-sex relationships, i.e., are living with their romantic partners 
in a marriage, civil union or domestic partnership, compared to 18.2 percent of respondents 
who are in heterosexually-structured relationships (w=85). Marital status in the sample is 
detailed in Table 6. 
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Table 6. Marital Status by Gendered Sexual Identity, N=466 
Married 
(Same-Sex Spouse) 
Married 
(Different-Sex Spouse) 
Separated 
(Same-Sex Spouse) 
Separated 
(Different-Sex Spouse) 
Divorced 
(legal marriage, not civil union) 
Domestic Partnership 
(Different-Sex) 
Domestic Partnership 
(Same-Sex) 
Widowed/Single Survivor 
Bisexual 
men 
13 
(2.8%) 
— 
— 
1 
(.2%) 
3 
(.6%) 
8 
(1.7%) 
Single/Dating, Romantic Interest --
Single and unattached 
Totals 
18 
(3.9%) 
43 
(9.2%) 
Bisexual 
women 
1 
(.2%) 
30 
(6.4%) 
1 
(.2%) 
2 
(.4%) 
4 
(.9%) 
28 
(6.0%) 
13 
(2.8%) 
• 17 
(3.6%) 
48 
(10.3%) 
144 
(30.9%) 
Gay 
men 
11 
(2.4%) 
10 
(2.1%) 
— 
— 
2 
(.4%) 
— 
66 
(14.2%) 
3 
(.6%) 
19 
(4.1%) 
79 
(17.0%) 
190 
(40.8%) 
Lesbian 
women 
5 
(1.1%) 
— 
--
— 
3 
(.6%) 
1 
(.2%) 
39 
(8.4%) 
1 
(.2%) 
10 
(2.1%) 
30 
(6.4%) 
89 
(19.1%) 
Row 
Totals 
17 
(3.6%) 
53 
(11.4%) 
1 
(.2%) 
2 
(.4%) 
10 
(2.1%) 
32 
(6.9%) 
126 
(27.0%) 
4 
(.9%) 
46 
(9.9%) 
175 
(37.6%) 
466 
(100.0%) 
About one half of the sample is single, while the other half (48.9%) is married, joined in 
a civil union or living in a domestic partnership. Among the single respondents («=238), one 
in five reported a current romantic interest at the time the survey was administered. More 
than half of these "single and dating" respondents have high hopes for their current dating 
partner, believing that their relationships perhaps evolve into more permanent relationships 
that will last longer than five years. 
Optimism about intimate relationships is high in this sample across relationship 
categories. I asked respondents in committed same-sex relationships («=134), "Assuming 
that you and your partner will live for another 20 years, how long into the future do you 
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realistically expect to be in this relationship?" Fully 85 percent predicted their relationships 
would last 10 or more years. Respondents in committed heterosexual relationships (n=73) 
reported a similarly high rate of optimism about the future of their relationships (85.9%). 
High levels of optimism are closely related to emotional and physical satisfaction, which 
were measured using items adapted from Lauman, et al. (1994). Optimism for individuals 
in committed relationships (»=217) is strongly correlated with both emotional and physical 
satisfaction with one's partner (r=.434,p<.00\; and r=.342,/><.001, respectively). 
Physical satisfaction—which can be assumed to mean sexual satisfaction—is not nearly so 
strong as emotional satisfaction in predicting optimism. Love and emotional bonds between 
individuals and their partners appears to be more important than sex or physical relationships 
to most participants in this study. I decided to test this proposition. Table 7 shows the results 
of logistic regression analysis, including regression coefficients, Wald statistics, odds ratios, 
and 95% confidence intervals for odds ratios for the predictor variable, "High emotional 
satisfaction" and controlling for age, gender, and sexual identity. Individuals who report high 
emotional satisfaction are nine times more likely to be most optimistic than those who report 
lower levels of emotional satisfaction controlling for sexual identity, gender and age. 
This strong sense of emotional connection is linked to a desire to marry. More than 77 
percent of individuals within same-sex domestic partnerships indicated that their current 
Table 7. Logistic Regression of Emotional Satisfaction on Optimism in Committed 
Relationships (n=228), controlling for Sexual Identity, Gender and Age 
Variables 
Emotional Satisfaction (high) 
Control Variables 
Sexual Identity (Gay) 
Gender (Man) 
Age (under 25) 
Constant 
B 
2.177 
-0.667 
-0.030 
-2.276 
1.188 
Wald 
Chi-Square 
23.717** 
1.912 
0.004 
12.969 
6.857 
Odds 
Ratio 
8.819 
0.513 
0.971 
0.103 
3.280 
95% Confidence Interval 
for Odds 
Lower 
3.672 
0.199 
0.368 
0.030 
Ratio 
Upper 
21.178 
1.321 
2.558 
0.354 
**/><.001 
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partner was someone they "would like to marry someday," suggesting a perception among 
respondents that marital commitment might transform their relationships into something 
more than they currently are. Commitment among coupled respondents was captured 
using a 5-point scale developed by Stanley and Markman (1992), which has been used 
consistently in healthy marriage initiative surveys across the country. Subjects were asked to 
respond to die following (1) My relationship with my partner/spouse is more important to 
me than almost anything else in my life; (2) I may not want to be with my partner/spouse a 
few years from now; (3) I like to think of my partner/spouse and me more in terms of "us" 
and "we," rather than "me" and "him/her;" (4) I feel trapped in this relationship but I stay 
because I have too much to lose if I leave; and (5) We regularly have great conversations 
where we just talk as good friends. Responses were captured on a scale ranging from 
strongly agree to strongly disagree, and were modified slightly to read as inclusive of same-
sex partners. Reliability analysis of these five items yielded a Cronbach alpha of .7379 for 
the scale (coupled respondents only, n=272, missing=2). Scores on die commitment scale 
ranged from 2 to 25, with a mean score for coupled respondents (n=272) of 20.86. The 
median commitment score for coupled respondents was 21.5. On average, these committed 
relationships had already lasted between three and five years by the time these data were 
collected. 
I remained concerned about the possible differences between homosexuals and 
bisexuals. These groups had consistently demonstrated differences, so it stood to reason that 
homosexuals and bisexuals might approach relationships differently, as well. I compared 
the commitment scores of coupled bisexuals and homosexuals in an independent-samples 
t-test, and found a significant difference between bisexuals (M=20.21, SD=3.80, n=\ 12) 
and homosexuals [Af=21.40, 5£>=3.658, »=157; <(267)=2.581,/=.011]. The effect, like 
most of the differences between these two groups, might seem relatively small, but there is 
a consistent pattern of significant differences between gays and lesbians and their bisexual 
counterparts. It would be misleading and an overstatement to interpret this last finding to 
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mean that homosexuals are more committed to their relationships than bisexuals. Instead, 
this finding adds another variable to the list that suggests that the line that divides bisexual 
from homosexual intimate and family life is fairly bright when all the elements are brought 
together. 
Education and Student Status 
Respondents report very high levels of education compared to national data on 
educational attainment available from the United States Census American Community 
Survey (2005). More than half of respondents age 25 and older hold a four-year college 
degree or graduate degree (69.8 percent, ra=354), and one-quarter of 18- to 24-year-olds 
(24.5 percent, »=110) have graduated from college. In the US population over age 25, only 
28.6 percent hold a bachelor's degree or higher, and among 18- to 24-year-olds just over 
9 percent have obtained a four-year degree (Census, 2005 American Community Survey, 
SI501. Educational Attainment). Figure 4 shows how educational attainment among those 
over 24 years old is distributed among gendered identity groups in the sample compared to 
data on the US population. 
The youngest participants in the survey are essentially college students. About half of the 
18- to 24-year-olds in the sample reported that they had "some college" or a two-year college 
degree, implying that they are currently enrolled in colleges, universities or trade schools. 
Among the 83 younger respondents who did not have a four-year college degree, 61 are 
currently students (part-time, »=11; full-time, «=50). More than half of those 18 to 24 who 
already hold bachelor's degrees are apparently students in graduate or professional schools. 
Only seven individuals reported that they had not completed high school: six 18-year-olds 
and one 19-year-old. Among those older than 24, only one respondent—a 42-year-old 
man—reported that he had not graduated from high school. It is possible, since the study 
was carried out in the spring of 2005, that one or more of the seven younger individuals were 
still in high school at the time they completed the questionnaire. If this is true, then given 
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Figure 4. Percentages of US Population* and Quest for Quotidian respondents age 25 and 
over (n=354) with high school education, two-year, four-year and advanced degrees 
* Source U.S. Census Bureau, 2005 American Community Survey 
the imputed college enrollment among those in this age group, it is more likely than not that 
all of the people in this age category will ultimately complete high school and subsequently 
pursue some sort of post-secondary higher education. Educational attainment among 18- to 
24-year-olds in the sample is compared to that in the US population in Figure 5. 
The sample includes a very high number of respondents with post-graduate degrees 
when compared to the US population. According to Census data, only about 10 percent 
of Americans hold a masters, professional or doctorate degree, compared to 25.4 percent 
(n=l 18) of the sample. Notably, about 20 percent of individuals over 25 who currently hold 
a bachelor's degree report that they are also full- or part-time students. Most of these students 
are in their late twenties and early thirties. 
Friends and Social Networks 
Friendship networks themselves are at once a comfort and a commodity; connected 
individuals know they can reach everyone they know via email or text-message if the 
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Figure 5- Percentages of US Population* and Quest for Quotidian respondents age age 18 to 
24 (n=l 10) with high school education, two-year, four-year and advanced degrees 
US Population* Bisexual men Bisexual women Gay men Lesbian women 
n Less than high school • High school graduate D Some college B Bachelor's degree or higher 
* Source U.S. Census Bureau, 2005 American Community Survey 
telephone is not an option, and the temporary shortcomings or absence of friends can 
be rectified through membership in a social network website, a personals site, or a freely-
accessible chatroom. For non-heterosexuals, the internet has provided a vastly efficient 
medium through which lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender individuals can combat 
isolation and alienation, meet friends, or find potential sexual or romantic partners (Riggle, 
Rostofsky, and Reedy 2005). That non-heterosexuals rely on the internet so heavily for 
integrative opportunities is probably related as much to the need for discretion (for those 
not out) as to the lingering anti-gay hostility or the perception of being unwelcome in their 
neighborhoods and physical communities. 
Weeks, Heaphy, and Donovan (2001) demonstrated that friendship appeared to the 
dominant model for intimate relationships among gays and lesbians in the United Kingdom, 
and others have pointed to a long history of friendship as the social context (perhaps the only 
available context, in many cases) for same-sex romance and intimacy (Sullivan 1995; Boswell 
1994; Weston 1991). If perceptions of openness and patterns of disclosure of sexual identity 
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are indications, then friends and friendship networks are undeniably important to social 
life among non-heterosexuals, perhaps even more important than kinship networks. While 
friendships in the past may have been rooted in shared experience or work, circumscribed 
by norms of gender or social class, or simply delimited by geographic or social propinquity, 
friendships today can be maintained across great distances through accessible and affordable 
transportation and communications technology that has arguably become a central feature of 
late modern social life and interaction. 
Respondents were asked how many heterosexual and non-heterosexual friends they had, 
respectively, and responses ranged from none to an unbelievably high 4000. At the risk of 
sounding dismissive, no one realistically has 4000 friends. Generally, half the sample counted 
six to ten gay or queer friends, and half the sample counted 11 to 15 straight or heterosexual 
friends in their network. These data are not terribly useful in their raw form, because they 
likely overstate the size of friendship networks among younger respondents, or among those 
who tend to be more avid or enthusiastic users of the internet. To improve the utility of the 
raw data, I describe the friendship networks of survey respondents in terms of proportions: 
the proportion of heterosexuals or non-heterosexuals in one's friendship network. These are 
calculated by summing responses to the two "how many friends" questions, then dividing 
the number of straight or gay friends by that sum. The resulting variables range in value from 
zero to one, where one indicates that the respondent has only straight friends on one hand, 
or only non-heterosexual friends on the other. From these data, I classified respondents' 
friendship networks as mostly heterosexual, mostly homosexual and—when the proportions 
for both were between .40 and .60—sexually diverse, wherein homosexuals and heterosexuals 
were more or less equally distributed within friendship networks (see Figure 6). 
One might suspect the friendship networks of individuals who share a marginalized 
sexual identity to be somewhat homogeneous, delimited by similarities in sexual identity 
and gender as well as other interests, hobbies or experiences. Homosexuals themselves can 
be reasonably expected to have more homosexual friends—friends like themselves—than 
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heterosexual friends, and likewise build gender-delineated friendships based on shared 
interests and community. 
What I found was that about one in four non-heterosexuals have highly integrated 
friendship networks that include more or less the same number of heterosexuals and non-
heterosexuals. This finding implies that for one-quarter of the sample, sexual identity may 
not translate into residential or social isolation, or "ghettoization" in their social lives, 
altliough there is a possibility that ghettoization becomes more pronounced as individuals 
age. More cynically, it might imply that these people pass more readily in die heterosexual 
world, but it is possible that these friendship networks describe a level of integration that 
is made possible through shared values and interests, or other interactions that erase the 
boundaries—stereotypes, homophobia, etc.—that have historically arisen between non-
heterosexuals and straight people. Notably, bisexuals, and especially bisexual women, are 
Figure 6. Friendship Networks by Age, and by Gendered Sexual Identity (N=466) 
Under 30, n=181 
30 and older, n=285 
Bisexual men, n=43 
Gay men, n=190 
Bisexual women, n=144 -
Lesbian women, n= 
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more likely to be in friendship networks dominated by heterosexuals. Approximately half 
of all bisexuals have more heterosexual friends, and only one in four bisexuals report that 
homosexuals are more prevalent in their networks. Lesbian and gay respondents' networks 
are more evenly balanced across the three categories (see Figure 6). The difference between 
bisexuals and homosexuals with regard to friendship networks may indicate two things 
about the subpopulations: First, that bisexuals are socially more likely to be influenced 
by heterosexual values than are homosexuals because of more frequent interaction and 
engagement; or second, that gay culture and institutions are becoming less powerful or 
compelling for lesbians and gays, or at least less functional for those who seek long-term 
marriage-like relationships, or social equality in family policy. 
Community Involvement and Political Participation 
Fewer than 25 percent of respondents described their local communities as "very 
(queer- or gay-) friendly." The modal response to this question was "somewhat friendly" 
(n=23l, or 49.6 percent). Fully one-third of all respondents are unsure whether other non-
heterosexual individuals or families live within one mile of their homes. Only about nine 
percent report that no non-heterosexuals live nearby, just under 30 percent report one to ten 
non-heterosexual households in their immediate neighborhoods, and 28 percent indicated 
that they live near more than 10 non-heterosexual households. The latter group's responses 
suggest that many respondents—but by no means the majority—live in "gay ghettos," 
perhaps metropolitan areas with relatively high concentrations of non-heterosexual residents 
and queer-friendly businesses and organizations. 
The data suggest that perceptions of neighborhood friendliness are a reflection of how 
comfortable or "out" the respondent is. After all, people are no doubt more likely to view a 
neighborhood or community as friendly if they feel they are among friends, which may not 
be entirely possible unless queer people are out or visible to the extent that others can react 
to their public gay, lesbian or bisexual identities. It is unlikely that the friendliness of the 
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neighborhood is a factor in the personal decision to come out or reveal sexual orientation, 
but level of disclosure {disclose) is positively correlated with perceptions of neighborhood 
gay-friendliness (r=.224,/><.001). People who live where other non-heterosexuals are out 
and visible are probably more likely to be open about their own sexual identities, and to 
view their neighborhoods as queer-affirming or friendly. For example, knowledge of or 
the presence of other non-heterosexual families in the immediate vicinity is very strongly 
correlated with perceptions of a more friendly neighborhood or community (r=.582,/><.001, 
#=308). But for those outside of such communities, perhaps assessment of friendliness is 
dependent upon being out, and having contact as queer others with heterosexual people in 
their neighborhoods, making friends, and changing minds by challenging stereotypes about 
gay and lesbian identity and lifestyle. It is also possible tliat individuals who disclose their 
sexuality or same-sex family structure do so because of a sense of optimism about their ability 
to integrate into communities, which might lead them to be less likely to anticipate antipathy 
on die part of their neighbors or other locals. Coming out or being out in die community is 
strongly correlated with how friendly the atmosphere is perceived to be, and neighborhood 
friendliness is positively associated both with integration into the queer community and with 
civic involvement in the community at large. 
Community integration is likely to influence attitudes toward marriage among non-
heterosexuals. To measure community involvement among non-heterosexuals, I drew 
upon a widely-used, ten-item Civic Involvement Index (Perkins et al. 1985) which is today 
associated with the Resident Survey of Neighborhood Conditions (see Nario-Redmond and 
Coulton 2000; Coulton, Korbin and Su 1996; Pew Research Center 1997). Items include 
the following: 
• Attended a public hearing, town hall meeting, or city council meeting. 
• Participated in block groups, neighborhood associations, and/or community action 
groups. 
• Called or sent a letter to an elected public official. 
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• Spoke to a public official in person. 
• Participated in a civic group or fraternal lodge. 
• Participated on the board of any local service agency. 
• Attended a church or religious service in the neighborhood. 
• Attended a PTA meeting. 
• Are you currently registered to vote? 
• Participated in neighborhood safety or block watch programs. 
The Civic Involvement Index is the sum of scores of tliese ten items. Affirmative 
responses on each item were coded as 1, with negative or "don't know" responses assigned 
a value of zero. Missing data were not recoded. A new and different scale was developed for 
this survey to measure involvement in the LGBT community. 
While the Civic Involvement Index measures more traditional community involvement, 
the Queer Community Integration Index (QCII) developed for this study measures 
engagement in community institutions and organizations constituted by those who share 
a marginalized sexual identity. Integration into the queer community is conceived not as 
an individual sense of belonging to a group, but rather as a set of choices and behaviors 
that indicate interaction with specifically non-heterosexual social structures, activities and 
organizations within communities. Subjects were asked to indicate whether the following 
statements were "never true," "sometimes true," or "always true": 
• I seek entertainment exclusively at nightclubs, bars or restaurants serving the queer 
community 
• I shop exclusively at lesbigay-owned businesses, like bookshops or other retail outlets 
• I seek professional and other services (legal, home repair, medical, plumbing, etc.) 
from lesbigay providers 
• I only attend fundraising events hosted by and serving the queer community 
• I belong exclusively to political organizations promoting queer issues 
• I regularly attend Pride festivals or parades in my community 
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• I regularly participate in online lesbian, gay or other queer communities 
• I would prefer to go on alternative, or gay- or lesbian-oriented vacations 
• I regularly participate in gay, lesbian or other queer social clubs, like hiking or 
camping clubs, sports leagues, gourmet clubs, or reading groups 
Affirmative responses to items in the QCII were captured and coded as 1 for "sometimes 
true," and 2 for "always true." Missing and "never true" responses were coded zero. Item 
scores were summed to yield the QCII. The higher the QCII score, the more integrated into 
the queer, gay or lesbian community the respondent is likely to be. Reliability analysis of the 
nine items included in the Queer Community Integration Index yielded a Cronbach alpha 
coefficient of .8022, indicating a highly reliable degree of internal consistency among tiie 
measures. The Cronbach alpha coefficient for the ten-item Civic Involvement Index for this 
sample (ra=455) was .6747. 
Civic Involvement 
For those 25 and older, the mean score on the Civic Involvement Index was 3.42 with 
a standard deviation of 2.01, while for those under 25 the mean was 2.52 with standard 
deviation of 1.851. While the difference between mean civic involvement scores is significant 
[>(464)=-4.194,/><.001], the effect is relatively small (T|2=.04). That individuals who are older 
are more active in civic .life is something we should expect. Older individuals have moved 
out on their own, have married and possibly divorced, have begun building or retired from 
careers, are perhaps parents themselves, own homes, or have established themselves within 
their neighborhoods and communities. A larger concern might be that these scores seem 
somewhat low, but a closer look at the items themselves suggests certain biases that non-
heterosexual people might have difficulty overcoming. 
The language of these particular questions is somewhat dated and exclusionary at times, 
and because the survey was self-administered, some respondents may have had difficulty 
translating the questions so that tliey could answer. For example, in a face-to-face interview, 
the interviewer could clarify terms like "civic organization"—-the Jaycees, for example—or 
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the sexist "fraternal lodge"—the Elks, or the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW). That these 
types of organizations might be less than welcoming to gay or lesbian members is obvious, 
historically. The Jaycees, or Junior Chamber International, only admitted women as members 
in 1984 after being ordered to do so by the courts, and the ban on gays in the military— the 
Clinton-era "don't ask, don't tell" policy not withstanding—clearly suggests that "real" 
veterans are heterosexual. 
As far as participation in church or parent-teacher association meetings, I would not 
expect high levels of participation from individuals in my sample. Only a few mainstream 
dominations in the United States take a sympathetic stance toward the LGBT community, 
while the most vocal religious leaders and institutions tend to set a tone of intolerance and 
hatred toward non-heterosexuals in public discourse. Participation in a local PTA chapter 
presupposes that the respondent is a parent and/or an educator herself. Indeed, more than 
one-third of all gay and lesbian respondents who have attended a PTA meeting recently 
(n=27) are themselves in the business of education as teachers, instructors or administrators. 
Fifteen lesbian and gay parents to minor children have recently attended a PTA meeting, but 
only two report to be employed in education. Apparently, involvement in certain areas of 
civic life is sometimes a frightening leap of faith into a hostile environment, or just part of 
the job. 
Queer Community Integration 
Gay and lesbian scores on the QCII ranged from 0 to 17, and were normally distributed 
around a mean of 6.7 («=279; M=6.72, 5Z)=3.522). The mean QCII for bisexuals («=187; 
M=4.91, 5Z)=3.543) was significantly lower than for homosexuals [*(464)=-5.440, j>=.000, 
T|2=.06]. That lesbian and gay people appear to be more integrated than bisexual men and 
women into the queer community is unsurprising, given the differences between levels of 
disclosure and perceptions of openness that exist between these groups. What is fascinating 
is the normal distribution of QCII scores, particularly among lesbian and gay respondents. 
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Very few individuals are completely isolated from participation in the queer community, and 
about the same number of individuals report that they essentially segregate themselves from 
non-essential interaction with mainstream heterosexual/heterosexist institutions and social 
structures. 
More than die distribution of the Civic Involvement Index, the variability in QCII scores 
calls into question the shrill characterization of the queer community as a unified cultural 
and political force with a radical "agenda" for the transformation of American family and 
society. To argue that LGBT individuals are exclusively committed to queer community 
concerns, to a specific stereotypical queer lifestyle, or to a particular range of behaviors or 
interests driven solely by sexual identity is simply unsupportable. It seems all too obvious 
from the data here that there is more to peoples lives than their sexuality, even though sexual 
identity plays an undeniably important role in staking out opportunities for friendship, 
shopping, recreation, and building intimate relationships and families. 
Politics and Party 
Non-heterosexuals are active members of their communities, and their activities within 
their neighborhoods or cities must be informed by their personal political sensibilities and 
beliefs. Often political activism on the part of lesbian, gay or bisexual people in the interest 
of equality or justice is interpreted by opponents as part of the larger queer conspiracy, so 
not only are homosexuals themselves condemned as "unnatural" or evil, but any effort to 
address social inequality, discrimination or violence against non-heterosexuals through the 
political process is likewise derided or attacked by the conservative right. Homosexuals are 
cast as stalwarts of the Democratic Party in the United States, and characterized as invariably 
"liberal" by more conservative forces in American politics. Where non-heterosexuals are 
concerned, the animus of social conservatives, religious fundamentalists, or other anti-gay 
activists does not stop with the banter and name-calling that represents the ideological divide 
between political opponents. In the hateful rhetoric of the "homosexual agenda," gays and 
lesbians are portrayed as insidious and evil, a force that has quietly corrupted not only the 
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Democratic Party but the entire political process. While gays and lesbians are represented 
in all major US political parties—Log Cabin Republicans, for example, is an organization 
for gay conservatives—the Democratic Party is more likely than others to attract non-
heterosexual constituents. It is also true that non-heterosexuals are likely to be more liberal 
than the general population, but this is not because there is a secret plan to take over the 
world. It is because the more conservative positions on most social and family issues are 
positions that either exclude or harm lesbian, gay or bisexual individuals or their families. 
Fortunately for non-heterosexuals, the rhetorical strategy to undermine queer politics 
and activism has not been as successful as its adherents would like. Quest for Quotidian data 
indicate that non-heterosexuals remain engaged in their communities and politically active: 
they have a diverse politics of their own, and they vote. At the time data were collected 
in 2005, 91 percent of the sample was registered to vote. Ninety-three percent of voters 
registered in 2005 had also voted in the prior year's presidential election that swept George 
W. Bush into office for a second term (86 percent of all respondents voted in the 2004 
election). The majority of registered voters in die sample claimed they were Democrats (58.1 
percent, «=244), but a sizable number defined themselves in the survey as Libertarians (26 
percent, w=109). Republicans made up less than 5 percent («=20) of die sample, slightly less 
than Green Party adherents («=21), but more than self-proclaimed independents {n=\ 1) or 
those who reported other political affiliations, e.g., anarchists and socialists («=15). Party 
affiliation or association, along widi respondent-provided characterizations of their personal 
political beliefs, are summarized in Table 8. 
Fewer than two-thirds of respondents consider themselves "Democrats," a finding 
that seriously undermines the claim that that non-heterosexuals share a uniform political 
philosophy, much less subscribe to a collective political "agenda." Still, when asked to 
describe tJieir politics, 47 percent indicated that their politics were "very liberal," 33 percent 
were "somewhat liberal," 16 percent claimed they were politically "moderate," and 3.4 
percent described their politics as "somewhat conservative." No one in the survey claimed to 
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be "very conservative." While eighty percent of respondents (n=373) described their politics 
as liberal, as opposed to moderate or conservative, perhaps the liberal label is misleading. 
Given that political philosophies in the sample are diverse and not uniform, it is possible 
that gay and lesbian people, whose interests are best served by liberal thinking if not liberal 
politics, might be inclined to automatically define themselves as liberal, regardless of which 
political party or philosophy holds their loyalty. If lesbian, gay and bisexual people—as 
marginalized second-class citizens—are by definition liberal but not necessarily Democrats, 
then their "somewhat liberal" views might be more similar to those of moderates than to 
those who claim a "very liberal" political stance. 
Gay men and lesbian women are twice as likely as their bisexual counterparts to identify 
as Democrats, but sexual identity is not a strong predictor of "very liberal" politics. Instead, 
binary logistic regression models indicate that gender is the strongest of three predictors 
(including sexuality and age) that respondents will describe their political views as "very 
liberal." Neither gender nor sexuality tend to explain much of the variance in the sample. 
The model predicting Democratic party association explains about 6 percent of the variance 
at best (Cox & Snell R2=.044, Nagelkerke i?2=.059), while the model predicting respondents 
will be "very liberal" explains even less—at most, still less than 3 percent of the variance (Cox 
& Snell R2=.02l, Nagelkerke £2=.028). 
Table 8. Political Beliefs within Party Affiliation Among Non-Heterosexuals 
Political Beliefs 
Somewhat Somewhat Very 
Conservative Moderate Liberal Liberal 
Party Affiliation 
All Respondents, N=462 
Democrats, n=256 
Libertarians, n=129 
Green Party, n=27 
Republicans, n=21 
Other parties, n= 16 
Independents, n=13 
3.5% 16.2% 
1.2% 12.5% 
3.1% 17.1% 
7.4% 
42.9% 42.9% 
6.3% 
69.2% 
33.3% 47.0% 
36.7% 49.6% 
38.0% 41.9% 
14.8% 77.8% 
4.8% 9.5% 
18.8% 75.0% 
23.1% 7.7% 
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In this chapter, I have shown that Quest for Quotidian respondents represent a cross-
section of non-heterosexuals in the United States, albeit the non-random nature of the 
sample undermines any claim that results from this study are reliably generalizable to the 
population. Nevertheless, the sample is sufficient to tell a compelling story about attitudes 
toward marriage among gay, lesbian and bisexual people. Certainly, the biases in this sample 
are no more or less compelling than those in other studies. 
While racial and ethnic diversity is weak, the sample includes an otherwise 
geographically, demographically, and politically diverse group of non-heterosexuals who 
appear to be living rather mundane lives, not so very different from their privileged 
heterosexual neighbors, friends and coworkers. They are not disproportionately unhappy 
or dissatisfied with their lives. Individuals in this study have reported diat their parents and 
siblings are generally supportive of their private lives and intimate relationships, although 
like most non-heterosexuals many have had to rely more often on their friends for social 
support. Gay, lesbian and bisexual people in this sample grew up in more or less traditional 
families characterized by stable marriages and, in most cases, a typical commitment to 
religion and education. Participants in this survey are somewhat better-educated than the 
general population, and the incomes reported here are somewhat higher than the national 
average. Still, the survey captured respectable ranges of educational attainment and income. 
Across these various strata, individuals in the sample are economically and politically active 
in their communities, a number of individuals have made homes for themselves and their 
partners, and many are quietly but not secretly raising children in neighborhoods that are not 
particularly well-known for their annual Gay Pride parades. 
Much of the success of anti-gay initiatives and activism aimed at denying equality to gays 
and lesbians can be explained by the successful promotion of questionable claims that there 
are fundamental differences in the lifestyles and values of heterosexuals and homosexuals; 
that lesbians and gays are deviant, or damaged in some way by a failure of socialization or 
a trauma in the past; that same-sex desire is somehow synonymous with a desire to destroy 
105 
families rather than create them. This sample challenges the broad brush that specifically 
paints lesbians and gays as so alien that they must by their very existence be "anti-marriage" 
or "anti-family." Analyses of the data from this sample show that gays and lesbians might 
hold value orientations and attitudes that are more similar to heterosexuals than they are 
to bisexuals, that marriage means different things to different groups within the non-
heterosexual population, or that the commitment to values traditionally associated with 
marriage is stronger among gays and lesbians than among bisexuals, many of whom have 
already exercised the right to marry. This might mean that marriage advocates have been 
punishing allies, not enemies, in the struggle to strengthen marriage, by denying lesbians and 
gays a shot at life on the quotidian—the "normal" life promised by legal marriage. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
NOT-SO-QUEER ATTITUDES 
TOWARD MARRIAGE 
In 2005, the National Fatherhood Initiative published With This Ring.. .A National 
Survey on Marriage in America, conducted by sociologist Norval D. Glenn, based on survey 
data collected via telephone interviews of a random national sample of 1503. The NFI study 
included many of the same items used in this research, including items from marriage surveys 
conducted in Oklahoma and Florida (Johnson, et al. 2001, Winston, et al. 1999). The NFI 
survey was conducted between December 2003 and February 2004, the year leading up to 
the 2004 presidential election in which same-sex marriage would ultimately be a significant 
issue(Lewis 2005), and force many in the electorate to evaluate their own "pro-marriage" 
attitudes against the possibility (or threat) of legal same-sex marriage. The political rhetoric 
and public scrutiny of marriage was likely driven by the legalization of same-sex marriage in 
Massachusetts {Goodridge v. Department of Public Health 2003), and the landmark United 
States Supreme Court decision {Lawrence v. Texas 2003) diat struck down state sodomy 
statutes long held to be explicitly anti-gay, and may have intensified a sense of familism 
among survey respondents. Given the period in which the NFI survey was conducted—a 
time when marriage attitudes in the general population might be particularly strong, and just 
a year before Quest for Quotidian was launched—Glenn's research report serves as the basis 
for comparing the strength of non-heterosexual attitudes and- beliefs toward marriage to the 
strength of heterosexual marriage in the United States. 
In all, the Quest for Quotidian online survey included 27 indicators of attitudes toward 
marriage. Seventeen items measured the degree support for norms and values such as 
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monogamy, fidelity, assumptions of marital permanence, relative ease of divorce, die 
importance of marriage to parents and children, etc. Seventeen of the measures are drawn 
from recent surveys exploring the strength of marriage across the United States, including 
surveys conducted to support Healthy Marriage Initiatives in a number of states, such 
as Oklahoma, Florida, and Alabama (Glenn 2005; Karney 2003; Johnson, et al. 2001; 
Winston, et al. 1999; Nock 1995; Booth et al. 1983). Most individual items were taken 
verbatim from existing surveys. Table 9 shows the mean scores and standard deviations 
on each item for the sample, and for gay men, lesbian women, bisexual men and bisexual 
women. In consideration of the target population of the study, ten additional items 
were adapted to be more sensitive to non-heterosexual respondents. Means and standard 
deviations on each of these items are shown in Table 10. These additional reworded questions 
measure concepts already captured by the original items with established validity and 
reliability. All items were measured on a five-point scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to 
"strongly agree," including a neutral "neither agree/disagree" category. Responses were coded 
such that the higher the score, the stronger the commitment to the more traditional position 
on the value in question. 
One goal of this research is to measure the strength of support among non-heterosexuals 
for what is and has been culturally defined as marriage, regardless of the critique that 
marriage is heterosexist in its assumptions. This research assumes that answers to the 
general question, "What does marriage mean to homosexuals?" fall along a continuum 
between strong support and weak support for traditional values about the marital contract 
or its importance to society. While analysis of each attitude measure might seem prudent 
and interesting, this report will focus on particular attitudes that are often at the center 
of controversy or contention in the family debates in the United States. In die pages that 
follow, I examine a range of attitudes toward marriage that reflect the "family values" of non-
heterosexuals in the United States, with an eye toward understanding some of the major 
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differences in values that set non-heterosexuals apart from heterosexuals, and differentiate 
some non-heterosexuals from others. Specifically, I will examine several themes that tend 
to be nearly universal in scholarly discussions of "pro-marriage" attitudes: (1) the social 
relevance of marriage, (2) marital permanence and durability; (3) marriage and the welfare 
of children; (4) marriage as necessary to good parenting; (5) the centrality of monogamy; (6) 
taking marriage seriously; and (7) divorce as a social problem. 
The Social Relevance of Marriage 
In Quest for Quotidian, a large majority of respondents reject the idea that "most gays 
and lesbians prefer the single life" (65.9%, «=466; only 7.9% agreed with the statement). 
Nevertheless, only about half of all respondents were married, in civil unions or in domestic 
partnerships at the time of the survey. Of the 238 single respondents, 88 (37%) were 
individuals under age 25. Only seven of these 88 younger respondents were dating or seeing 
someone, leaving 81 individuals who were neither involved in nor pursuing a relationship, 
although one was separated and exiting a relationship, and another was single due to the 
death of a partner. Forty-five of these under-25 respondents reported being under 21, 
which perhaps suggests that many of the younger respondents, much like their heterosexual 
counterparts, might place a lower priority on serious relationships than on moving out 
on their own, attending college or university, building their careers, or otherwise delaying 
anything that might look like marriage until a later stage in their lives. This makes inclusion 
of this younger group somewhat suspect when speculating about the extent to which all non-
heterosexuals are committed to singlehood. 
On the other hand, older respondents have presumably had ample opportunity to assess 
their desire or need for an intimate relationship. Sixty-three percent («=150) of the 238 
single respondents were individuals age 25 or older who were either dating («=39), separated 
(«=1), divorced (ra=10), were single after the death of a partner (n=3), or for whatever reason 
112 
were not pursuing a romantic relationship («=96). Discounting those who are dating, 
those who have demonstrated a recent commitment to a relationship (single, divorced, and 
widowed), and all respondents under 25, we are left with only 96 individuals (20.6 percent 
of the entire sample) who appear to have no interest in seeking a steady relationship. Based 
on this number, I cautiously conclude that only about 1 in 5 individuals might arguably be 
committed to a "single" lifestyle. 
The rejection of singlehood as a preferred status is supported by an additional finding 
that fully 90 percent of all respondents disagreed that "marriage is for straight people, not 
gay or lesbian people." Gay and lesbian people, according to these findings, have a relatively 
positive view of marriage as a flexible institution that can and should accommodate the lives 
they are already living, and the relationships they are seeking or maintaining. The items 
measuring rejection of singlehood and acceptance of marriage are significandy correlated 
(r=.257,p<-00l, n=465). At the very least, these findings challenge the stereotype that 
describes non-heterosexuals as committed to a life devoid of intimate relationships, or to 
ideologies that minimize the importance of marriage to individuals. While these items do 
not necessarily measure the social relevance of marriage, together they suggest that if it were 
available, marriage would be an attractive alternative to a large number of gays and lesbians. 
My question is whether non-heterosexuals view marriage as hip, fashionable and 
functional today. Such a position would reflect what most consider a "pro-marriage" 
attitude, in line with traditionalist or politically-conservative views of marriage. In the Quest 
for Quotidian sample, 31 percent agreed that "marriage was an old-fashioned, outmoded 
institution," 49.1 percent disagreed, and 19 percent were undecided («=464). Compared 
to the NFI study (Glenn 2005), in which 88 percent of Americans took die pro-marriage 
position on this item, these numbers are relatively low. It would likely be a mistake, however, 
to assume the finding that almost half of non-heterosexuals believe marriage remains a 
relevant institution is a sign of weak support for marriage. Any assessment of the institution 
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by members of this population would almost certainly be influenced by the lack of access 
to marriage, as well as the history of exclusion from it that so many gays and lesbians have 
experienced. 
Non-heterosexual people see value and meaning in marriage. Arguably, the value of 
marriage might be reduced, for many, to the myriad social and governmental benefits 
associated with marital status, despite the romance rhetoric deployed in the public discourse 
that emphasizes love and emotional bonds between same-sex partners. Sixty-nine percent 
disagreed overall, and 45 percent strongly disagreed, that "for same-sex couples, having the 
right to form civil unions is just as good as being able to marry." Responses to this item 
indicate that while civil unions such as those available in Vermont are essentially the legal 
equivalent of marriage, most non-heterosexuals may perceive civil unions as inferior to legal 
marriage. 
The community is arguably divided over whether marriage or civil unions offer the 
better opportunity for family-building among same-sex couples, but it seems likely that the 
majority of non-heterosexuals believe the current situation in which most same-sex couples 
have no legal standing at all is untenable. Overall, more than 69 percent of respondents 
report that the gay community is supportive of long-term, committed relationships, and 
when I asked respondents to identify the best policy option for defining same-sex committed 
relationships, the results favored legal marriage over civil unions for gays and lesbians by a 
wide majority (83 percent, compared to only 14.8 percent who believed that civil unions 
would be preferable to legal marriage). Less than 2 percent of respondents—only eight 
individuals—rejected both marriage and civil unions, while 98 percent of the sample opted 
for some form of legal recognition of same-sex relationships for lesbian, gay and bisexual 
people. Members of this population arguably see marriage as a better way, and perhaps die 
best way, to promote, secure and support long-term relationships between partners. This 
position is hardly different from the position held by most activists who oppose extending 
marriage rights to same-sex partners. 
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Most non-heterosexuals in the sample—like the majority of heterosexuals—imagine 
marriage to be a source of satisfaction and happiness. About half of the respondents reported 
that most married couples they knew had happy marriages, a number that might seem a 
bit low. When asked the same question about the gay and lesbian couples they know, about 
75 percent responded that same-sex couples in their social networks were in happy, healthy 
relationships. The differences in responses here might best be explained in terms of social 
networks: non-heterosexuals may interact with fewer heterosexual couples, or perhaps are less 
likely to be close enough to these couples to judge their happiness or unhappiness. Of course, 
neither of these numbers necessarily is an accurate measure of the quality of relationships 
within respondents' social networks. Rather, response patterns for these items give us some 
indication as to how optimistically the members of marginalized sexual communities 
represented in this study view committed relationships—whether they are marriages or not. 
Any direct comparison to aggregate heterosexual attitude scores such as those reported 
in the National Fatherhood Initiative study is somewhat suspect, and certainly makes the 
attitudes of Quest for Quotidian participants seem decidedly less supportive of marriage than 
the attitudes of the general population. Making such comparisons irresponsibly or without 
proper specification could lead some to believe that allowing same-sex marriage would dilute 
the ideological foundation upon which marriage and its concomitant social benefits depend 
is justified, when the evidence here does not support such a conclusion at all. What we know 
from this research is that while many lesbians, gays and bisexuals have grown up looking at 
their future and current intimate relationships through the prism of marriagelessness that 
isolated homosexual from heterosexual relationship options, they have not necessarily grown 
up with a warped or atypical view of marriage. 
In fact, it appears from these data that on the whole, non-heterosexuals hold positive, 
supportive attitudes toward the idea and institution of marriage, even though most are 
excluded from it by law and custom. With regard to the social relevance of marriage, it is safe 
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to say that to a substantial proportion of the non-heterosexual population represented in this 
sample, marriage is viewed positively, as an important and functional institution, and also as 
a form of intimate or family relationship that is preferable to other dyadic family forms. This 
orientation toward marriage—found in individuals as well as the lesbian and gay community, 
according to respondents—reflects values and attitudes that most Americans would consider 
more traditional than radical. 
Marital Permanence and Durability 
Non-heterosexuals see very little difference between same-sex relationships and 
traditional "marriage." More than 80 percent of respondents agreed that "committed, same-
sex relationships last just as long as most heterosexual marriages." In this study I approximate 
marital status for statistical purposes by defining as "married" anyone in a committed, 
coresidential relationship with a primary romantic partner. While some might object, I do 
not believe that equating cohabitation with legal marriage dilutes the definition of marriage, 
especially for individuals in same-sex relationships. In most states and municipalities in the 
United States, formal or informal domestic partnerships are the only options available to 
lesbians and gays who want to be or start families of their own. Without marriage equality, 
cohabitation for many is as close to marriage as same-sex relationships can get. Among 
the 466 individuals who make up the Quest for Quotidian sample, 228 (49 percent) are in 
marriages or marriage-like relationships—unrecognized marriages, civil unions and domestic 
partnerships—that are demonstrably different than friendship or "dating." It should come as 
no surprise that in the absence of marriage, members of this population place their faith in 
the next best thing. 
Different-Sex Relationships 
About 19 percent («=87) of all respondents are currently in different-sex relationships, 
most of which are marriages («=53) between the bisexual respondent and a different-sex 
partner. Of 228 coupled respondents (married, or in a civil union, domestic partnership or 
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dating relationship; separated respondents are not counted as coupled), 37 percent («=85) are 
in relationships with different-sex partners. Two thirds of these are currently in heterosexual-
styled (man-woman) marriages, while the other third are co'habitating with their different-sex 
partners. 
A small minority (12.9%, n=\ 1) of those in heterosexual relationships are homosexual: 
one lesbian woman lives in a domestic partnership with a man, and ten individuals—all 
men who identify as gay, some closeted, some not—are legally married to women. These are 
unusual marriages, and unfortunately, our data do not reveal much about these relatively 
unique configurations, except that most of them feature a non-monogamous relationship 
style of some type. The relationship styles appear to be an accommodation of the mismatch 
of sexual identity between the partners in these marriages, but for most do not seem to have 
an adverse effect on the stability or longevity of these marriages. The mean age of these ten 
married gay men is 51, and all but one of them—the youngest, who at 25 is more than 20 
years younger than the next older respondent in this group—have been married for at least 
11 years. In fact, eight report that they have been married for twenty years or more, with no 
expectation that their marriages will end any time soon. These ten men—the oldest of whom 
was 68 at the time of data collection—appear to be more open about their sexuality (Af=3.5) 
than are bisexual men in the sample living with or married to women (M=2.69, n=\6). These 
mean scores suggest that the married gay men are out in multiple domains—friends, family, 
work and/or community. Only one of the married men who identified himself as gay has 
disclosed his sexual identity only to friends but not to members of his immediate family, a 
pattern which implies that this particular respondent is closeted, and unwilling to risk his 
long-term marriage by coming out publicly as homosexual. 
Higgins' (2004) research demonstrates that relatively little is known about why non-
heterosexual men marry in the first place, much less remain in heterosexual marriages. 
Analyzing a sample of 69 previously-married and never-married MSM (men who are same-
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sex attracted), Higgins found that neither sexual orientation (whether someone is gay or 
bisexual), internalized homophobia, childhood experiences, nor psychological maladjustment 
accounted for non-heterosexual men's marital decisions. The only variable that significantly 
influenced men's decisions to marry at some point was religiosity of family of origin—that 
is, the more fundamentalist were a subject's parents, the more likely the subject was to have 
been married (Higgins 2004). No comparable data are available in this survey that would 
allow me to determine reliably whether the factors Higgins examined figured into the marital 
decisions of the admittedly small group of married men in my study. Examining in detail the 
question of why non-heterosexual men marry women is beyond the scope of this research, 
but it is within bounds to speculate as to why gay and bisexual men might stay in such 
marriages. The Quest for Quotidian data show that all ten gay men and three of four of the 
bisexual men in heterosexual marriages are parents to at least one child, the majority are in 
stable marriages, and most of these men appear to be committed to staying married. Perhaps 
for them, marriage is a durable institution in which they have not only been husbands, but 
also fathers. 
Coupled bisexual men are, on average, about six years younger (M=44.5 years) than the 
married gay men, but more than half of them have already been married more than ten years. 
Like the gay married men, bisexual married men are optimistic about their current marriages: 
only 2 of 16 reported that their relationships would not last beyond ten years. Notably, 
because they are in marriages that appear normatively heterosexual, these men probably do 
not experience the same forms of discrimination as men who choose to enter committed 
same-sex relationships. The bisexual married men are similar to the gay married men in one 
other important way: most prefer relationship styles that are not strictly monogamous—their 
marriages are more "open" in terms of sexual boundaries. 
Same-Sex Relationships 
The other coupled respondents (63%, ra=l43) are in same-sex committed relationships— 
mostly domestic partnerships that fall under my expanded definition of marriage—including 
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85 gay couples and 58 lesbian couples. About 80 percent of these relationships have lasted 
at least 3 years. The majority (55%) of respondents in same-sex relationships lasting fewer 
than three years were themselves younger—between the ages of 18 and 35, when individuals 
are more likely to be seeking spouses or long-term romantic partners, and more likely to be 
closer to the beginning of long-term relationships and their family lives. 
Personal marital histories may shed light on the degree to which non-heterosexuals view 
marriage as durable. A history of divorce might explain why some groups or individuals hold 
weaker attitudes toward marital permanence. In this sample, about one in five respondents 
overall (48 women and 32 men) were in heterosexual marriages at some point in their 
lives, and prior to their current relationships. Of the men and women men with marital 
histories, only about one third of the women (n=\5) and one half of the men (#=16) are 
currently in same-sex committed relationships today. The rest are either single, remarried or 
in civil unions, or living in domestic partnerships. Previously-married gay men outnumber 
previously married bisexual men three to one, but are not significantly more likely to have 
been married. On the other hand, bisexual women are more likely than lesbian women to 
have been married, but again, the relationship is not significant. 
Attitude Measures 
Two items in the survey address the norm of permanence in the marital relationship for 
all respondents. These items, like all attitudinal indicators here, are measured on a 5-point 
Likert scale, where the higher the score, the stronger the support for traditional marriage 
values or beliefs. The first item captures the degree to which individuals believe that marriage 
creates a more stable or dependable relationship between two people, so that agreement 
with the statement, "In marriage, you can count on your partner being there for you more 
than you can when you are living with someone outside of marriage," signals stronger 
commitment to a pro-marriage position. The second item, "Couples who marry should make 
a lifelong commitment to one another to be broken only under extreme circumstances," 
captures die degree to which individuals adhere to the cultural belief that marriage is 
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"forever," a relatively unbreakable bond between two people. Agreement with this statement 
indicates a stronger, more traditional pro-marriage attitude. These two items are significantly 
correlated (r=.224,p<.0\, n=466), but the relationship is not as strong as one might expect. 
One might think that belief in lifelong marriage would presume a partner on whom one 
could depend before all others, but there is a great deal of ambivalence in these data. For each 
of these items, between 14 and 19 percent of all respondents selected the neutral response 
category, "neither agree nor disagree." The response patterns on these variables indicate 
that a substantial number of respondents might not, in fact, see marriage as particularly 
strong. For example, those who believe that marriage should not necessarily last a lifetime 
represent 35.4 percent of the sample (Af=3.18). Only 33.7 percent of the sample believe that 
marriage makes for more supportive and responsive spouses (Af=2.73). Almost 19 percent are 
ambivalent or uncertain, but tellingly, more than 47 percent disagree that a married spouse is 
more likely to "be there" when the going gets tough. Scores affirming marriage on the other 
item are distributed more or less evenly: Fifty percent of respondents agree that marriage is a 
lifelong commitment, while the other 50 percent are uncertain or disagree. 
Perhaps the uncertainty in these questions is an expression of the relatively limited 
experience individuals have had or can expect to have with marriage in their own lives, 
although the argument could conceivably be applied to explain pro-marriage as well as 
anti-marriage attitudes. Bisexuals in this sample, and indeed in the population, can more 
reasonably expect to marry, so I conducted an independent samples t-test to compare the 
scores of both groups on each of the two attitude measures concerning the durability and 
permanence in marriage and committed relationships. On the first measure, "In marriage 
you can count on your partner being there for you more than you can when you are living 
with someone outside of marriage," the t-test revealed no significant difference in scores 
between bisexual respondents (M=2.58, SD= 1.297) and homosexual respondents [Af=2.83, 
SD=1.403, *{463)=1.947,/>=.052]. Similarly, scores on the second item, "Couples who 
marry should make a lifelong commitment to one another, to be broken only under extreme 
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circumstances," were not significantly different between bisexuals (M=3.06, SD=1.357) 
and homosexuals [Af=3.27, 5Z>=1.445; /(4157)=-1.595,/>=.111]. While tests of mean 
difference do not always reach statistical significance, it is worth noting that the mean scores 
for homosexuals on these and other items measuring pro-marriage attitudes are consistently 
higher than the means of bisexual respondents. 
Because sexual identity does not add much to understanding scores on these attitude 
measures, I ran a similar test to examine mean differences between those under 25 years of 
age—the youngest group, the group most likely to include students, and the group least 
likely to already be in a long-term committed relationship—and those 25 and over. My 
hypothesis was that these younger, inexperienced non-heterosexuals would hold stronger 
attitudes toward marital permanence and durability, that youthful optimism might trump an 
inherent cynicism born of age and experience in die queer romance market. This hypothesis 
was confirmed, but only on the item measuring agreement that marriage is a lifelong 
commitment. Mean scores for "under 25s" (Af=3.52, SD= 1.426) were significantly higher 
than the mean scores for older respondents [Af=3.08, SD= 1.322; *(464)=2.824,/>=,005]. 
The magnitude of the effect is statistically small (T)2=.02), but the importance of the 
finding should not be diminished. It raises die possibility that younger cohorts of non-
heterosexuals are more likely to reasonably expect to marry than older lesbians and gays who 
have lived through not only private intimate same-sex relationships (failed or otherwise), but 
also the public social and political battles for equality that have reduced anti-gay prejudice 
and discrimination. Younger respondents not only believe marriage is permanent, but may 
also be more optimistic that it is within their reach. Cross-sectional survey data cannot be 
used to verify this claim, but the finding is an endorsement of future longitudinal studies of 
marriage attitudes among non-heterosexuals. 
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Marriage and the Welfare of Children 
Opposition to same-sex marriage is frequently based on the argument that procreation is 
a unique, specialized function of heterosexual marriage, one that entails a host of collective 
responsibilities and social obligations that homosexual couples—by virtue of being unable to 
reproduce offspring through sexual intercourse—cannot "naturally" fulfill (see Blankenhorn 
2007). Thus, the argument goes, unions between lesbians or gay men cannot be recognized 
as "real" marriages. The problem with this argument, of course, is that a large number of 
children have grown up in households headed by same-sex couples—by some estimates, 
as many as six million children are being reared in lesbian and gay families (Badgett 1995, 
1998). 
Non-Heterosexual Parents in the Sample 
In the Quest for Quotidian sample, 100 individuals indicated that they are parents to at 
least one child, and sixty-six of those are parents to children under 18. Most of the minor 
children reported in the survey are the biological children of the respondent and live full-
time with their gay, lesbian or bisexual parent. In all, the parents in this sample care and have 
cared for more than 200 children, with at least 39 respondents having already raised their 
children to adulthood. Twenty-six respondents are single parents, and of the remaining 74 
parents in the sample, 39 are married to a different-sex spouse, 28 are living in a same-sex 
domestic partnership, six are in a different-sex domestic partnership, and one is in a same-sex 
marriage. 
The relatively high concentration of parents in coupled households suggests that while 
marriage may be the preferred context for childrearing for people in heterosexual-styled 
unions, domestic partnership is perhaps the only two-parent context for nurturing children, 
or for becoming parents, available to individuals in same-sex relationships. In the absence 
of legal marriage, lesbian and gay parents appear to have sought out the next best thing for 
themselves and their children—committed, coresidential relationships. Participation in two-
parent family structures possibly reflects modern economic conditions and considerations, a 
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negotiated strategy for reducing the strain of domestic labor and childcare, a tendency toward 
more conservative or assimilationist family values, or perhaps an amalgamation of such 
issues, no more for same-sex couples than for different-sex or legally married couples. 
Many studies demonstrate that children do better when they have two parents in the 
home (see Glenn and Sylvester 2005, 2006), but research on whether parents must be 
different-sex to effectively care for children is in relatively short supply (Allen and Demo 
1995; Lambert 2005), probably because ideological biases among researchers and advocates 
tends to undermine or discredit research findings that cast gay and lesbian parenting in a 
positive light (Stacey and Biblarz 2001). We know that children of married parents generally 
have better outcomes than children of single parents (Wallerstein et al. 2001; Wake and 
Gallagher 2000), but such conclusions are usually drawn from studies of family structural 
change that results from divorce. For heterosexuals, these outcomes are explained by the 
economic hardships associated with divorce, or economic disadvantages attached to single 
parenthood, mostly for women, that come about as immediate consequences of structural 
change (Glenn and Sylvester 2006). Comparing outcomes in lesbian and gay families to 
outcomes in divorced families or other alternative heterosexual family structures presumes 
same-sex-headed households bear disadvantages wrought by divorce, and thus does not 
encourage fair assessment of the efficacy of gay families or the success of children raised by 
same-sex parents. Most studies tend to demonstrate few differences in children's outcomes 
between same-sex-headed families and married heterosexual families (Hicks 2005; Stacey and 
Biblarz 2001). 
It appears from the data here that parents in Quest for Quotidian are following the logic 
of the two-parent family model in their own households, which likely reflects a belief that 
marriage makes a difference for children regardless of whether they have a mom and a dad, or 
two moms, or two dads. Provided gay and lesbian couples with children can avoid economic 
disorganization or disadvantage, as well as most of the other difficulties that plague post-
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divorce and single-parent families, there is little reason to believe that their inability to legally 
marry should prevent them from doing so for the sake of the children. 
Children Benefit from Marriage 
To measure the extent to which participants in this research believe that marriage 
provides the best environment in which to raise children, I asked all respondents whether 
they agreed with the statement that "All things being equal, it is better for children to be 
raised in a household that has a married mother and father." I chose this question because it 
has established validity and has been used in numerous surveys to measure the same concept, 
but it did not perform well in this research. Only 17 percent of the sample agreed with the 
statement at all, and the modal response was "strongly disagree." The concept I was trying 
to capture was whether marriage is good for children, but after considering the wording of 
this particular item and the response patterns, I decided that for non-heterosexuals—and 
especially for gays and lesbians—the question is double-barreled and invalid for this sample. 
Non-heterosexual participants could conceivably respond to either (1) the idea that marriage 
is the best family structure in which to raise children, or, more likely, (2) the idea that only 
heterosexual marriage is good for children. It appears that most respondents interpreted the 
item as a measure of the importance of having heterosexual parents. 
Because the relationship between marriage and children's welfare is such an important 
and salient feature of current policy debates, I could not simply skip the question, especially 
if the final goal of this research is to capture and explain the strength of pro-marriage 
attitudes in this sample. In order to get at the concept I wanted to measure, I had to replace 
the original item with a form of the question adapted to the target population: "All things 
being equal, it would be better for children of gays and lesbians to be raised in a household 
where their same-sex parents are married, not just living together." The distribution of 
responses to this item was essentially reversed from the first item. Only 15 percent disagreed 
and more than 52 percent of the sample agreed that children should grow up with same-
sex parents who are married. On the first item, about 17 percent agreed while 60 percent 
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disagreed diat it is better for children to have married heterosexual parents. On both items, 
between 22 and 23 percent of respondents selected the neutral category to signal their 
uncertainty. Independent samples t-tests showed no significant differences in mean scores 
on this item between men and women, bisexuals and homosexuals, or younger and older 
respondents, a finding that indicates a certain stability—but not uniformity—of ideology in 
the sample that cannot be explained by gender, sexual identity or age. 
Decoupling Parenting from Marriage? 
For the currently unmarried, including those in civil unions, the desire to marry and 
the desire to have children (each measured as no=l, maybe=2, yes=3) are strongly and 
significantly correlated (r=.366,/x.0005; «=4l4). Among these respondents, 60 percent 
specifically expressed a desire to marry at some point in their lives, compared to 26 percent 
who "maybe" would like to marry someday, and only 14 percent who do not want to 
marry or remarry at any point in their lives. The latter responses are distributed across all 
relationship status categories, from "single and unattached" to "in a civil union," which 
implies that the individuals who do not want to marry are satisfied with their current 
relationships, marriage-like or not. Of those who want to get married at some point, three 
of four respondents at least consider the possibility of becoming a parent. Among currently 
unmarried same-sex couples («=135), almost 80 percent («=105) would like to marry 
their current partners or lovers, and almost two-thirds (n=66) of these would-be married 
individuals want to have children or have more children. 
For many in the sample, having children, or becoming parents, is closely linked to being 
married or in a committed relationship. Real life, however, sometimes makes parenting 
within a marriage or marriage-like relationship difficult or impossible. The survey item, 
"Couples who have children together ought to be married," assesses the extent to which 
individuals in the sample believe that having children is an integral part of being married. 
This item is a standard item on other surveys about the strength of marriage, and is used here 
to specifically address the concern among marriage advocates that parenting is becoming 
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increasingly decoupled from marriage, that the roles of parent and spouse are becoming 
disintegrated from one another. The initial results are somewhat troubling. 
Forty-nine percent of respondents disagreed that couples with children ought to be 
married, compared to 27 percent who agreed (M-2.6, n=466). These results are similar 
to the question regarding whether children should grow up in married households with 
a mother and a father. Likewise, t-tests on scores for the item revealed no significant 
differences in means due to gender, sexual identity or age difference in the sample. This 
would seem to indicate that marriage and parenting are, by and large, becoming less cohesive 
as institutionalized role sets for individuals. On one hand, non-heterosexuals are generally 
supportive of marriage as the preferred context for raising children, but on the other 
hand, about the same proportion do not see marriage as a necessary condition for effective 
parenting. 
The Centrality of Monogamy to Marriage: 
Practice and Attitudes 
Perhaps the structural feature that most strongly defines modern marriage is the norm 
of monogamy (Weaver and Woollard 2008, Kanazawa and Still 1999). Recent controversies 
in Arizona, Nevada, and Texas surrounding a polygamous religious sect (Tetreault 2008, 
Knickerbocker 2006) speak to the level of discomfort in American family culture with 
family systems that challenge the monogamy norm, and certainly most state constitutional 
amendments aimed at denying same-sex couples the right to marry implicitly place 
monogamy at the center of the legal definitions that limit marriage to one man and one 
woman. The political rhetoric surrounding movements to pass marriage amendments and 
die language of such legislation also implies that gays and lesbians are not what Seidman 
(2002) might call "good sexual citizens." This prejudice feeds upon a common stereotype 
about non-heterosexuals and their same-sex partners: Gays and lesbians are undeserving of 
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marriage equality, because as a group they are unable to conform to the social expectations 
attached to contemporary marriage, namely the norm of monogamy. 
Indeed, anti-gay rhetoric and activism seems designed to invoke a state of continuous sex 
panic that casts the intimate lives of non-heterosexuals as an affront to the very fibers that 
hold civilized society together, namely heterosexuality. Despite the increasing visibility of 
lesbian, gay and bisexual people in everyday society, in media representations, and in political 
circles, homosexuality continues to be reduced in much public discourse to a synonym for 
sexual deviance and promiscuity, and a dangerous promiscuity at that. Seidman notes that 
Many scholars hold that the beliefs people have about being gay are not 
simply a reflection of what they know or don't know about homosexuality. 
Rather, the meaning of being gay is in part fixed by its being the opposite 
of what it means to be straight. For example, if heterosexuality is associated, 
ideally, with behaviors such as being loving and being monogamous, 
homosexuality is often associated in the public's mind with being hedonistic 
and promiscuous. (Seidman 2002:150) 
Among the most virulent in the anti-gay crowd, assumptions of homosexual 
promiscuity are translated to claims that homosexuality is the result of child sexual abuse, 
that homosexuals themselves are likely to be predatory pedophiles, that they carry and 
intentionally pass along disease, and that they wish to "recruit" children and young people 
into their ranks in order to spread their anti-family values and behaviors to the larger society. 
With these assumptions entrenched in the public consciousness, it is easy to see how lesbians 
and gays are seen as something other than "good" citizens. Moreover, it is even easier for 
those opposed to marriage equality to dismiss the idea that non-heterosexuals might be, or 
even desire to be, monogamous in their own private relationships. As long as homosexuals 
are seen as being incapable of monogamy, the discriminatory proscriptions against same-sex 
marriage will appear on the surface to have moral, if not real, merit. 
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Frankly, not all homosexuals or bisexuals believe in or practice monogamy (Lannutti 
2005), but this does not necessarily distinguish them from heterosexuals, who are certainly 
not consistently pillars of moral virtue when it comes to monogamous sexual relationships 
(Laumann, et al. 1994). Liberationist ideology in queer politics openly challenges the 
norm of monogamy, suggesting that the expectation that a person may have only one 
sexual partner for life infringes on the ability of an individual to form alternative sexual 
relationships if he or she so desires. The liberationist interpretation of monogamous marriage 
is that it is a heterosexist, patriarchal social structure which would introduce tighter social 
controls on non-heterosexuals and limit the creative and perhaps revolutionary ways that 
gays, lesbians and bisexuals have re-invented and enacted sexual and intimate relationships 
(Warner 1995). From the most extreme liberationist perspective, monogamy undermines 
individual freedom in a way both unwarranted and undesirable in the late modern world, 
and thus should not necessarily be embraced by the queer population, or anyone else, for 
that matter (Ettelbrick 1992). 
Monogamy in Practice 
How compelling is the norm of monogamy among non-heterosexuals? I asked 
participants to select the relationship style they would most prefer, if they were single and 
unattached, and the relationship style that best describes their current relationship if they 
were coupled. The original categories for both questions are adapted from Shernoffs (1995) 
research on the relationship styles of gay men: 
• Monogamously coupled and strictly sexually exclusive 
• Non-monogamous, as long as we don't have to talk about it 
(unacknowledged open relationship) 
• Primarily sexually exclusive; committed but "play" together as a couple 
(menages) 
• Primarily sexually exclusive; occasional non-monogamy (under certain 
conditions or with rules) 
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• Non-monogamous and not sexually exclusive (an acknowledge open 
relationship) 
• A committed relationship, but no sex (non-sexual lovers) 
While there were responses in all categories, "monogamously coupled and strictly sexually 
exclusive" was generally the rule rather than the exception. Among single respondents 
with no romantic attachments, 57 percent reported that they would prefer a monogamous 
relationship over other forms of intimate relationships. Fifty-two percent of participants 
in committed relationships described their unions, marriages and domestic partnerships as 
"strictly sexually exclusive," as did 54 percent of those who were dating or seeing someone 
seriously. I merged die two measures—so that coupled respondents' scores reflect their 
current relationship and single respondents' scores reflect the kind of relationship they are 
seeking—to get an idea of the prevalence of monogamy in tlie sample overall. Using this 
variable, just over 48 percent of respondents appear to practice and prefer monogamy over 
various forms of non-monogamy. In otlier words, a substantial proportion of the sample 
rejects promiscuity as an option in committed relationships. 
Monogamy Among Lesbians and Gay Men 
Still, to justify continuing discrimination against gays and lesbians in family policy, 
opponents of same-sex marriage would likely point to the fact that the number of 
respondents already in or seeking monogamous relationships fails to reach even a simple 
majority. A review of the distribution of responses to the monogamy questions showed 
that 63 percent of homosexuals in the sample («=279) defined themselves and/or their 
relationships as monogamous, compared to only 26 percent of bisexuals («=187). Since the 
burden of discrimination is heavier for lesbians and gay men, it is wortii asking whether 
being homosexual as opposed to bisexual increases the chances that individuals will identify 
themselves as monogamous or will pursue monogamous relationships. To do this, I 
conducted a standard direct logistic regression to determine if sexual identity—homosexual 
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Table 11. Logistic Regression of Gay/Lesbian Sexuality on Monogamous Relationship Style 
(n=228) 
Wald Odds 95% Confidence Interval 
B Chi-Square Ratio for Odds Ratio 
Variables Lower Upper 
Gay/Lesbian, not Bisexual 1.599 58.890** 4.948 3.289 7.444 
Constant -1.063 40.337 .345 
**/><.0005 
or bisexual—would distinguish respondents who were strictly monogamous from those who 
were not. 
Table 11 shows the results of the logistic regression analysis, including regression 
coefficients, Wald statistics, odds ratios, and 95% confidence intervals for odds ratios for the 
predictor variable, "Gay/Lesbian, not bisexual." The test of the predictor variable against a 
constant-only model was statistically significant, Chi-Square 2(1, N=466)=64.85,/><.0005, 
which indicates the "Gay/Lesbian" variable identifies monogamous individuals more 
reliably than chance alone. The positive predictive power of the model is .6308, meaning 
that the model accurately classified 63% of those folks who claim to be in or desire strictly 
monogamous relationships. 
More telling, however, is the odds ratio in Table 11. According to the analysis, gays 
and lesbians are almost five times more likely to be in the "monogamous" group than are 
bisexual men and women. From this finding, I can conclude that the relatively low rate of 
monogamy in the sample as a whole is most likely explained by the beliefs and practices of 
bisexual individuals—notably, individuals in this population who are often legally able and 
personally willing to exercise the right to marry as it currently exists in law, and who make up 
the majority of legally-married participants in this sample—rather than lesbians or gays who, 
for the most part, must try to adhere to the norm of monogamy without the benefit of social 
pressure and support for their relationships that come with marriage. 
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Sex and fidelity in same-sex relationships, as in all intimate relationships, are products of 
negotiation. "Sexual relationships outside the primary relationship are not de facto affairs," 
write Martell and Prince (2005:1430), but "the context of the couple's agreement with one 
another about outside sexual activity is crucial in understanding what impact such activity 
will have on the couple." That 63 percent of homosexual individuals are monogamous to 
many might still seem a rather tepid endorsement of monogamy, and perhaps it is. But it is 
possible that it is the absence of marital opportunity, not a tendency toward promiscuity, that 
would explain at least some of the apparent weakness of normative monogamy among gays 
and lesbians. 
Waite and Gallagher (2000), reviewing findings and analyzing data from the National 
Health and Social Life Survey by Laumann, Gagnon, Michael and Michaels (1992), 
conclude that "cohabiting relationships seem to be built around sex to an even greater 
extent than marriage" among heterosexuals, noting that "while sex is a very important part 
of marriage, it is not (as it is for cohabitors) the defining characteristic of the relationship" 
(Waite and Gallagher 2000:81-82). It is somewhat astounding that researchers might 
assume that since gays and lesbians in most jurisdictions cannot legally marry, they do not 
collectively feel the effects of its absence. Individuals in same-sex relationships often have 
cohabitation as their only option for making the kinds of commitments that lead to building 
a family. Heterosexual cohabitation is given a pass for emphasizing the sexual aspects of the 
intimate dyad, and heterosexuals themselves are not necessarily stigmatized as bad sexual 
citizens, at least not now in the 21st century. Same-sex couples, however, who by necessity 
rather than choice live in domestic partnerships or other relationships that approximate legal 
marriage are chastised and derided for their collective "deviance," especially with regard to 
sexual monogamy. Because almost all gay and lesbian committed couples are living together 
as "cohabitors," does it not make sense to consider the possibility that many of them, 
like heterosexual cohabitors, are also likely to see sex as a "defining characteristic" of their 
relationship? Add this possibility to the historical challenge to traditional modes of sexual 
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expression that is part of gay culture in the United States, and one might be able to explain 
why one-third of homosexuals in this study do not consider themselves monogamous. 
Perhaps if they could legally marry, the emphasis that Waite and Gallagher describe 
would shift from sex to the more tangible social benefits and obligations of marriage, and 
monogamy might be reported more frequently among the members of this population. 
Attitudes about Monogamy and Marriage 
Two items are included in the survey to measure attitudes about monogamy and the 
connection between valuing monogamy and valuing marriage. One captures attitudes 
toward monogamy in same-sex relationships, which generally are domestic partnerships, 
not marriage. It is a modified version of a more standard survey item that more specifically 
addresses monogamy in marriage. Both were included in the Quest for Quotidian 
questionnaire, coded so that agreement indicates positive attitudes toward monogamy in 
intimate relationships. By and large, the attitudes individuals hold about monogamy reflect 
the practices and preferences reported earlier, in much the same proportions. For this reason, 
I also compared the mean scores of homosexuals and bisexuals on each of these attitudinal 
measures using independent-samples t-tests. 
Slightly over 47 percent of all respondents agreed that "it is wrong for gays and lesbians 
to have sex witli others when they are in a committed relationship," including 33.2 percent 
of bisexuals and 57 percent of homosexuals. The t-test revealed that the difference in mean 
scores between bisexuals (Af=2.85, SD= 1.389) and homosexuals (Af=3.71, SD-1.257) on 
this item, attitudes toward monogamy in intimate relationships, was statistically significant, 
?(463)=-6.9l6,/x.001, and that the magnitude of the effect was moderate to large (t|2=.094). 
On the second item, which addresses marital monogamy in particular, results are even 
more dramatic. While only 48.7 percent of the sample agreed with the statement that "it 
is wrong when married people have sex with someone other than their spouse", just 29.4 
percent of bisexuals agreed compared to a solid and substantial majority of lesbians and 
gays, 61.6 percent. The t-test on sample means showed a significant difference in scores on 
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attitudes toward marital monogamy between bisexual respondents (M=2.66, SD= 1.436) and 
homosexual respondents [M=3.80, S£>=1.233; *{354.53)=-8.848,/><.001]. The t statistic 
indicates that the effect size was considerably larger (r|2=.l446) than on the more general 
question about monogamy in intimate relationships. This is the largest effect size recorded 
for any set of variables in t-tests in this research, and can be interpreted to mean that almost 
15 percent of the variance in this score is explained by sexual identity alone. Overall, I can 
conclude that bisexual individuals in this sample are significantly less likely to agree with 
statements that suggest non-monogamy is wrong than are homosexuals, a finding that is 
consistent with the analyses of monogamous practices elaborated above. 
Of all the individual attitude measures in this survey, the differences between bisexual 
and homosexual attitudes toward monogamy are the most striking. Of the 187 bisexuals 
in the sample, 40 percent are in different-sex committed relationships, and more than half 
among those are already in heterosexual marriages, but their attitudes toward marriage and 
toward monogamy in particular appear to be distinctly and dramatically different from the 
attitudes held by homosexuals and indeed by heterosexuals. Homosexuals seem to hold 
monogamous marriage in higher regard. 
The two items analyzed here are strongly and positively correlated (r=.818, A/=465, 
^x.001), suggesting that individuals who hold positive attitudes toward monogamy hold such 
attitudes regardless of whether the relationship in question is a marriage or civil union, or 
a domestic partnership. Forty-two percent of all respondents agreed with both statements, 
but only 25 percent disagreed with both statements. There is a lot of uncertainty and 
ambivalence in this sample, probably because many in this subculture and population are 
still hammering out the meaning of monogamy in the absence of social, structural and legal 
support for same-sex relationships. Among gays and lesbians, more than 50 percent agreed, 
but only 11 percent disagreed with both statements about monogamy in relationships. 
These numbers clearly give the lie to the notion that homosexuals and the culture they 
enact celebrates promiscuity. Based on the analyses in this section, lesbians and gay men are 
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more often than not monogamous, and indeed monogamy appears to be a lifestyle for most 
homosexuals. They are monogamous because they want to be, because they believe—as does 
the majority of heterosexuals, but only a minority of bisexuals—that monogamy is a central 
feature of intimate life (Worth, Reid and McMillan 2002), and more importantly, of married 
life. 
Taking Marriage Seriously 
An unfortunate joke has floated around the queer community for decades (see Gordon 
2006 for discussion of these stereotypes): "What does a lesbian bring to the second date?" 
The answer? 
"A U-Haul." 
The joke exploits the idea that gays and lesbians are desperate for a relationship, but also 
suggests that lesbian and gay relationships are somehow unserious, driven by petty concerns, 
rash decision-making, or even immaturity. While the joke might be funny to some, this view 
of non-heterosexual relationships is stereotypical, prejudicial, and distinctly unfunny when 
deployed in arguments about marriage rights for same-sex couples. Marriage advocates who 
oppose same-sex marriage point to the relatively low rates of same-sex marriage in Canada 
and Massachusetts (Gallagher and Baker 2006) as indications that the LGBT community is 
not really interested in marriage, tacitly implying that gays and lesbians do not have the will 
or character necessary to build relationships deserving of the moniker. The problem is that 
there is little empirical evidence to either support or challenge that claim. 
Two items in the current survey assess whether non-heterosexuals view marriage as 
a weighty and considered decision, and both are concerned with marriage timing. The 
first item, "Too many couples rush into marriage," is drawn from previous research. Legal 
marriage presumes coresidence with a heterosexual spouse; marriage means "moving in." For 
same-sex romantic partners, however, the absence of marriage and its rituals reverses the logic 
of household-building. To most gays and lesbians, moving in means "marriage." I included 
134 
in the survey a second item, worded for those in the non-heterosexual population for whom 
marriage is out of reach: "Too many lesbian and gay couples move in with each other too 
soon after they meet." Both items measure the degree of serious with which respondents take 
coresidential intimate relationships, be they marriage or cohabitation. 
Respondents are far more critical, apparently, of heterosexuals than of gay people on 
this issue. Most respondents (more than 85 percent) agreed that too many couples rush into 
marriage, and since most of the people who marry are heterosexual, it is logical to assume 
that non-heterosexuals believe that straight people do not take marriage seriously enough. On 
the other hand, responses to the question concerning gay and lesbian relationships were more 
normally distributed, but only 43.4 percent of respondents agreed that same-sex couples 
move in together too soon after they meet. About 21 percent disagreed, and 35.8 percent 
took a neutral or uncertain stance on the item. Looking at the data another way, 57 percent 
of participants strongly agreed that couples marry too soon, but only 11 percent strongly 
agreed that gay and lesbian couples are too quick to merge households. The rather strong 
criticism of marriage timing, as opposed to "cohabitation timing" among gays and lesbians, 
holds across the various groups in the sample. There are no statistically significant differences 
in mean scores on the first item between men and women, bisexuals and homosexuals, 
respondents under 30 and older respondents, or those who are coupled and those who are 
single. Almost everyone in the sample believes that too many people do not take marriage 
seriously enough, and get married too quickly or too early in their relationships. 
Means tests on the second item concerning whether gays or lesbians rush into 
cohabitational relationships reveal a slightly different story. Sexual identity and age appear to 
influence attitudes toward marriage timing. T-tests comparing the mean score for bisexuals 
(M=3.10, 5£>=.893) to the mean score for homosexuals (Af=3.44, 5Z>=1.057) showed a 
significant difference between the two groups, using the Levene statistic, ?(439.94)=3.789, 
p<.00l. A similarly significant difference was revealed when comparing mean scores 
for respondents between the ages of 18 and 29 (Af=3.42, SD= 1.009) and respondents 
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30 and older, ?(464)=3.119,/>=.002. The magnitude of each effect was small (T|2=.03 
for homosexuals/bisexuals; t|2=.02 for younger/older respondents), but it remains that 
homosexuals and younger respondents, on average, tend to take a dimmer view of the idea of 
moving in with a lover too soon after they meet than do bisexuals and older respondents. 
The difference in the pattern of responses to both items begs interpretation. Clearly, 
participants in this sample distinguish between marriage and cohabitation. Cohabitation is 
probably seen as a less serious commitment, even when it is the only marriage-like option 
available. Marriage, on the other hand, is taken very seriously by a dramatic majority of 
individuals in the sample. The differences in the distributions between the two items suggest 
that cohabitation is a more ambiguous relationship, that the decision to move in together 
might be based on any number of factors that are not immediately clear, and that living 
together might be an elegant social analogy for marriage, but it is not marriage. Marriage, 
according to these data, should not be entered into lightly. The decision to marry, especially 
from the perspective of homosexuals and younger people in this sample, is serious, and 
should take some time. 
Divorce as a Social Problem 
Until the emergence of same-sex marriage in the late 1990s, no social change had more 
of an effect on marriage culture than the introduction of no-fault divorce in the early 1970s. 
Relatively high rates of divorce remain associated in the public consciousness with a range 
of family-related social problems, including fatherlessness and single-parent families, which 
many blame for increased teen sexual activity, rising rates of pregnancy, high school dropout 
rates, juvenile delinquency, increasing poverty among women and children, and the rising 
costs of welfare programs to address these problems. In short, most marriage advocates (who 
frequently oppose same-sex marriage) see the ease and prevalence of divorce as significant 
indicators of the decline of family and marriage in US society over the last 40 years (Stacey 
1996, 2004). 
136 
Most respondents in the sample do see divorce as a problem, and as is true for most of 
the attitude questions on this survey, gays and lesbians appear to take the stronger "pro-
marriage" position than bisexuals. The measure I used was straightforward. I asked whether 
individuals agreed or disagreed that "divorce is a serious national problem in the United 
States today," with responses ranging from "strongly disagree" to "neither agree nor disagree" 
to "strongly agree." While 57.9 percent of the sample agreed, only 22.1 percent disagreed. 
The remaining 20 percent, or one in five respondents, were uncertain. 
Again, I ran tests comparing means to determine whether gender identity, sexual identity, 
age, or relationship status influenced responses. Sexual identity was the only factor among 
the four that yielded significant results on independent samples t-tests. The pattern is by 
now familiar: There was a significant difference in mean scores between bisexual respondents 
(A/=3.35, SD= 1.325) and homosexual respondents [M=3.69, S£>=1.119; *(371.23)=-2.809, 
/>=.005], and the magnitude of the difference in the means was small (t]2=.0l67). 
This measure and these tests do not necessarily confirm that non-heterosexuals view 
divorce as a primary cause of juvenile delinquency, or any other specific social problem, but 
neither does it necessarily suggest that bisexual, lesbian and gay people are "anti-divorce." 
The high level of concern about divorce prevalent in a group that has limited or no access 
to marriage does reinforce, however, that this population places a high value on marriage. 
Individuals and groups tend to take marriage very seriously, and our social history is replete 
with evidence supporting the central importance of marriage to family life, community 
cohesion and economic and social growth. The data here have shown that this belief is not 
foreign to gay, lesbian and bisexual people. Consider that only 13.5 percent of respondents 
in this survey agreed with the statement, "These days, couples who live together outside 
marriage get all the benefits of marriage without the legal details." In fact, 53 percent strongly 
disagreed with the statement, meaning that marriage is viewed by many, but by no means 
all, non-heterosexuals as structurally superior to other forms of intimate relationships. That 
so many respondents register concern about divorce—that is, the negation of marriage—as 
137 
a social problem most likely indicates a commitment to the core values and practices that 
define the institution of marriage in the United States, as well as an understanding of the 
rights of individuals and responsibilities to the community that set marriage apart from other 
relational forms in the family system. Divorce, I might argue, is interpreted by participants in 
this study as a problem because it represents the failure of married people to uphold their end 
of the social bargain, to take marriage seriously. 
How Strong is Marriage? 
Marriage is arguably the one social institution uniquely tailored to empower people to 
create families. Marriage creates kin from non-kin, binds extended families and support 
networks to one another through married couples, creates boundaries through monogamy 
and a private context for emotional and physical intimacy free from surveillance or 
interference from the larger society, organizes everyday economic and domestic labor, 
integrates individuals into social networks and communities, and often provides a relatively 
stable environment in which to have and care for children. The eufunctions of marriage are 
well-documented, as are its historically significant dysfunctions. This study does not seek to 
settle the debate over whether marriage is good or bad, workable or unworkable, or liberating 
or enslaving. Marriage exists as a social practice, a form of relationship that connotes a 
preferred social status for its participants, and thus translates into a range of privileges, 
benefits and rights that most people engage and enjoy without a second thought. For lesbians 
and gay men in particular, marriage has remained culturally and legally out of reach until 
relatively recently, despite the creative and subversive ways they have devised to live "normal 
lives" even as they have been persistently marginalized by deeply-rooted homophobia, 
stigmatization as criminals or deviants, and institutionalized discrimination that has, at least 
throughout modernity, kept them from being able to fully realize themselves as individuals 
and citizens. 
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Despite being isolated from marriage, or perhaps being forced to see their lives through 
a "prism of marriagelessness" (Rauch 2004:9), non-heterosexuals in this sample and in the 
population grew up in families whose existence was informed and organized by marriage 
(Sherrill 1996). Marriage was not something they rejected, out of hand, but something that 
rejected them. With this in mind, it is easier to understand why many non-heterosexuals 
in this sample hold attitudes toward marriage that are not so very different from the 
attitudes held by their heterosexual friends, siblings or parents. The movement for marriage 
equality, seen in this same light, seems a call for the right to be mundane, to fall into the 
same comforting routines of social life that organize and enhance the lives heterosexuals. 
While activists with liberationist leanings might find fault with the movement, it is difficult 
to ignore the underpinnings of the assimilationist logic that drives so many toward an 
integrative rather than revolutionary family politics. 
One of the purposes of this study is to attempt to explain why the marriage movement is 
as strong as it is, and to identify the social forces that are leading same-sex-attracted people to 
call for the right to marry. My general hypothesis is rather simple: they believe in marriage. 
But how strong is that belief? There has been little research testing the "conservative case" for 
marriage, and thus comparisons between the strength of pro-marriage ideology between non-
heterosexuals and heterosexuals or the general population are rarer still. 
Elements of the Pro-Marriage Attitudes Scale 
In order to measure the strength of pro-marriage ideology among bisexuals, lesbians and 
gay men, I constructed a scale from eight of the individual attitude measures discussed above. 
All the indicators have been validated in other surveys on the strength of marriage in the 
United States except one worded to capture the concept for the non-heterosexual population, 
which replaced a similar question. Collectively, the attitude measures capture the various 
dimensions of traditional attitudes toward marriage in the sample of non-heterosexuals. The 
Pro-Marriage Attitude Scale (PMAS) is the sum of each respondent's scores on the following 
individual items: 
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• Marriage is an old-fashioned, outmoded institution. 
• All things being equal, it would be better for children of gays and lesbians 
to be raised in a household where their same-sex parents are married, not 
just living together. 
• Couples who have children together ought to be married. 
• Couples who marry should make a lifelong commitment to one another, 
to be broken only under extreme circumstances. 
• In the absence of violence and extreme conflict, parents who have an 
unsatisfactory marriage should stay together until their children are 
grown. 
• It is wrong when married people have sex with someone odier than their 
spouse. 
• Too many couples rush into marriage. 
• Divorce is a serious national problem in the United States today. 
Performance and Reliability 
Scores on the PMAS are normally distributed from 8 to 40, with a sample mean of 26.25 
(median=26, mode=25). There are no missing data. Reliability analysis on the 8-item scale 
yielded a Cronbach's Alpha of .64. Higher scores on the scale indicate a stronger expression 
of attitudes favorable to marriage and to assimilationist ideology. Scores below 32 likely 
indicate an ambivalent or more liberationist ideology. The scale reflects the emphasis on 
children salient in the critique of family from the more conservative side of the political 
spectrum. 
Effects of Sexual Identity on the Pro-Marriage 
Attitudes Scale (PMAS) 
Sexual identity—whether someone is bisexual or homosexual, as defined in this 
research—has been the identity marker that most frequently accounts for differences 
in die strength of individual pro-marriage attitudes. The evidence so far is leading to a 
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testable hypothesis, namely, that homosexual people hold stronger pro-marriage attitudes 
than bisexual people, who are more likely to be able to access the social and legal benefits 
of marriage. Put another way, an assimilationist ideology is likely to be stronger among 
homosexuals than among bisexuals in the sample. To test this hypothesis, I ran a series of 
statistical tests comparing means, using the PMAS as the dependent variable. 
The first tests included an independent-samples t-test by which I compared mean scores 
on the PMAS for bisexuals and homosexuals, generally. The mean score on the PMAS 
for bisexuals (M=25.06, SD=5.16) was lower than the mean score for lesbian and gay 
respondents (M=27.05, SD=5A5), and the difference was statistically significant, t{464)=-
4.090, p<.001. As with individual attitude measures, the effect size was statistically small 
(t|2=.03). Nevertheless, my hypothesis was confirmed: assimilationist ideology is stronger 
among homosexuals than among bisexuals. However, I remained concerned about the effect 
size, so I ran similar tests on the other identity markers I have used in analyses—gender, age 
and relationship status—to examine how they might influence or impact the PMAS. Results 
of the t-test of the mean scores between men (M=26.96, SD=4.90) and women (M=25.54, 
SD=5A8) were significant, using the Levene statistic, /(458.38)=2.951,/>=.003. Women are 
slightly less inclined to assimilationist ideology, and have weaker pro-marriage attitudes than 
men. Mean scores on the PMAS are not significantly influenced either by age or relationship 
status. 
Having established that sexual identity and gender each influence the strength of 
marriage among non-heterosexuals, I ran a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) test to 
examine the strength of marriage or pro-family assimilationist ideology between gender-
identified sexuality groups in the sample: bisexual men, bisexual women, gay men, and 
lesbian women. I wanted to know which of the groups had the weakest and the strongest 
scores on the PMAS, and whether the differences in those scores were significant. There was 
a statistically significant difference at thep<.05 level in PMAS scores for the four groups, 
F(3, 462)=6.265,/<.001. Despite reaching statistical significance, the differences in mean 
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scores between the groups were moderate to small, and the effect size, r\2, was .04. Post-hoc 
comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for bisexual women 
(A/=24.8, SD=5A0) was significantly different from that of gay men (M=27.2, SD=4.78) 
and lesbian women (M=26.7, SD=5.87). Scores for bisexual men (M=25.9, SD=5.32) did 
not differ significantly from any of the other groups, but that might be explained by small 
number of bisexual men in the sample (n=43). 
The ANOVA results suggest that bisexual women are the group most likely to resist 
assimilationist ideology, and to hold a more "anti-marriage" orientation than any other 
group in the sample. Bisexual women outnumber bisexual men more than three to one, 
and represent 31 percent of the sample compared to lesbians' 19 percent. Only gay men 
constitute a larger group at 41 percent of the sample («=190). Lesbians and gay men do not 
differ significantly on PMAS mean scores. 
Non-Heterosexuals and the "Normal" Life 
What these tests show is that there is nothing intrinsically or uniquely "anti-marriage" or 
"anti-family" about homosexuals—people who would prefer to be in same-sex relationships. 
The vast majority of non-heterosexual people in the United States denied marriage rights are 
gay or lesbian, and the reasons policy-makers and anti-gay activists give for denying that right 
to homosexuals rely heavily on assumptions that lesbians and gay men hold negative attitudes 
toward marriage and traditional notions of family. My analyses here demonstrate that we 
cannot assume non-heterosexuals share a collective culture or political orientation toward 
marriage and family any more than they share a sexual identity. What is more, my findings 
lend convincing support to the notion that being gay by itself does not reliably predict 
rejection of what are understood to be basic and largely traditional family values, or even 
traditional notions of what marriage means. Rather, my findings so far suggest that for many 
non-heterosexuals—particularly the people who wish to marry their same-sex partners—the 
"alternative lifestyle" that arouses so much ire among opponents to same-sex marriage 
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is a way of living deeply informed by the same values and attitudes that define marriage 
and family-making for the majority of privileged heterosexuals. Nevertheless, liberationist 
attitudes are more pronounced among bisexuals and women, and assimilationist attitudes 
are more prevalent among homosexuals and men. Overall, it appears that gays and lesbians, 
more than bisexuals, are moving toward marriage, catching up to the quotidian. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
MAPPING THE QUOTIDIAN 
The Strength of Marriage and Assimilationist Ideology 
We can glean from comparisons of means that homosexuals and bisexuals hold 
significantly different positions on a number of attitudes, and particular on attitudes about 
monogamy in marriage. Analyses of my Pro-Marriage Attitudes Scale (PMAS) suggest that 
the former group is demonstrably less enthusiastic about traditional marriage values than the 
latter. Overall, bisexuals in this study are probably more likely to embrace the liberationist 
ideology most often associated with radical and feminist critiques of traditional marriage 
and modern family models, while homosexuals in the sample tend toward assimilation as a 
cultural policy. However, the same analyses demonstrated that identity markers such as sexual 
identity or gender by themselves are not powerful enough to explain the stronger demand for 
marriage equality among some non-heterosexuals and not others, or the frequent spikes in 
popularity of same-sex marriage within the queer population and among the public at large. 
Dependent Variable: Pro-Marriage 
Attitude Scale (PMAS) 
The Pro-Marriage Attitude Scale (PMAS) developed in Chapter 6 was designed to 
measure the relative strength or weakness of attitudes toward marriage, which can be 
interpreted as assimilationist or, respectively, liberationist ideological tendencies in the 
sample. Because the PMAS draws on generally-accepted items from national surveys in use 
around the country, die scale gives us a relatively accurate starting point for analyzing how 
and why non-heterosexuals value the institution of marriage, something that has not often 
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been measured in this population. Certainly political support for policy changes leading to 
same-sex marriage has been measured (Avery, et al. 2007, Barclay and Fisher 2003, Brewer 
and Wilcox 2005, Brumbaugh, et al. 2008, Egan and Sherrill 2005, Loftus 2001), among 
both heterosexuals and non-heterosexuals, but is supporting same-sex marriage the same 
as holding more or less traditional attitudes toward the institution? In order to distinguish 
between assimilationists and liberationists generally, and those with stronger rather than 
weaker pro-marriage attitudes specifically, I use the PMAS as the basis for testing hypotheses 
about different groups within the sample, and as the dependent variable in a regression 
analysis in which I attempt to build a model for understanding the factors that shape 
ideological orientation toward marriage. 
Influences of Identity 
Although I have already established that some identity markers effectively explain 
differences in specific attitudes toward marriage as well as variation in mean scores on the 
PMAS, I begin this phase of data analysis with a standard multiple regression of a set of 
identity markers on the dependent variable, the PMAS. So far, I have for the most part used 
gender and sexual identity as separate variables. In the standard and sequential regression 
models presented here, I have chosen to use the more specific gendered sexual identity 
variable. The categorical variable identifying bisexual men, bisexual women, gay men and 
lesbians was transformed into four binary variables, or dummy variables, used as predictors 
in the first model, and essentially as control variables in subsequent models. For example, 
bisexual man is coded 1 if respondent reports sexual identity as "bisexual" and gender 
identity as "man," while all other responses are coded 0. The predictors used in the model 
are bisexual man, bisexual woman, lesbian woman, while gay man is omitted to serve as 
the reference category for the three included variables. Most anti-gay rhetoric is directed 
toward homosexual men, and the most virulent anti-gay stereotypes (e.g., pedophile, pervert, 
predator) usually attach to gay men, whose rejection of heterosexuality, gay identities and 
sexual practices appears to be considered the "worst of the worst" by social and religious 
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conservatives and others who express distaste or disgust at the idea of gay equality. For 
this reason, I used gay men as the reference category, and compare other gendered sexual 
identities to gay men in most analyses. 
The two other identity markers used in analyses are age and relationship status. The age 
variable used here is a binary variable that codes raw age under 30 years as " 1 , " and raw age 
of 30 or more years as "0." Respondents under thirty were born after 1974, and have always 
lived in a world in which gender inequality is openly challenged and often addressed, and in 
which divorce has always been an integral and unquestioned element in the family system 
and family decision-making. By dividing the sample into those under 30 and those 30 and 
older, I control for not only age, but also for the effect of growing into adulthood in the era 
of no-fault divorce and increased equality for women. Relationship status is similarly coded 
" 1 " when respondent reports being in a committed relationship (not just dating), and "0" 
when the respondent reports no current romantic partner, no "steady" dating partner, or is 
single and not seeking a long-term relationship. 
Regression Model 1: Analysis and Results 
A standard multiple regression of these identity markers on the Pro-Marriage Attitudes 
Scale was conducted to determine how much gendered sexual identity, age and relationship 
status (coupled or not) together influence positive attitudes toward marriage. Table 12 
displays correlations between the five identity markers and the PMAS, and among the 
identity markers themselves. All the predictors in this model are binary variables, and there 
are no missing data, although one case is omitted as an outlier (n=466). 
This regression tests a series of related hypotheses derived from conservative arguments 
against same-sex marriage, based on stereotypical propositions that homosexual people 
or people in same-sex relationships are unfit for marriage and family life, are collectively 
antipathetic toward what are called "traditional family values," and do not behave in ways 
that reflect mainstream values. Specific hypotheses tested in Model 1 include the following: 
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Table 12. Correlation Matrix for Pro-Marriage Attitude Scale and Predictors used in 
Regression Model 1, including Age, Coupled Status and Gendered Sexual Identity , N=465 
Independent Predictors 
Pro-Marriage Attitudes Scale 
Age (under 30) 
Gendered Sexual Identity 
Gay Men 
Bisexual Men 
Bisexual Women 
Lesbian Women 
Pearson's R Correlation Statistic 
Pro-Marriage Attitudes 
(PMAS) 
Scale (PMAS) 
1.000 
.014 
.148* 
-.021 
-.188** 
.052 
Coupled 
Status 
.040 
-.277** 
-.050 
.045 
.016 
.011 
Age 
(under 30) 
.014 
1.000 
-.206** 
-.057 
.219** 
.042 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
Hj Homosexuals are more likely than bisexuals to hold weaker positive attitudes 
toward traditional marriage; 
H 2 Older Respondents are more likely than younger respondents to hold stronger 
positive attitudes toward marriage; and 
H 3 Respondents in committed relationships are more likely than single respondents 
to hold stronger positive attitudes toward marriage. 
Table 13 displays unstandardized regression coefficients (B), the standardized regression 
coefficients ((?), the intercept, R2 and adjusted R2 for the first step of sequential regression 
on the Pro-Marriage Attitude Scale. According to the analysis, H2 and H 3 can be rejected, 
as neither age nor coupled relationship status is a significant predictor of PMAS scores. The 
analysis shows that bisexuality is inversely related to PMAS scores for both men and women, 
but that lesbian and gay identities are both positively associated with PMAS scores. The 
finding that bisexual women are the only group significantly more likely to report lower 
scores on the PMAS (1? = -.237,/><.001) than gay men lends support to earlier analyses that 
revealed significant differences in means on specific attitude scores between homosexuals and 
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Table 13. Model 1—Regression of Identity Markers on Pro-Marriage Attitudes Scale 
(PMAS) 
Model 1 
-1.368 
-2.676 
-.541 
.888 
.736 
26.619 
.869 
.588 
.669 
.527 
.499 
.480 
R2= 
Adjusted R2= 
R= 
-.076 
-.237** 
-.041 
.083 
.070 
:.048 
:.038 
=.219 
Identity Markers Mean SD B SE B fi_ 
Bisexual Men 
Bisexual Women 
Lesbian Women 
Age under 30 
Coupled 
Intercept 
Model Correlation Coefficients 
* p < . 0 5 , * * p < . 0 1 
bisexuals. That women's scores on the PMAS are significantly influenced by bisexuality while 
men's scores are not, however, suggests that interaction between gender and sexual identity 
results in different sets of attitudes toward marriage among women. 
Overall, Model 1 was significant, Fl (5,459)=4.623,^<-001. The R2 and adjusted R2 
indicate that age, gendered sexual identity, and relationship status together explain four to 
five percent of the variation on pro-marriage attitude scores. In other words, results from 
this regression once more suggest that identity alone does not reliably account for ideological 
commitments to either assimilationist or liberationist perspectives on marriage and family. 
These results indicate that neither age, relationship status, nor gendered sexual identity—with 
the possible exception of bisexual women, who might be inclined to hold less positive views 
toward marriage than other groups in the sample—has much at all to do with the values and 
attitudes members of the non-heterosexual population hold toward marriage. Based on these 
results, it is at least highly suspect to equate "gay" with "anti-family." Findings suggesting 
significant interaction between gender and sexuality highlight the need for nuanced 
interpretation of the influence of identity markers on attitudes, at least one less clumsy than 
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the "either you are with us or against us" conclusions drawn by anti-gay activists and others 
in the family debates who are opposed to same-sex marriage. 
Lifestyles and Attitudes Toward Marriage: 
Community, Religiosity and Monogamy 
Sequential regression was employed to determine if the addition of variables describing 
public engagement and private lifestyles would improve prediction of PMAS scores, and 
expand understanding of the factors that might influence adherence to traditional values 
and definitions of marriage. The initial block of dichotomous identity markers function 
as front-loaded control variables to account for gender and sexuality, age, and relationship 
status in Models 2, 3 and 4. The identity markers indicate who non-heterosexuals are, and 
why they are being studied in the first place. In subsequent regression, the identity marker 
variables control for gender, sexuality, age and relationship status, in keeping witii my 
general commitment to conduct this research under the assumption that non-heterosexuals 
exist, prima facie. By front-loading these variables in the sequential regression and resulting 
models, I hope to reduce the likelihood of overstating the significance of any specific findings 
at any stage of analysis, as well as challenge the conventional practice of adding such control 
variables nearer the end of analyses. 
Community Integration: Failure and Revelation 
The initial working hypothesis governing this model states that stronger pro-marriage 
attitudes representing assimilationist orientation toward marriage are positively associated 
with integration in social networks and communities. Specifically, I hypothesized that 
H 4 The higher the level of involvement in the local community (measured using 
the Civic Involvement Index), the stronger are attitudes favorable to marriage (the 
Pro-Marriage Attitude Scale, or PMAS); and 
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H, The deeper the integration into the queer community (measured using the 
Queer Community Involvement Scale, QCIS), the weaker are attitudes favorable 
to marriage (measured using the PMAS). 
Prior to regression analysis, I conducted a bivariate correlation to ensure that the constructed 
variables Civic Involvement Index, Queer Community Integration Scale (QCIS) and Pro-
Marriage Attitude Scale (PMAS) would meet a basic assumption of multivariate analysis, 
namely that independent variables included in regression should be correlated with the 
dependent variable, but not correlated with each other or with other independent predictors. 
The results of the initial bivariate correlation were surprising. The correlation between the 
Civic Involvement Index and the PMAS (r=.082,/»=.077) and the correlation between 
QCIS and PMAS (r=.650,p=.02l) failed to reach significance, although the CII and QCIS 
were significantly correlated with one another (r=.239,/><.001). Because neither measure of 
community integration was significantly correlated with marriage attitudes, these variables 
were discarded as potential predictors. 
Similar results were obtained when analyzing correlation between the PMAS and other 
variables measuring various dimensions of social integration. For example, the variable 
disclosure measures visibility, or the extent to which people are open to others about their 
sexuality within their social networks. Disclosure is a valid measure of at least one aspect 
of community integration of non-heterosexuals, but was not significantly correlated with 
marriage attitudes at all (r=.023,p=.6\3). The positive correlation between the PMAS 
and a more traditional proxy for community integration, "years in community," was very 
weak and still only approached the threshold of significance (r=.082, p=.079). Exploration 
of my data brought me to one variable that measured the concepts in the hypotheses and 
was significantly but still only weakly correlated with marriage: "years in current home" 
(yrshome; r=A\7,p<.05), and "proportion of friendship network that is homosexual" 
{networkq; r=-A27,p<-0l). Unfortunately, if the validity of a measure is largely dependent 
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upon the use to which the measure is put, then the validity of both of these variables within 
the context of my hypotheses is suspect. 
Using years in one's current home as a measure of community integration assumes (1) 
that residential stability is a proxy for community integration, and (2) that the more time 
one spends in a place, the more integrated s/he becomes into the community that surrounds 
that place. For the sociologist studying gay and lesbian populations, these assumptions are 
counterintuitive. First, about 65 percent of Quest for Quotidian respondents reported that 
they had been in their current homes or apartments 3 or fewer years. Some might have 
moved recently within their communities, or moved in with a significant other whom they 
met in their shared community; others might have moved from one city or neighborhood 
to another for work, for love, or just for a change of scenery; and still others might have 
lived 20 years in their current home and still not be integrated into either the straight or 
gay community in any meaningful way, especially if they closeted or feel threatened by 
their neighbors or community leaders. Second, time spent does not equal integration. If it 
did, lesbians and gays would be unlikely to report so often experiencing alienation in their 
hometowns or in the neighborhoods in which they grew up, and non-heterosexuals in rural 
areas would not generally tend to migrate toward cities and urban ghettos, where the relative 
freedom to express alternative sexual identities without negative sanction or stigma seems to 
make integration and the development of a sense of belonging even possible. 
The networkq variable presents a different set of problems related to validity. As discussed 
earlier, this variable is derived from the self-reported number of friends who are homosexual 
divided by the total number of friends, heterosexual and homosexual, with scores ranging 
from zero to one. The first problem should be immediately evident: a proportion does not 
tell us much about the actual size, reach or influence of one's friendship network. A lesbian 
individual reports she has three friends, two heterosexual and one homosexual. Does the 
fact that the majority of her friendships are with heterosexual people mean that this woman 
is more integrated into the heterosexual community? I would argue it does not, but even 
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so, she has only three friends: From that fact alone, it would appear that she might be 
somewhat uninvolved with her community. Someone who describes her friendship network 
as containing 30 friends—ten homosexual and twenty heterosexual—would appear on the 
face to be more integrated into the community one way or another, but on the variable 
networkq, the women in these examples would have the same score. The second problem 
is the implication that the higher the score networkq, the more integrated into the queer 
community one is, and the less integrated into the heterosexual community one is. Consider 
that this variable is normally distributed in this sample. When networkq is expressed as a 
discrete categorical variable (up to 10 percent, over 10 percent up to 20 percent, etc.), the 
mean, median and mode fall in the fifth category (up to 50 percent), meaning that about 
one-third of all respondents report that between 40 and 60 percent of their friends are 
homosexual. The raw networkq data make this even clearer: the raw mean for networkq 
expressed as a continuous variable is .48, while the median and mode are both .50. The 
question is this: How do we interpret the scores in the middle of the distribution? It would 
appear tliat a balanced number of heterosexual and homosexual friends would indicate a 
relatively high degree of integration overall, but the logic of the measure actually suggests 
that respondents are no more integrated into the queer community than they are into the 
heterosexual community. Networkq was recoded so that scores around the mean would 
indicate higher integration, while scores toward the two tails of the distribution would 
indicate less "balanced" integration, but that measure fails for the same reasons. What 
networkq probably describes is the degree to which membership in the "non-heterosexual 
club" affects perceptions of integration, but it does not measure integration itself. Because the 
correlation between networkq and the PMAS should not be ignored, and because friendship 
networks probably do exert some influence on attitudes that should be accounted for, I 
constructed a dichotomous form of networkq to indicate a "predominantly homosexual 
friendship network" for use as a control variable in sequential regression. 
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Further analyses would eventually show that both "proportion of friendship network 
that is homosexual" and "years in home" are significantly correlated with a number of other 
independent variables in the regression equation, and so were ultimately tossed into the 
growing pool of discarded community integration variables. The failure of any valid measure 
of community integration in this survey to meet the basic assumption of multivariate 
analysis—correlation with the dependent variable—led me to reject both of the working 
hypotheses in favor of the null: Neither civic involvement nor integration into the queer 
community has a signficant effect on attitudes toward marriage among non-heterosexuals. 
The rejection of these hypotheses is itself an important finding about non-heterosexuals 
and their attitudes toward marriage. Community integration and participation in public 
life do not significandy influence attitudes toward marriage, so I must assume that the most 
powerful influences on non-heterosexuals' attitudes lie in personal, more private practices, 
perceptions and circumstances. Apparently, non-heterosexuals view the institution of 
marriage through the lens of individualism, think of their own marriage or possible marriage 
as a private arrangement informed by their personal expression of beliefs about what 
matrimony ought to mean. This view of marriage is not uncommon among heterosexuals, 
but among heterosexuals it has been cause for alarm as scholars and pundits cite 
individualism as corrosive to marriage. For lesbians, gays and bisexuals, however, the push 
for marriage appears to be driven by this commitment to marriage as a personal, not public, 
choice; a private contract; and an individual human right. 
Because non-heterosexuals appear to be following the example of their "marriageable" 
heterosexual counterparts, it is likely that their attitudes toward marriage, including attitudes 
that represent an assimilationist orientation, will be influenced by many of the same personal 
factors that shape the attitudes of heterosexual people. To test this theory, I screened two 
variables: one that measures personal religiosity, and another that measures personal and 
practical commitment to monogamy. Both met the assumptions of the model, and were 
included in the sequential regression. 
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Strength of Personal Religious Belief 
One of the most politically compelling—but obviously flawed—arguments in the public 
debate over same-sex marriage is a religious one, the most egregious expression of which is 
the proclamation by the infamous Phelps family of the Westboro Baptist Church that "God 
hates fags." Judeo-Christian and Islamic traditions expressly define marriage as between a 
man and a woman, and proscribe marital unions between people of the same sex. Subscribers 
to this point of view hold that marriage simply is not possible for gay and lesbian couples, 
that marriage is essentially a religious institution deriving its legitimacy from the church 
or other faith community, and thus is not subject to definition by individuals, much less 
regulation by the state. From this somewhat extreme perspective, legal recognition of same-
sex relationships as marriages is at best an encroachment upon religious freedom. At worst, 
marriages between gays or between lesbians are tantamount to blasphemy that invites the 
wrath of a vengeful Almighty on a sinful and disobedient America. 
The weaker version of this objection amounts to a tepid endorsement of alternatives to 
marriage—civil unions, for example—that are not called "marriage," in order to leave intact 
the "sanctity" of marriage as a religious sacrament. Stronger versions of the religious objection 
to same-sex marriage rely on interpretations of the Bible and other sacred texts to justify 
continued discrimination against non-heterosexuals and same-sex couples as a "natural" 
and appropriate consequence of their "sin." Those supporting the latter position fear that 
allowing same-sex couples to marry will signal the end of claims that heterosexuality is 
"morally" superior to homosexuality, thus undermining the foundations of institutionalized 
discrimination against lesbians and gays which many churches defend. Despite the foggy 
logic that informs these arguments, it remains probable that widiin queer culture-—as in 
American culture—there exists a robust relationship between religion or religiosity and 
marriage attitudes (Yip 2004). 
Because adherents to the "homosexual agenda" rhetoric promote the idea that same-sex 
attraction is "sickness" or a deviant lifestyle choice, there is also an assumption among these 
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opponents that a "cure" is possible. At the very least, same-sex attracted individuals can learn 
to make—and live with—less "sinful" and specifically heterosexual choices. Of course, the 
"cure" for homosexuality is deemed by many to be a resocialization regimen that includes 
more God and less gay. In this study, I do not assume that non-heterosexuality—bisexuality 
or homosexuality—is aberrant or abnormal, or that same-sex couples are living in "sin." 
What I do suspect is that at least part of the claim of religious activists might be correct— 
that religion matters, and influences attitudinal orientations among non-heterosexuals who 
are or have been religious—so I test the following hypothesis in the second step of sequential 
regression, controlling for identity markers: 
H6 The more religious one is, the more positive is one's view of marriage. 
Many gays and lesbians have been rejected or even ejected by the faith communities in 
which they grew up. Often, when they attempt to continue to practice their faith openly 
and honestly as gay people, they find they are unwelcome in the congregations they once 
considered their spiritual homes (Yip 1997). The exclusion of non-heterosexuals from public 
religious life raises questions about both the validity and reliability of traditional measures of 
religiosity used in studies of broader, more heterosexual populations when they are applied 
in research specifically targeting non-heterosexual people. For example, it seems problematic 
to use frequency of attendance as a proxy for religiosity when so many lesbians and gays are 
discouraged from attending religious services and systematically marginalized by religious 
rhetoric and activism that demonizes them or casts them as dangerous, sick or unworthy—by 
this measure, even gays and lesbians of faith would be deemed non-religious. There is no 
reason to doubt that for most, coming out into the world seems to require closing the door 
to the church or temple on the way out. 
Variables measuring church attendance and intensity of religious belief were screened for 
inclusion in the regression. Bivariate correlations showed no significant relationship between 
regular family attendance at religious services during childhood and adolescence—at least 
two or three times per month to as often as several times per week—and attitudes toward 
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marriage, r=.03l,p=.502, 7V=466. The relationship between current regular attendance at 
religious services and attitudes toward marriage was also not significant, r=.075,/=.108, 
N=466. Neither of these binary variables met the assumption of correlation with the 
dependent variable in regression, so were not used in the model. 
When the dichotomous variables failed, I ran a similar test of correlation between the 
PMAS and the original, untransformed religious attendance variables, which yielded ordinal 
data and might be more sensitive. I asked how often the respondent attended religious 
services with family members before the age of 18, and later asked how often the respondent 
attended religious services today. The questions were slightly modified, but included the 
same answer categories as the original questions: never, less than once a year, several times a 
year, about once a month, two or three times a month, nearly every week, once a week, and 
more than once a week. Using these variables, family religious attendance during childhood 
was not correlated with current attitudes toward marriage, r=.070, />=.130, N-AGG. Current 
religious attendance was positively correlated with the PMAS, r=.128,/>=.006, N=466, 
indicating weak support for die hypothesis that religious attendance influences pro-marriage 
attitudes. 
To address the question of whether attendance is a valid measure of commitment 
to religion, I ran a bivariate correlation between current religious attendance and the 
respondents' self-reported level of religiosity. The item in the survey was straightforward: "All 
things considered, how religious would you say yo.u are today?" Answers on a four-point scale 
ranged from "not at all religious" to "very religious." Less than half of respondents reported 
they were "not at all religious" («=200), but the majority reported they were somewhat 
(«=132), moderately (n=l02), or very religious (n=32). The positive correlation between 
attendance and self-reported religiosity was strong and significant, r=.670,/»<.001, N=465, 
but suggests only that people who claim to be religious are more likely to attend services. 
Crosstabulations reveal that many non-heterosexuals who claim they are not religious at 
all nevertheless attend religious services once or more per year, but not regularly. Most but 
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not all of these individuals are non-Christians, or attend religious meetings in alternative 
Christian settings defined earlier in this research as "non-Christian." Those who are 
somewhat or moderately religious also attend services infrequently and irregularly, a pattern 
that is similar for both Christian and non-Christian respondents. 
Despite the starkly hurtful messages of religious groups like the Westboro Baptist Church 
(e.g., http://www.godhatesfags.com), religion appears to be a relatively invisible aspect of 
lesbian and gay life, for non-heterosexuals of faith, Religion among non-heterosexuals of faith 
is probably a more private concern reflecting diverse strategies for fulfilling personal spiritual 
needs in the face of marginalization by both mainstream religious denominations and the 
religious communities that might have influenced young lesbians and gays as they came to 
terms with their sexual identities. Just because religious or Christian homosexuals do not 
attend services regularly does not mean that their core beliefs have changed. Rather, it more 
likely means that their religiosity must be forced into the closet they themselves vacated. 
The influence of religious belief—including variations from traditional religion—cannot be 
ignored, precisely because the innovative ways non-heterosexuals have found to express their 
faiths are probably the result of their exclusion from more traditional options for worship. 
For this reason, I concluded that the self-reported religiosity variable was a better measure of 
religiosity, and based on the significant and stronger correlation between this variable and 
the PMAS, r=.207,p<.001, N=466, I included the variable as a measure of the strength of 
personal religious belief in the regression model. 
Commitment to Monogamy in Relationships 
In 2005, when data were collected for this study, the sexual revolution of the 1960s and 
1970s was, for many, ancient history. Divorce was and remains relatively common among 
heterosexual couples, and does not constitute the threat to livelihood or social status it once 
did. All major US cities can boast a sizable population of gays, lesbians, bisexuals and other 
non-heterosexuals who live openly in relative—if sometimes uneasy—harmony with their 
neighbors. Queer or gay culture flourished in the years following the Stonewall Riots in 
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1969 (see discussion in Duberman 1994), an alternative parallel subculture that grew in 
economic, social and political influence through the 1970s and 1980s despite the devastating 
impact of AIDS on a generation of activists and influential thinkers who had helped make 
non-heterosexual life more visible, less dangerous, and more imaginable for those who came 
after. At the height of the AIDS crisis in the eighties, lesbians, gays and others had already 
reorganized their lives, communities and institutions to cope with tlie spread of HIV and 
the need to care for sick friends, lovers and others battling the disease (Nardi 1997). While 
policymakers and government agencies remained officially indifferent to both AIDS and the 
changes that were occurring in the grief-stricken, beleaguered queer communities around the 
country, heteronormative marriage culture was beginning to enjoy a resurgence in popular 
opinion and scholarly discourse. 
Cultural conservatives busily promoted the idea that "family values" in the US had been 
dangerously eroded by the post-1960s-era critique of marriage and liberal ideologies that 
celebrated sexual freedom rather than the stability of traditional gender roles in families. 
Some pointed to the AIDS epidemic as indicative of how far the moral standards in the US 
had fallen, implying that it was homosexuality, not a resilient new virus, that was ultimately 
responsible for the deaths of so many. Those who lay claim to the "pro-family" mantle argued 
that if US society would simply turn back the clock to simpler times when more traditional 
values governed sexual lives, the social problems plaguing US society—juvenile delinquency, 
out-of-wedlock childbirth, teenage pregnancy, divorce, and HIV—would simply go away. 
There could be little doubt that gay and lesbian people were publicly called to account for the 
prevalence and spread of HIV, linked as they were to frightful stereotypes of sexual deviance, 
promiscuity and sickness by a persistent chorus of religious and conservative ideologues in 
media and politics. The moral panic surrounding HIV was integral to the revitalization of 
heteronormative "traditional family values" rhetoric that extolled the public health benefits of 
monogamy and other virtues. 
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Probably to the chagrin of the anti-gay mob, it is likely that the very same messages 
were trumpeting loud and clear to a large segment of the gay community which, by the 
time Baehr v. Letvin was argued in Hawaii (1993), had already begun to see monogamy 
as at least a personal strategy for minimizing HIV risk, and legal marriage—including the 
rights and privileges associated with it—as desirable to protect partners and children from 
the ravages of disease, poverty and political indifference. In many ways, heterosexuals and 
non-heterosexuals were no longer at cross purposes. The traditional family values crowd had 
organized a sustained assault on homosexuality and gay culture, but gay culture had already 
been changed, and homosexuals had begun to form relationships and families around more 
traditional values, including monogamy. 
To capture the strength of commitment to monogamy in relationships, I used a 
modified version of the relationship styles variable discussed earlier (see Shernoff 1995). The 
relationship style variable—which merged actual relationship styles for coupled respondents 
with preferred relationship styles for single respondents—was recoded into a five-point scale 
indicating practical commitment to monogamy along a continuum from very weak (non-
monogamous) to very strong (exclusively monogamous). Thus, in addition to the hypothesis 
concerning personal religiosity, the second step in the regression analysis here also tests the 
following hypothesis: 
H 7 The stronger one's commitment to a monogamous sexual ideology or lifestyle, 
the stronger the pro-marriage attitude score. 
The popular view, shaped by a sexual discourse of moral absolutism, is that monogamy 
is a black-and-white issue: one is either monogamous or not, so the idea that there is a 
"middle ground" for measuring monogamy might raise a few eyebrows. In response to the 
obvious question, I submit that measuring commitment to monogamy on a dichotomous 
scale is willfully disingenuous in a study of a fragmented population largely defined by 
sexual behaviors for which socially-compelling norms and socially-approved relationships 
do not exist. As I have already established, there is relatively strong support among non-
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heterosexuals for monogamy as a central feature of marriage, but marriage is not yet a central 
feature of the intimate lives of most non-heterosexual people. Sexual negotiations among 
the people in this sample have been complicated by the uneven historical development of 
sexual subcultures that emerged from secrecy in the safer shadowlands of the closet. Strict 
monogamy, for same-sex attracted individuals, has not always been practical or even possible, 
despite the powerful moral imperative that drives it. 
The "Tea Room" Revisited: Insights on 
Monogamy and Tradition 
In his classic and highly controversial study of "tea room trade" (1975), Laud Humphreys 
studied public sex between men in the mid-1960s by serving as the "watchqueen" in public 
restrooms where men would meet surreptitiously for relatively quick and impersonal oral sex. 
Humphreys was able to interview some of the participants in this sexual subculture openly 
and in situ, but his study gained both notoriety and relevance because of Humphreys findings 
about the men whom he could not readily interview in the field. Humphreys recorded 
license plate numbers of many of the tea room's visitors, traced them to their owners, secured 
addresses, then later disguised himself as a government health official and interviewed the 
men in their homes. Leaving aside the ethical problems with this approach—the debates 
over which have by now elevated the study to almost legendary status among sociologists and 
students—some of Humphreys' findings are instructive, and might help to clarify the need 
to measure commitment to monogamy in degrees rather than binary categories. Specifically, 
Humphreys found that the social stereotype that ascribed deviant public sexuality to 
homosexual men was a gross overstatement. Humphreys' research demonstrated that public 
sexual contact between men was not limited to self-identified homosexuals or bisexuals. More 
than a third of tea room patrons were heterosexuals seeking only sexual release, who were not 
enacting a queer identity. A bare majority of the men were married, although half of those 
men were bisexual. Definitively or stereotypically gay men made up only a small minority of 
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the individuals Humphreys encountered in his journey through what was assumed to be a 
uniquely gay sexual underworld. 
The truth is that even during an historical period in which monogamy was both highly 
valued and strictly enforced through powerful norms of heterosexuality, dramatically limited 
opportunities to divorce without incurring significant social costs, and repressive public 
policies targeting gay communities (Kaiser 1997, Chauncey 1995, Duberman 1994), the 
practice of monogamy was likely inconsistent across the adult population, or at least across 
the population of men in the United States. It is unlikely that the married heterosexual men 
in Humphreys' study would have seen themselves as non-monogamous—much less actively 
endorsed a non-monogamous lifestyle—simply because they occasionally and anonymously 
received fellatio and a hurried orgasm from a willing stranger in an impersonal public setting. 
If we assume that one is either monogamous or not, not one of the subjects in Humphreys' 
study was technically or unambiguously monogamous. Rather, the men gave accounts of 
their personal lives that featured ideological commitment to fidelity—a value—rather than 
practical commitment to sexual exclusivity—a behavior. 
The implication that should be taken from this discussion and Humphreys' research is 
that commitment to monogamy in relationships is relative, sensitive to social circumstances, 
opportunity and risk, the sexual politics of desire, and the structure of primary sexual 
relationships. One could conceivably argue that many of the bisexual and heterosexual 
men—particularly the marrieds—in Humphreys' sample at best aspired to monogamy 
because they valued it, but clearly failed to practice it. While marriage did not prevent non-
monogamy, it certainly constrained it. The married heterosexual had a vested interest in 
limiting same-sex extramarital activity in terms of frequency and location, which reduces 
opportunity and narrows the risk of discovery and consequent public stigmatization that 
might be brought about from marital conflict or divorce in the 1960s. That so many 
heterosexual men frequented the tea room for impersonal and detached sexual release 
suggests that they were actively working to maintain the illusion that their private failures 
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to adhere to norms of monogamy did not threaten or diminish the public ideological 
commitments to marital fidelity that protected them from marginalization as sexual deviants. 
That so few homosexual individuals—fewer than one in five, according to Humphreys— 
visited the tea rooms tells us virtually nothing about the intimate relationships of gay men 
during that time, and absolutely nothing about the strength of monogamy as sexual ideology 
in the queer community or the degree to which commitment in same-sex couples, who were 
even more invisible during the period of Humphreys' study, encouraged or constrained non-
monogamy. 
Commitment to monogamy in sexual relationships must be understood in terms of 
constraint. Apart from challenging and undermining a number of negative stereotypes 
about gay men, Humphreys inadvertently demonstrated that measuring monogamy is more 
complicated than simply dividing people—even straight people, or married people—into 
those who have sex outside their primary relationship and those who do not. Doing so 
disconnects social practice from social structure, and inhibits understanding of monogamy 
as an institutional imperative that binds sexual activity to marital status. That is, monogamy 
is essentially a set of modern cultural beliefs, values and norms so embedded in marriage 
culture as to seem the only natural and "normal" way to organize sexual relationships in 
human communities. For heterosexuals, to be married has long been understood to entail an 
explicit obligation to conform to norms of fidelity as well as an explicit right to expect sexual 
exclusivity from a partner. Same-sex couples are denied marriage, which renders both the 
obligations and rights associated with marriage implicit, unstated, and thus less enforceable 
through either formal or informal channels. 
Theoretically, there should be a weaker inclination toward monogamy in non-
heterosexual populations than in heterosexual populations, but as even Humphreys' 
forty-year-old data suggest, the strength or weakness of monogamy cannot be measured 
in either population unless negotiated interpersonal and social constraints are taken 
into account. If marriage is unavailable—as a normative structure constraining sexual 
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activity—then non-heterosexual people are forced by circumstance to negotiate a more 
personal, more individualized commitment to monogamy and sexual exclusivity in their 
intimate relationships. While heterosexuals might also engage in such fluid negotiations, 
these negotiations proceed from a tacit understanding that monogamy is expected, so they 
must negotiate degrees of deviation from the norm—non-monogamy. Non-heterosexuals, 
given the absence of structural constraint, the relative difficulty or impossibility of public 
recognition of their relationships, and a cultural and political history shaped by resistance to 
normative sex roles and sexual practices must alternatively negotiate degrees of conformity to a 
set of rules that were designed to exclude rather than include them—monogamy. 
In this study, commitment to monogamy is a reflection of the negotiated rules between 
couples that produce diverse configurations of relationships relative to aspirations to the 
norm of monogamy; that is, how close the relationship style practiced by individuals and 
couples comes to a form of strict monogamy on the part of both members of the dyad. 
Commitment to monogamy is very strong when respondents describe their intimate 
relationships—current or preferred—as strictly sexually exclusive, implying that the 
relationship style is negotiated by the couple and that the rules are binding upon both 
Table 14. Relationship Styles Recoded as Commitment to Monogamy, N=466 
Commitment to Cumulative 
monogamy is when relationship style is and is recoded as... n Percent Percent 
Weakest Non-mo nogamom'acknowledged 1 Non-monogamy 86 18.5 18.5 
open relationship; 
or non-sexual lovers 
Weaker 
Neither strong 
nor weak 
Stronger 
Strongest 
Primarily sexually 
exclusive/non-monogamy 
with rules 
Undecided or 
no preference 
Primarily sexually 
exclusive/menages 
Monogamous/strictly 
sexually exclusive 
2 Limited monogamy 84 
3 Undecided 13 
4 Limited non-monogamy 33 
5 Monogamy 250 
Total N=466 
18.0 
2.8 
7.1 
53.6 
100.0 
36.5 
39.3 
46.4 
100.0 
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members of the intimate dyad. Commitment to monogamy is very weak when respondents 
describe their relationships as "open relationships;" that is, when both partners assume 
that monogamy is either not possible or not desirable. Table 14 shows how the original 
relationship style variable was recoded, as well as the distributions of the new variable 
measuring commitment to monogamy in personal relationships. 
The new variable, monostyl, was significantly correlated with pro-marriage attitudes, 
r=.318,/x.OOl, N=466, indicating that the aspiration to monogamy is positively linked 
to support for a traditional understanding of the link between sex and marriage. The 
magnitude of the effect in the bivariate correlation is stronger than any one of the identity 
markers, although the correlation produces different—and somewhat surprising—results 
for bisexuals (^=.380,p< .001, n=\%7) when analyzed separately from homosexuals (r=.197, 
/x .001 , «=279). Additionally, it appears that the relationship between commitment to 
monogamy and pro-marriage attitudes is significantly stronger for single individuals, botii 
bisexual (r=A45,p< .01, n=9l) and homosexual (r=.230,/>=.005, «=147), than for coupled 
individuals. The relationship between monogamy and pro-marriage attitudes is significant for 
* 
coupled bisexuals (r=.317,/>=.002, n-96), but does not quite reach significance for coupled 
homosexuals (r=.l69,/>=.052, «=132). 
These findings might appear at first glance to contradict earlier results that suggested 
bisexuals are less likely to be monogamous than homosexuals, but that would be a 
misinterpretation of the data. Bivariate analyses tell us the direction of correlations, but do 
not explain or predict outcomes. For example, the finding that there is a strong, positive 
correlation between pro-marriage attitudes and commitment to monogamy among single 
bisexuals in this sample tells us that the two variables covary in the same direction: As 
commitment to monogamy increases, so does the score on the PMAS. It is also true, 
however, that as commitment to monogamy decreases, the PMAS score also decreases. 
The statistically insignificant correlation between the PMAS and monostyl for coupled 
homosexual respondents is unique, as the correlation is significant for all other groups. 
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Given that a larger proportion of gays and lesbians in the sample are monogamous, and 
that bisexuals in this sample are much more likely to be non-monogamous, the significant 
differences in R observed between the two groups suggest that the strength of commitment 
to monogamy probably predicts weaker or lower PMAS scores for bisexuals than for 
homosexuals. In this sample, bisexuals are likely to be women in heterosexual marriages, and 
all but one bisexual man in this sample is married to a woman, which could imply that the 
ability to enter into legal marriage changes the nature of sexual negotiations within couples as 
I have suggested: people who can marry tend to negotiate non-monogamy as an alternative 
to the normative assumptions of marriage, while people who cannot marry tend to negotiate 
toward monogamy as an alternative to forms of relationship and sexual expression that have 
emerged in a subculture without marriage. 
Regression Model 2: Analysis and Results 
To argue that "queer subculture" has been largely shaped by the absence of marriage 
is not the same as stereotyping gay culture as inherently antithetical to monogamy, or 
lesbians and gay men themselves as "anti-marriage." These stereotypes assume that non-
heterosexual people actively reject monogamy, and thus monogamous marriage, but none 
of the data I have collected indicate that this is true across the spectrum of queer identities. 
Instead, what these data suggest is that lifestyle choices—such as whether to practice some 
form of religiosity or spirituality, or whether to adhere to norms of monogamy in intimate 
relationships—are understood by non-heterosexuals as highly individualized choices shaped 
by exclusion from the heteronormative community as well as the structural supports that 
sustain the privileges of heterosexuality, including legal marriage. Having established in 
Model 1 that gendered sexual identity itself has a negligible effect on pro-marriage attitudes, 
I hypothesize that religion and monogamy influence attitudes toward marriage when identity 
is controlled. Whereas Model 1 was a standard multiple regression using only identity 
marker variables as predictors against the dependent variable PMAS, Model 2 represents the 
second step of a sequential or hierarchical regression wherein identity markers are entered 
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into the regression equation first as controls, followed by two new independent predictors, 
personal religious belief and commitment to monogamy, to determine whether inclusion of 
this information would improve predictions of scores on the PMAS. Hypotheses specifically 
tested in Model 2 are as follows: 
Hfi The more religious one is, the more positive is one's view of marriage, and 
H 7 The stronger one's commitment to a monogamous sexual ideology or lifestyle, 
the stronger the pro-marriage attitude score. 
While the two new predictor variables were significantly correlated with the dependent 
variable PMAS, they were not correlated with one another, both conditions for inclusion 
in the model. Further screening, however, showed that the distributions for both variables 
were skewed. Personal religious belief was moderately positively skewed, while commitment 
to monogamy was moderately negatively skewed. Neither square root nor logarithmic 
transformation corrected the skewness in either variable, and since tentative analyses using 
the transformed variables produced substantially the same results as analyses using the 
original variables, neither variable was transformed. The untransformed variables are used in 
all analyses. 
Model 2 of the sequential regression is summarized in Table 15, which shows the 
unstandardized regression coefficients (B), standardized regression coefficients {&), intercept 
and R, R2, and adjusted R2 after all predictors were entered into the regression equation, 
including gendered sexual identity markers for which "gay men" is the reference category 
in step 1 (initial control variables), and lifestyle variables howrlg and monostyl'm step 2 
(predictors). With all identity markers and predictor variables in the equation, the model 
remains significant, R2=.l76, F(7, 457)=12.897, p<.001, and explains more than 15 percent 
of the total variability in PMAS scores (adjusted i?2=.l63) compared to the four percent 
explained by identity markers alone. Together, the two new lifestyle predictors in Model 2 
explain an additional 12.8 percent of variability in pro-marriage attitudes, F2 (2, 457)=35.35, 
p<.00\, over the identity markers in Model 1, R2=M8, F{ (5, 459)=4.62,/><.001. 
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Table 15. Model 2—Sequential Regression of Lifestyles and Identity Markers on 
Pro-Marriage Attitudes Scale (PMAS) 
Variables In the Equation 
Bisexual Men 
Bisexual Women 
Lesbian Women 
Age under 30 
Coupled 
Personal Religious Belief 
Monogamous Lifestyle 
Model Correlation Coefficients 
Mean SD 
--
--
_ 
... 
--
1.93 .959 
3.59 1.670 
Model 1 
Identity Markers 
B 
-1.368 
-2.676 
-.541 
.888 
.736 
-
-
SEB 
.869 
.588 
.669 
.527 
.499 
-
-
# = 
Adjusted/?= 
R= 
Is 
-.076 
-.237'"* 
-.041 
.083 
.070 
— 
-
= .048 
=.038 
=.219 
B 
-.488 
-2.127 
-.857 
.843 
.557 
1.225 
.895 
Model 2 
Lifestyles 
SEB 
.821 • 
.567 • 
.633 • 
.492 
.469 
.238 
.143 
]?= 
Adjusted /?= 
R= 
fi 
-.027 
-.188** 
-.064 
.079 
.053 
.224** 
.285** 
=.176 
=.163 
=.419 
* / . < . 0 5 , **/»<•01 
The results here suggest that the hypothesis, H 6 The more religious one is, the more positive 
is ones view of marriage, is confirmed. Controlling for the effects of gendered sexual identity, 
relationship status, and age, the strength of personal religious belief has a significant positive 
effect on PMAS scores, but the magnitude of the effect is only moderate (ft =.224, p<.001). 
The effect of the strength of commitment to monogamy on PMAS scores is stronger, 
but not substantially different (ft=.285,/><.001), a finding that confirms H ? The stronger 
one's commitment to a monogamous sexual ideology or lifestyle, the stronger the pro-marriage 
attitude score. These two variables are stronger predictors than any of the identity markers 
included in the model. Both are positively associated with higher scores on the PMAS, 
suggesting that individuals who see themselves as strongly religious and who demonstrate 
a stronger commitment to monogamy in their personal relationships—both dating and 
long-term domestic partnerships, civil unions or marriages—are significantly likely to 
hold more traditional values toward marriage. Put another way, those who are religious 
and monogamous are more likely to be assimilationist in their politics regarding same-sex 
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marriage, perhaps reflecting the degree to which they have internalized and conformed to 
the dominant heteronormative expectations of late modern marriage as a way to integrate 
themselves and their loved ones into the US family system. 
Stronger religious belief, be it a form of Christianity or some other religion, appears 
to reliably predict assimilationist ideology among respondents. The norm of monogamy 
is similarly influential. The more constraint on sexual non-monogamy experienced or 
negotiated by respondents, the more likely are respondents to hold attitudes toward marriage 
that are recognizably traditional or supportive of marriage as it is currently defined in US 
culture. The addition of both variables improved prediction of PMAS scores, so that this 
model accounts for almost 20 percent of variability in pro-marriage attitude scores. In 
the next step in my analysis, I examine the relationship between marital expectations 
and attitudes, as well as the influence of what some have called "divorce culture" on non-
heterosexuals' attitudes toward marriage. 
State of the Union: Marriage vs Divorce Culture 
As I have already established, assimilationists and liberationists are divided as to whether 
marriage sui generis is actually a social good or worthy goal for non-heterosexual individuals 
or queer politics in general. The assimilationist perspective on same-sex marriage insists that 
marriage is an integrative institution leading to emotionally satisfying, stable relationships; 
a sense of purpose and responsibility that encourages economic and financial stability; and 
the end of discrimination against non-heterosexuals and their families by neighbors and 
communities. In the society imagined by assimilationist thinkers, same-sex marriage is both 
possible and socially acceptable, and individuals in queer families are happier, healthier and 
more productive members of society. In other words, the perspective assumes diat marriage 
makes life better for lesbians, gays and other non-heterosexuals. 
The liberationist perspective dismisses marriage as the catalyst for equality, pointing 
instead to the increased social control of bodies and sexuality that marriage has historically 
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represented, and the tendency of the marital institution to rely on constraining or curtailing 
individual rights, most especially of women, in order to survive across generations and 
epochs. Liberationists criticize the assimilationist discourse as an overly conservative one 
that perpetuates stereotypes of gays, lesbians, and the subcultures they have created on their 
own as deviant, somehow not good enough for mainstream heterosexual society. While 
assimilationists argue that marriage makes life better, more extreme liberationists counter 
that marriage is an attempt to make individual non-heterosexuals "better," or less deviant, 
by encouraging them to reify the very institutions and social structures that oppress them in 
the first place, and thus abandon the late modern liberal political project to undermine or 
transform political and social institutions to guarantee more, not less, individual freedom 
and equality for all. From a liberationist perspective, marriage is not necessarily a catalyst 
for positive change, but a tool for quelling dissent which divides the non-heterosexual body 
politic into Seidman's (2001) "good sexual citizens," i.e., gays and lesbians in monogamous 
heteroanalogous relationships, and "bad sexual citizens," including those who reject marriage 
or reject sexual norms that stigmatize alternative relationships and family structures that do 
not fit into the narrow range of sexual expression reserved for "marriage." The liberationist 
view suggests that the special status of marriage marginalizes other sexual minorities by 
defining even more stringently who receives the benefits of legitimacy from governments and 
society and who does not. 
Although the impact of same-sex marriage on sexual politics and queer culture is 
probably overstated in both camps, adherents to both ideologies acknowledge that many, if 
not most, non-heterosexual people are ambivalent about marriage. Regardless of ideological 
differences, assimilationists and liberationists appear to agree on the importance of marriage 
rights to the gay and lesbian community. Respondents were asked three questions about 
the importance of marriage: "How important would you say the right to marry is to you, 
personally? To your friends? To the gay/lesbian community?" Responses to these questions, 
which were measured on a 7-point scale where 1 was "not important at all" and 7 was "very 
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important," indicate that while the right to marry is very important to most individuals in 
this sample (M=5.51, median=6) and their friends (M=5.46, median=6), it is even more 
important to the community (M=6.27, median=7). A t-test using the mean of the "personal 
importance" item as the test value showed that the the mean score for "importance to the 
gay/lesbian community" item was significantly different from the test value, t(465)=15.9, 
p<.00l. This result suggests that whether marriage is viewed as a personal, individual 
affirmation of love, a set of legal rights, a path to social acceptance, or the same old 
patriarchal ball and chain, non-heterosexuals across the ideological spectrum view same-sex 
marriage as a worthy political goal for the queer community. 
While there might be some disagreement about what marriage means to individuals on a 
personal level, it is clear that marriage rights are central to the current political project of gay 
rights movements. Love it or hate it, securing the right to marry is a collective concern within 
the non-heterosexual community that binds liberationists and assimilationists to a common 
cause. Same-sex marriage would, with some certainty, legally and socially box all non-
heterosexuals into the normatively regulated relationship pattern that includes monogamy 
and long-term commitment—no doubt provoking personal and political claustrophobia 
among the more sexually marginalized or socially libertine. Inside that box, however, is a set 
of rights, responsibilities and social benefits for married individuals and their families that, 
apparently, assimilationists and liberationists alike find difficult to sacrifice for a thin chance 
at more radical social change. An institution that at once constrains individuals and expands 
gay rights: This is a tall order for matrimony. 
Expectations for Marriage 
What do the participants in this study, and perhaps non-heterosexuals everywhere, expect 
of marriage? Respondents were asked how they thought their lives would be different if they 
could legally marry their romantic partners (or if they were already married, how their lives 
have changed since they married their partners)—better, the same, or worse. Six dimensions 
of difference were measured, including financial security, personal freedom, control over 
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Table 16. Distributions of Positive Effects of Marriage Items, Percentages (N=466) 
Effect of legal marriage... 
...on financial security 
...on personal freedom 
...on control over money 
...on sex life 
...on current/future children 
...on personal overall happiness 
Better 
66.3 
22.5 
28.5 
33.0 
48.5 
56.9 
The same 
30.5 
66.1 
64.8 
62.1 
49.1 
39.7 
Worse 
3.2 
11.4 
6.7 
4.9 
2.4 
3.4 
money, sex life, current or future children, and overall happiness. Table 16 details the 
distribution (percentages) of responses in each category. 
The six items were recoded into dichotomous variables, with "better" coded as 1, and 
all other responses coded 0. The items were summed to produce a scale that measures the 
strength of the perceived positive effects of marriage on one's life. A reliability analysis 
conducted on the dichotomous items included in the scale yielded an Alpha of .6841 for 
N=466 cases, acceptable for a six-item scale and comparable to the Alpha obtained from 
analysis of the original variables coded 0 to 2 (Cronbach's a =.6831). Item analyses revealed 
that inclusion of all six variables produced the highest Alpha. Scores on this Positive Effects 
of Marriage scale (PEM, ejxmarp2) ranged from 1 to 6, and are distributed more or less 
normally widi a mean of 2.56 and median of 3. Higher scores on this scale indicate higher 
expectations for marriage, in that respondents assume that legal marriage improves or would 
improve conditions in more areas of tlieir personal lives. Using this scale in analyses, I 
hypothesize that 
Hg The more positively individuals view the effects of marriage, the higher their 
pro-marriage attitude scores. 
Analysis reveals that the PEM is positively correlated with the Pro-Marriage Attitude 
Scale (r=.227,p<.00l), thus confirming the hypothesis and meeting the first criterion 
for inclusion in further regression analyses. The PEM is significantly correlated with 
commitment to monogamy (/>=.034), but the correlation is statistically weak (^=.098). 
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Assuming the sustained influences of identity markers and lifestyles variables already in the 
regression, the addition of the PEM should improve the explanatory power of the model. 
Commitment to Divorce Culture 
Many Quest for Quotidian respondents are or were married at some point, and many 
more are prohibited by law from experiencing divorce precisely because they are and have 
always been denied the right to marry. Fewer than 15 percent of all respondents have 
personally experienced divorce, and while it cannot be determined from the data here, it is 
possible that many of these divorces occurred because the respondents were not very good 
at being heterosexual, not because they were bad at being married. Moreover, I have already 
established that a significant majority of the participants in this study spent their childhood 
and youth in intact families and homes that were not impacted by parental divorce or marital 
disruption—no living with a single mother, no spending weekends with a Disneyland dad, 
none of the particular conflicts and struggles associated with the process of divorce and 
subsequent custodial arrangements, and none of the adjustment problems associated with 
the remarriage of a parent or stepparents. Essentially, most do not come from families 
that modeled divorce culture. Rather, we can reasonably assume that most of the non-
heterosexuals in this study—including and perhaps especially those gays and lesbians who are 
now divorced from their different-sex partners—were socialized into a culture of marriage, 
no different from that to which many of their heterosexual peers were exposed. 
The final predictor in the model is the influence of divorce culture on attitudes toward 
marriage. I hypothesize that 
H„ The stronger the commitment to divorce culture, the weaker are attitudes 
favorable to marriage. 
Operationalizing the concept of "divorce culture" presents a problem, especially within a 
subculture that generally does not marry—the necessary prerequisite for divorce. Divorcing 
itself no more declares one's antipathy toward marriage than having one's groceries bagged 
in plastic rather than paper announces to the world one's plan to single-handedly destroy the 
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environment. Each is an example of an individual making a choice—one that may have long-
lasting consequences positive or negative, to be sure—from a limited range of socially- and 
culturally-defined options. Neither having divorced nor having experienced parental divorce 
as a child indicates a commitment to a culture of divorce; both are simply circumstances 
derived from individuals exercising their right to dissolve their marriages. The vast majority 
of lesbians and gay men in the United States do not have the right to marry, and thus cannot 
choose to divorce, so seeking behavioral indicators for commitment to divorce culture in this 
population is more or less a pointless exercise. Therefore, I define "divorce culture" as a set of 
beliefs that justify or rationalize divorce as a viable alternative to marriage. 
Imagine that nothing is worse than a bad marriage, and since lifelong marriage is 
unrealistic anyway, one should expect to divorce at some point. Since divorce is inevitable, 
getting a divorce should be easy, even if mere are young children involved, because everyone 
knows that divorce does not diminish one's ability to parent. This narrative is representative 
of what could be considered a "pro-divorce" discourse, a cultural script that is ubiquitous 
in American society and certainly familiar to non-heterosexuals and heterosexuals alike. 
Heterosexuals—because they may marry and thus can experience divorce—have drawn 
upon and deployed this script consistently to account for their own failed marriages, and 
have thus deeply embedded this narrative into the cultural discourse on marriage and family. 
Importantly, the institutionalization of divorce culture over die past several decades cannot 
be attributed exclusively to non-heterosexuals, or to lesbian, gay or queer subcultures. 
Divorce culture is a product of the heterosexual marriage culture from which it emerged, 
a response to the most significant change in the American family system in the twentieth 
century: easy-to-obtain, widespread no-fault divorce. 
Most respondents have not experienced their parents' divorce, and just under 60 percent 
of Quest for Quotidian respondents have never known an America in which divorce was rare 
or difficult to obtain. If only those individuals who were no more than 10 years old when 
no-fault divorce was introduced in California in 1970 are counted, the percentage jumps to 
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more than 80 percent. This means that almost all of the participants in this study have been 
exposed to both the possibility of divorce as well as the cultural script that justifies divorce for 
most if not all their lives, as have their heterosexual siblings, friends, co-workers, neighbors 
and other contemporaries. Divorce culture is part of their lives, a discourse that has for more 
than 30 years competed with more traditional discourses that support marriage. Some have 
argued that divorce culture has ultimately won, and that the American family system has 
been reshaped and weakened by its victory (Whitehead 1998). 
To capture the strength of divorce culture among non-heterosexuals, I analyzed five 
attitudinal measures from the original 27 included on the questionnaire. Each was recoded so 
that higher scores would indicate a stronger commitment to divorce culture as defined in the 
narrative above. Following are the indicators: 
1. Sure, divorce is bad, but a lousy marriage is even worse. 
2. Given how long people are living these days, it is unrealistic to expect a 
couple to remain married to one another for life. 
3. Society would be better off if divorces were harder to get. (reversed) 
4. It should be harder for parents of children under age 18 to get a divorce 
than it is for couples who do not have young children, (reversed) 
5. If they are determined to do so, divorced couples can parent as effectively 
as can most parents who live together. 
Scores on these five indicators were summed to form an attitude scale score, "Divorce 
Culture." Reliability analysis yielded a Cronbach's alpha of .60, and although item analysis 
revealed that exclusion of "it is unrealistic to expect a couple to remain married to one 
another for life" would increase the alpha to .6465,1 opted to retain the item in the 
scale, as it measures an essential element of divorce culture—the assumption of marital 
impermanence. The Divorce Culture scale was significantly and more strongly correlated 
with the PMAS than any other variable analyzed in this research so far (r= -.459,/x.OOl). 
To correct moderate negative skewness in the distribution, I applied a square root 
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transformation to the original scale to yield the new variable dc_final, which is included in 
the third step of the hierarchical regression. 
Regression Model 3: Analysis and Results 
The results of the third step in sequential regression, Model 3, are presented in Table 17, 
and show that adding expectations for marriage and commitment to divorce culture at this 
step improves the overall model significantly, R2= .367, F, (9, 455)=29.274,^><.001, with the 
variables explaining an additional 19.1 percent of the variability in PMAS scores (adjusted 
R2=.354). Including identity markers, lifestyle variables, and the two new predictors, Model 
3 explains more than 30 percent of the variance in attitudes toward marriage compared to 
Model 2 (adjusted R2=A63). 
With all variables so far in the model, the strongest significant predictor of PMAS 
scores is commitment to divorce culture (6 = -.411,/x.OOl). High commitment to divorce 
culture, then, is associated with relatively low scores on the Pro-Marriage Attitude Scale. 
The expected effects of marriage significantly influence the PMAS (i?2=.l60,^<.001), 
but the effect is the weakest of the four independent predictor variables in the regression. 
Commitment to monogamy (i?2=.229,/><.001) and personal religious belief (R2 =.172, 
^x.OOl) remain significant positive influences in the model, but the effects of each fall far 
short of the strength of divorce culture as a predictor of pro-marriage attitudes. Finally, 
all identity markers but one fail to reach significance in Model 3, which suggests that age 
and relationship status play little to no role in the formation and maintenance of attitudes 
favorable or unfavorable to traditional marriage. On the other hand, gender and sexuality 
do play some role. The regression results predict that bisexual women are more likely than 
gay men to hold negative attitudes toward traditional marriage (f? = -.100,/>=.026), but this 
result should be interpreted cautiously, as the actual PMAS scores for bisexual women are 
probably not as dramatically different in practical terms as the statistics suggest. Despite the 
small effect size, this finding implies that lesbians and gay men are collectively more similar 
to one another than different, perhaps more "traditional" in their approach to coupling and 
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long-term relationships. If it is true that sexuality, more than gender, differentiates the various 
groups within this sample, such a finding would be consistent with findings presented earlier 
in this study. 
The dramatic influence of divorce culture on pro-marriage attitudes among non-
heterosexuals cannot be ignored. It suggests that anti-marriage attitudes among this 
population are driven most strongly by the same forces that, according to the conservative 
perspective, have undermined heterosexual marriage and the family since the late 1960s. If 
commitment to divorce culture is the definitive predictor of low pro-marriage attitudes, we 
can finally put to bed the notion that gay culture produces anti-marriage attitudes. Instead, 
it appears that the culture of marriage emerging in lesbian and gay communities is informed 
more strongly by the history of heterosexual divorce. 
Controls and Biases 
The results of regression analysis so far indicate that many of the factors that influence 
heterosexual support for marriage also influence non-heterosexual support for marriage. 
Whether these results might lead to more or less accurate generalizations from the Quest for 
Quotidian sample to the population of non-heterosexuals is debatable, however, because of 
biases in the sample. In the fourth and final step of the sequential regression, I add a series 
of variables to the equation to control for biases associated with social networks, type of 
religion, political persuasion, social class, geographic distribution of the sample in the United 
States, and recruitment method. All of the predictors introduced in Model 4 are dummy 
variables, dichotomous variables derived from existing categorical or ordinal variables in the 
survey. All control variables were entered into the model simultaneously. 
Queer Social Networks, Christianity, and Politics 
The persistence of the mythical "homosexual agenda" reflects a tendency in popular 
political, and especially anti-gay, discourses to treat non-heterosexuals as a unified body 
politic. The most extreme expression of this assumption comes unsurprisingly from the 
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religious right, which views lesbians and gays as a cohesive, conspiratorial elite. To these 
cultural conservatives, queer people are nothing less than a radicalized social club organized 
not to secure basic human rights or inclusive citizenship for gay and lesbian individuals, but 
to destroy the institutions and traditions that rightly exclude non-heterosexuals from the 
social and personal benefits of family and public life. 
What is more astonishing than the idea of a "homosexual agenda" is the fact that there 
is no such a thing. Clearly the history of injustice experienced by these people calls for 
unity, resistance, and perhaps even revolution. The lives of modern bisexuals, lesbians and 
gays are shaped by the discrimination they experience. Instead of banding together to fight 
for liberation, however, the current trend appears to be that non-heterosexuals are working 
quietly and independently toward assimilation. 
One could argue that perhaps the vengeance motif so prevalent in Christian 
fundamentalist rhetoric (Ruthven 2005; Armstrong 2001) colors the way anti-gay 
conservatives interpret pro-gay activism. Is it really that surprising that people who believe 
everyone who does not share their particular brands of faith will be cast into a lake of fire for 
all eternity would view any group that challenges their claim to social and political privilege 
to be worthy of anything but exclusion, or even death? I think not. To the self-appointed 
"chosen" of God, protecting heterosexual privilege—e.g., protecting marriage—warrants 
almost any sacrifice, including the degradation, humiliation, and marginalization of their 
fellow citizens in the name of "the family." If those fellow citizens are not heterosexual, 
according to the rhetoric of cultural warriors in the United States, then they definitely 
deserve such treatment for their audacity. In truth, denying homosexual people the right 
to marry is the least that can be done, which might explain the eagerness of politicians to 
embrace the one-man, one-woman definition of marriage while distancing themselves from 
more radical anti-gay rhetoric and actions. 
Regardless of the volume of the conservative rant in popular media, we know that 
non-heterosexuals are not a national club, but a diversified segment of the population 
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with a presence in almost all US communities. Nevertheless, non-heterosexual people are 
collectively different from the heterosexual majority, even if the most important differences 
are the result, not a cause, of structured social inequality sustained by ages-old prejudice 
that favors heterosexuals. We know that gay people have gay friends, no less than straight 
people are likely to build relationships with straight friends. I have shown that many non-
heterosexuals are religious, but whether they practice a form of Christianity probably 
depends on the level of acceptance or rejection they have themselves experienced in Christian 
faith communities. I have similarly demonstrated that while non-heterosexuals are unlikely 
to identify themselves as very conservative, politically, that does not necessarily mean that 
their politics are very liberal, or even substantially different from the politics of their more 
conservative heterosexual neighbors. 
In response to conservative concerns over the presumed homogeneity of queer 
communities and politics, I control for the effects of queer social networks—that is, 
networks that are more homosexual than heterosexual—I included a dichotomous version 
of the networkq variable, coded 1 for "half or more friends are homosexual" and 0 for "less 
than half of friends are homosexual." I also include a control for political views, coded 1 
for "very liberal"—which is the presumed political orientation of lesbians and gays—and 
0 for all other responses. Finally, I control for the specific influence of Christian faith, as 
opposed to other religious beliefs, in the sample with a variable that measures whether the 
respondent is "Christian now" (coded 1) or not (coded 0). Of these three variables, two 
are significantly and negatively correlated with the Pro-Marriage Attitude Scale: "Christian 
now" (r=-.234) and "Very Liberal" (r=-.246). Surprisingly, individuals in the sample who 
identify as Christians today might have lower scores on the PMAS than those who are not. 
That very liberal political views are associated with lower PMAS scores suggests that the most 
liberal among respondents are likely to take a dimmer view of assimiliation than their less 
liberal counterparts. What is surprising is that claiming a Christian identity today is similarly 
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associated with lower PMAS scores. Notably, there is no significant relationship between the 
composition of social or friendship networks and attitudes toward marriage. 
Social Class: Race, Education and Income 
In the Quest for Quotidian sample—as in many samples of non-heterosexuals and 
purposive samples generally—white, college-educated, and high-income respondents are 
overrepresented. Race is controlled in analysis using a dummy variable where non-white 
responses are coded 1, and white responses coded 0. I control for college education of the 
respondent, coded 1 if the respondent holds at least a 4-year degree. Finally, I control for 
respondents income, using a binary version of the "relational" income variable. Relational 
income is (1) respondent's personal income if single and/or reports household income from 
parents, roommates or other family members; or (2) household income if the respondent is 
married, in a civil union, or in a domestic partnership. The dummy variable is coded 0 for 
incomes less than $75,000, and 1 for incomes of $75,000 or more per year. 
Real and Virtual Geography 
To control for the differential effects of geographic region, I included dummy variables 
for three of the four census regions in the US—the midwest, south and northeast. The 
western region, which includes the majority of responses, is the reference category for these 
variables. I was able to obtain more responses from all regions of die United States in large 
part because of online recruiting through blogs, social networking sites and public bulletin 
boards. To account for the effects of online recruiting versus more traditional methods 
(face-to-face contact, print advertising, direct invitation, etc.), I included a control variable 
that indicates whether respondents were recruited anonymously online (coded 1) or not 
(coded 0). 
Regression Model 4: Analysis and Results 
All control variables were added to the equation at the fourth and final step of sequential 
regression on the Pro-Marriage Attitudes Scale. Following Green's (1991) rules of thumb for 
assessing the adequacy of ratio of cases to predictors, the minimum sample size for analyzing 
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the 19 predictors included in the model—five identity marker variables, four continuous 
independent predictors, and 10 variables controlling for demographic characteristics and 
sampling biases—is 202 for multiple correlations and 122 for individual predictors (see 
Tabatchnik and Fidell 2007), so even with a dramatic increase in the number of predictors 
in the model, the Quest for Quotidian sample used here is still above minimum sample size 
requirements. 
With all predictors and controls included, Model 4 remained significant, R2=A0l, F, 
(19,445)=15.65,/<.001. Table 18 displays the results of the regression, including means 
and standard deviations for continuous predictors, unstandardized coefficients (B), standard 
error, and standardized coefficients (6) for all predictors, and intercepts, R, R2, and adjusted 
R2 for all models. The final model explains 37.5 percent of the variability in attitudes toward 
marriage among non-heterosexuals in the sample. The inclusion of the control variables 
explains an additional three percent (R2 change=.034) of variation in scores on the PMAS 
compared to the Model 3, which omitted the controls [R2= .367, F3 (9, 455)=29.274, 
/K.001]. 
Commitment to divorce culture remains the strongest predictor of weaker pro-marriage 
attitudes in the final model (fi = -.370,/><.001), while expectations for marriage, personal 
religious belief and commitment to monogamy are significant predictors of stronger pro-
marriage attitudes. Among the control variables, two were significant predictors. Individuals 
with at least a four-year college degree are likely to have lower scores on the PMAS than those 
without (£= -. 108,/>=.008), although the effect is relatively weak. Slightly more significant 
and stronger is the influence of "very liberal" political views on pro-marriage attitudes 
(f>= -.125,/>=.002). Notably, when liberal political views are controlled in the sample, 
the relationship between status as a bisexual woman and pro-marriage attitudes virtually 
disappears (8= .072), implying that sexuality and politics might be more closely intertwined 
among some women, so tliat political views mediate the relationship between sexual identity 
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and attitudes toward marriage. No such mediating relationship was found between the 
PMAS and the college education control variable. 
The full regression model explains close to 40 percent of the variance in the PMAS 
(adjusted R2=57.5). Of the four independent predictors, religious belief, commitment to 
monogamy, and expectations for marriage are each positively and significantly associated 
with stronger, more traditional attitudes toward marriage as we know it. None of these 
predictors, however, has a stronger effect on attitudes than commitment to divorce culture, 
even when controlling for gender and sexual identity, age, relationship status, geographic 
location, education, income, Christian religious ideology, and possible recruitment biases. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
TOWARD A RED LETTER DAY 
Go to work and take your calls 
Hang the fruits of your labour on the walls 
Such precision and care 
What does it matter 
if there's no one here to share 
the flowers in the garden 
the wine 
the Waiting for Godot 
and so much modern time? 
All I want is what you want 
I'm always waiting for a red letter day 
— "Red Letter Day," Pet Shop Boys, Bilingual (Tennant and Lowe 1996) 
Assimilationist Ideology Among Non-Heterosexuals 
The question central to this research was this: How much of the commitment to 
assimilationist ideology is explained by the values and beliefs captured in attitudinal 
measures of support for marriage? Non-heterosexuals whose attitudes toward marriage are 
more positive are gays and lesbians who are younger rather than older, who are relatively 
more religious as well as more committed to monogamy as a sexual lifestyle, who believe 
that marriage would improve their quality of life, and who take a relatively negative view of 
divorce. These individuals represent at once the assimilationist position in queer politics and 
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the marriage debates, and the reclamation of "normal" as an ideological and practical anchor 
of lesbian, gay and bisexual understanding of marriage and family life. Quest for Quotidian 
findings strongly suggest that the passions driving same-sex marriage movements around the 
country reflect neither a radical departure from core definitions of marriage, nor a rejection 
of traditional "family values" associated with matrimony, at least by gays and lesbians. 
Diversity and Divergence: Bisexuality 
Bisexuals share with gays and lesbians the experience of marginalization as members of 
a sexual minority, and at times are marginalized even within alternative sexual communities 
and groups (Califia 2005; Green 2003), or at least misunderstood (Rust 2002). Bisexuals in 
this survey reported low levels of integration in queer communities, suggesting that many 
bisexuals might feel somewhat excluded from what has come to be known as gay culture. On 
the other hand, bisexuals in the sample reported relatively high degrees of integration into 
civic life. The availability of marriage might play a small role in explaining these data. While 
bisexuals are often married and "passing" in the heterosexual world, they remain relatively 
invisible and thus potentially immunized against the public criticism and vitriol usually 
directed at homosexuals and same-sex couples. Without the protective veil of privacy that 
marriage—or potential marriage—provides to bisexuals and heterosexuals, gay and lesbian 
couples often have little choice but to expose their private personal and family lives to public 
scrutiny, and make themselves more vulnerable to prejudice and discrimination within their 
own families, neighborhoods, schools and the workplace. 
While homosexuals and bisexuals—as defined in this research—may experience similar 
types of political or social marginalization, and may find themselves united against injustices 
based on their non-heterosexuality generally, the results of analyses of Quest for Quotidian 
data suggest it is a mistake for researchers to ignore differences between these two groups, 
and call for recognition that non-heterosexual populations are significantly diverse, not 
socially, ideologically, or behaviorally homogeneous. Lesbians and gay men people appear 
to hold a more traditional view of marriage than their bisexual counterparts, a pattern that 
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emerged in most analyses. For example, bisexuals were demonstrably less open about their 
sexuality and more likely to be closeted than were homosexuals. Commitment to monogamy 
in relationships was weaker among bisexuals than among homosexuals. Bisexual men and 
women were more likely to be legally married, but they were not as committed to monogamy 
as were homosexuals. PMAS scores for homosexual respondents were twice as likely to be 
captured in the upper quartile of the distribution as were scores from bisexual respondents. 
Inversely, the scores of bisexuals on commitment to divorce culture were twice as likely to 
be in the upper quartile of the distribution as were the scores of homosexuals, who viewed 
divorce more negatively, perhaps as a threat to the institution. Overall, the value orientations 
of lesbians and gays seem more similar to those of heterosexuals. The value orientations of 
bisexuals appear to clearly challenge the traditional definitions of marriage and the norms 
governing intimate relationships. 
I do not draw attention to these trends in the data to lay responsibility for anti-gay 
bigotry at the feet of bisexuals, however, or to engage in any type of fingerpointing. Perhaps 
gays and lesbians feel they bear a sharper social stigma than bisexual men and women, and 
this may translate into divergent legal and political interests. No one identifies a specifically 
"bisexual agenda" as a threat to families, but gays and lesbians—including those who hold 
values more similar to heterosexuals' than to bisexuals'—are collectively presumed by their 
critics and enemies to threaten the institution with their calls for inclusion. Bisexuals, on the 
other hand, are often in a position to critique marriage from the perspective of experienced 
participants, not hopeful applicants. Further, bisexuality challenges the "hetero-homo" 
binary as well as the "man-woman" gender dichotomy upon which historical constructions 
of both sexuality and traditional marriage rely, and do so in ways that "monosexuality"—an 
orientation toward only same-sex partners or only different-sex partners—does not(Carr 
2006). This is evident in this research, in which bisexuality often distinguishes attitudes, 
values and behaviors that might be less favorable to marriage from those that are more 
favorable to marriage. 
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The results of the full regression model suggest that sexual orientation itself does 
not necessarily determine differences in attitudes toward marriage. When demographic 
characteristics and ideological preferences were controlled in Model 4, the identity marker 
variable "bisexual woman" ceased to be a significant predictor. Bisexual respondents 
were overwhelmingly women, while bisexual men accounted for fewer than one in ten 
respondents overall. Bisexual women outnumbered lesbian women almost two to one in the 
final sample. Bisexual women were generally younger women who often came to the survey 
from popular social networking websites, while bisexual men were generally older, often 
married men, many of whom came to the survey via blogs. Feminist thought and activism, 
as well as related intellectual and political movements, have undoubtedly influenced late 
modern understanding of sexuality and identity through structural and cultural critiques 
of the various mechanisms by which gendered systems of meaning have limited sexual 
expression, or sanctioned alternative sexual behaviors and ways of living. Given that Quest for 
Quotidian recorded relatively few responses from bisexual men, it is possible that bisexuality 
is a more accessible identity for women than for men, and especially for women coming of 
age in an arguably "post-feminist" era wherein women's sexuality and bodies are less regulated 
than in the past. Perhaps bisexual women and men, who are rendered less visible in political 
and cultural movements as well as social life by monosexual discourse, are more likely than 
homosexual men and women to reject assimilation ideology because assimilation through 
marriage does not necessarily work. Bisexuals can already legally marry a partner, and many 
have taken advantage of the opportunity to do so. But marriage has not necessarily been a 
path to openness or acceptance for bisexuals in either the straight or gay world. Gay and 
lesbian people might gain social benefits and acknowledgment if they were allowed to legally 
marry, but bisexuals would likely see no significant changes to their own lives unless they 
adopted the norms and values of monosexuals, and specifically, norms of monogamy. 
Instead, it would appear that many bisexuals in this sample have defined marriage and 
intimate relationships in ways that do not rely on sexual constraint, or monogamy, as a basis 
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for durability and permanence. One could argue that many bisexuals might choose to live in 
a society with no marriage at all, or one that features a kind of marriage that resembles the 
more permeable, more fluid relationships that most lesbians and gays are forced to accept 
in the absence of the right to marry. Based on the attitudinal data presented here, bisexual 
identity in practice could be described as more potentially subversive and revolutionary than 
gay identity in practice, and thus is necessarily less assimilationist and more liberationist. 
Of course, individuals predisposed to liberationist ideology might be more inclined to self-
identify as bisexual, but it is just as reasonable to assume that bisexual individuals are inclined 
to embrace liberationist ideology, including values, beliefs and practices that may undermine 
marriage, but which they believe lead to a more radical transformation of marriage and 
family into more inclusive institutions. That bisexuals lean more toward liberationist ideology 
and homosexuals lean more toward assimiliationist ideology means that lesbians and gays 
have very different political goals than those of bisexual men and women, and further warns 
against treating non-heterosexuals as a monolithic category in public discourse or social 
research. 
Non-heterosexuals are, as a group, more politically and socially liberal, out of necessity 
or as a function of their systematic exclusion from various aspects of legal and social life. 
However, it appears that gays and lesbians in particular are less committed to extreme 
liberalism and radical social change. Glenn (1999) notes that the differences between 
"liberal" and "radical liberal" perspectives are determined by goal orientation: radical agendas 
generally include a revolutionary program aimed at destabilizing and replacing existing 
institutions and their cultural underpinnings. Radicals remain at the vanguard of progressive 
change, because they continue to question the present, and existing social structure and 
relationships. The uncompromisingly critical perspectives of radical liberal factions in the 
family wars have had relatively little influence on the ground in recent years, though, despite 
their ubiquitous presence in elite cultural and academic circles. Relegated to the margins, 
at least in the policy-making process, the radical liberal perspective alienates moderates 
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within the liberal camp even while offering the deepest and most dramatic criticisms of the 
structure of inequality in modern society. Too often, the pessimism expressed by radical 
liberal intellectuals toward the family as a system of gender, class and sexual oppression 
borders on stereotypical nihilism. Although I am painting with a broad brush, my data 
suggest that bisexuals tend to embrace a more radical stance toward marriage, while gays and 
lesbians appear to take a more moderate stance, one that suggest that solutions to problems 
of inequality in the present are at least partially found in the imagined stability of die past— 
namely, in the normative structure of monogamous legal marriage. 
Lifestyle Choices: Religion and Monogamy 
About sixty percent of respondents have left the faiths of their parents either for atfieism 
or another faith, but about forty percent report that their religious beliefs have not changed. 
Regardless of whether their beliefs have changed, however, it is likely that religion has 
become more a private practice for lesbian, gay and bisexual believers, especially if their 
religions or faith communities maintain a public anti-gay stance or discourage participation 
by non-heterosexuals and their families in worship or other activities. After all, to many 
Christian churches and other religious groups in the United States, homosexuality—and 
especially gay rights—threatens to undermine families, governments and society; lesbians 
and gays themselves are depicted as nothing less than the living harbingers of the end of the 
evil world. It is difficult to imagine same-sex couples or single homosexual men and women 
would feel welcome in such environments. Nevertheless, my analyses revealed that stronger 
personal religious belief of any stripe predicts stronger attitudes toward traditional marriage, 
implying that non-heterosexuals readily find or create alternatives to institutional structures 
that reject or limit them. This finding reflects the queer sensibility that inspires innovation 
in personal and sexual relationships extends into other social practices valued by individuals, 
including religion. The social and personal value of religion qua religion in the lives of gays 
and lesbians has not diminished, but has been transferred or transformed, and ultimately 
retained, even if past religious affiliations have been discarded (Tan 2005). Religious 
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individuals, in this sample as in heterosexual populations, are more likely to have stronger 
pro-marriage attitudes, and thus are more likely to embrace assimilationist ideology with 
regard to same-sex marriage. 
Slightly more than sixty percent of respondents who have a same-sex partner described 
their relationships as monogamous. As I have already established, personal religious belief 
is not correlated with commitment to a monogamous lifestyle, but religious conservatives 
might take heart in the finding from regression that relationship between monogamy and 
pro-marriage attitudes is significant and positive among non-heterosexuals. This finding 
must be interpreted with caution, however, since the measure actually captures the strength 
of commitment to monogamy, not whether individuals are practicing monogamy. Results 
indicate individuals whose relationships are more constrained by monogamy or limited 
non-monogamy are more likely to hold pro-marriage attitudes than those in relationships 
wherein the boundaries of appropriate extra-pair sexual behavior are less clearly defined 
and more permeable, or the rules governing sexual fidelity are more flexible. While no data 
currently in existence tells us whether the ability to marry will increase the number of strictly 
monogamous same-sex relationships among gays and lesbians, it is probably safe to say that 
a substantial number of partners in monogamous same-sex couples are likely to hold both 
traditional sexual norms and marriage in relatively high regard, and that these individuals 
would probably make up the lion's share of non-heterosexuals who would exercise the right 
to marry if it were available to them. 
Competing Cultures: Marriage and Divorce 
My research shows that positive attitudes toward marriage among non-heterosexuals 
are significantly correlated with a belief that marriage has improved or would improve their 
lives. The Positive Effects of Marriage scale (PEM) included six individual items, but there 
is reason to believe that some effects are more important than others. For example, on the 
individual items, gay and lesbian respondents indicated more frequently than bisexual 
respondents that marriage would improve their financial security, and increase their personal 
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happiness. These two items are significantly correlated with pro-marriage attitudes for gays 
and lesbians, but not for bisexuals. Relatively few respondents believe that marriage would 
improve their sex lives, their personal freedom, or their control over money. Most reported 
that these aspects of their lives and relationships would stay the same. Only a small minority 
indicated that marriage would make these matters worse. The sample is more or less divided 
on whether their lives as parents or potential parents might improve with the right to marry. 
Although my hypotheses required me to use the PEM scale in its entirety, early 
exploratory analyses in which all six scale items were entered independently into the 
regression showed that only the expectation that marriage would increase personal happiness 
reached significance, but did not significantly change the predictive power of the model. 
Non-heterosexuals may indeed claim to have high hopes for marriage, but security and 
happiness seem to me to be rather modest expectations for anyone, much less members of a 
marginalized minority who are victims of overt and systematic discrimination. More research 
on what non-heterosexual people expect from legal marriage is necessary, but from my data, 
such, expectations certainly do not appear to justify the claim that same-sex marriage would 
radically redefine marriage in the United States. 
Non-heterosexuals' expectations for marriage do suggest that gays, lesbians and bisexuals 
are ambivalent about marriage. On one hand, marriage is a private relationship, subjectively 
defined by the emotional bonds between two individuals that promote personal satisfaction 
and happiness (see Stack and Eshleman 1998). On the other hand, marriage is a public 
commitment that requires individuals to subordinate their personal desires to the needs of 
the larger society in exchange for the rights and recognition that come with married status. 
This ambivalence is not unique to non-heterosexual populations, but has been a focal point 
in analyses of family problems for quite a while. 
Based on analyses of Quest for Quotidian data, most non-heterosexuals are neither 
attacking marriage nor attempting to transform it into something it is not, but seeking 
integration into the family system through the one institution that is everywhere consistently 
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linked to a sense of security and an expectation of personal happiness. My data show that 
many same-sex couples clearly believe in the importance of marriage to individuals, children 
and the community, and tend to adhere to its more traditional normative structures. What 
is assumed to be an exclusively heterosexual culture of marriage is already an integral part 
of queer life, which requires interpretation of the struggle to expand the institution of 
marriage—to accommodate same-sex couples, their loved ones, and the relatively "normal" 
lives they already lead— a clear strategy of assimilation. "All I want is what you want," 
indeed. Nevertheless, it is also clear that non-heterosexuals are no more immune to the 
effects of an increasingly powerful—and contradictory—divorce culture in American society 
than are heterosexuals. 
Evident in this research is that values associated with the availability and desirability of 
divorce have a negative effect on pro-marriage attitudes. In other words, bisexuals, lesbians 
and gays are as ambivalent about divorce, overall, as everyone else in America. Even those 
with relatively strong attitudes toward traditional marriage often expressed equally strong 
attitudes that favor divorce in qualified circumstances. Echoing findings in other national 
surveys (Glenn 2005), findings from Quest for Quotidian data indicate that commitment to 
divorce culture is stronger among individuals with more education and more liberal politics. 
The strength of pro-marriage values in this survey cannot be explained by sexual 
identity alone, nor by adherence to any supposedly radical queer political agenda. The value 
contradiction implied by the significant inverse relationship between pro-marriage attitudes 
and commitment divorce culture is evidence of American, not just non-heterosexual, 
ambivalence about marriage. It is this state of ambivalence, which crosses the boundaries of 
gender, sexual identity, and political divisions, that speaks most clearly of the advancement 
of individualism about which even the most moderate opponents of same-sex marriage keen 
incessantly, and sometimes disingenuously. Assigning blame to lesbian and gay couples for 
undermining marriage is a red herring, since it was the spread of no-fault divorce in the 
early 1970s that marked the retreat from marriage as a sacred public trust toward a more 
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personalized, flexible, and private relationship between adults as an apparently unstoppable 
historical trend. 
Conservative and centrist family scholars and advocates are alarmed about the possibility 
that more people, specifically gay people, might participate in marriage, even though the 
real problem with marriage in the United States remains the endorsement of divorce as an 
alternative to marriage for individuals who find neither security nor happiness in matrimony. 
Even if same-sex marriage is realized nationwide within the next decade or two, family 
scholars and advocates will likely still be dealing with the possible negative consequences of 
divorce for families and children. It might even be the case that the expansion of marriage 
rights to gay and lesbian couples will refocus the energies of those concerned about marriage 
on the persistent social problems associated with divorce, or on the refinement of state 
policies concerning marital dissolution, child custody and support. In the meantime, divorce 
continues to be the singular issue about which Americans, gay and straight and otherwise, 
are divided when it comes to expressing support for an inclusive culture of marriage in the 
United States. 
Queer Assimilation as a Function of Radical Familism 
Quest for Quotidian is a search for common ground as well as an assessment of the 
possibility of a common social destiny for heterosexuals and non-heterosexuals alike. The 
current dynamic, fluid social context wherein so many Americans appear willing to accept 
rather than stigmatize sexual difference is indicative of social movement toward assimilation 
of lesbians and gays into more, not fewer, social institutions. Results presented here show 
that community integration variables exert relatively little influence on marriage attitudes 
among non-heterosexuals. Given the rates of both perceptions of openness about sexual 
identity and disclosure of sexual identity to others, the "closet" seems to be less a public 
space and more a personal problem in this sample. That stronger support for traditional 
values associated with marriage is not significantly dependent upon whether someone is 
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more or less active in either the straight or gay community may suggest a relatively high 
degree of presumptive integration at the levels of community, neighborhoods and families. If 
community integration variables predict neither assimiliationist nor liberationist ideological 
commitments, then perhaps non-heterosexuals are so visibly a part of everyday social life that 
it might be time to reassess the assumption that a "queer culture," separate and distinct from 
that of the heterosexual majority, is a major force in the lives and politics of lesbian and gay 
people. Though they continue to experience systematic discrimination, non-heterosexuals 
are here, queer, and apparently most people are used to it. 
Decades of differential and unequal treatment of gays and lesbians have certainly resulted 
in different interpretive frames for family life and politics, but that does not mean that 
having an alternative sexual identity requires that every individual must consistently and 
fundamentally challenge every existing social form or institution. For example, I have shown 
that non-heterosexual people live in towns and cities across the United States, working in a 
range of more or less traditional occupations. Some make a point of frequenting gay-owned 
or queer-friendly businesses, and some do not. Some want to get married sometime in the 
future, and some do not. A number are already in monogamous, marriage-like relationships, 
and within such relationships, many are raising children. Like their heterosexual neighbors 
and friends, some participate more in their communities, some less. In other words, non-
heterosexuals already live remarkably "normal" lives, even without having the right to marry. 
While some in the sample may think that marriage would change non-heterosexual existence 
from fabulously queer to unexceptionally mundane, a number of other respondents might 
believe marriage would finally transform uneasy tolerance into full acceptance of lesbians, 
gays and their families in the United States. And why would they not? 
As I wrote in Chapter One, the conservative case for same sex marriage relies on an 
assumption of a demonstrated commitment to traditional US familism. It seems clear from 
my data that individuals most likely to want to marry, or who want to see marriage made 
available to same-sex couples are those with such a commitment. The pro-family movement 
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has been largely successful in selling the American people—including gays and lesbians—on 
the importance of family and marriage. They have been so successful that their activities and 
rhetoric over the past 30 years may have had a sustained positive effect on non-heterosexuals 
who have grown into adulthood or into relationships during these past decades. The pro-
marriage value orientation described in these data come from somewhere. 
Socialization of children is a primary function of the family in all societies, and the 
process undeniably includes socialization of children into gender roles that are intimately 
intertwined with notions of "appropriate" sexual desires and activities. Even so, heterosexual 
parents are rarely held accountable for the adult sexual identities of their children. Given 
the heteronormative, patriarchal structure of American society, we cannot expect children 
of heterosexual couples who grow up to express same-sex attraction to have been socialized 
to do so—it is highly unlikely that parents would know how to socialize children into non-
heterosexual lifestyles or values, even if they wanted to do so. Rather, if after coming out, 
lesbian and gay individuals are assumed to be "sick" or "perverted," the assumption is that 
their socialization had no effect on them at all, or was negated in some way. This is an 
erroneous assumption. 
It is more likely that socialization "worked" exactly as it was supposed to work. Parents 
can and do model more generic values, attitudes, practices and behaviors that lead their 
children to an understanding of how sexual desire should be expressed within intimate 
relationships and regulated by the community within the broader cultural context of 
American life, even when those children may ultimately recognize tlieir non-heterosexual 
identity. In this context, it is relatively easy to see why monogamy is so desirable, why 
religious belief of some sort is so important, why higher expectations for marriage are 
so influential, and why negative views of divorce are so prevalent among those Quest for 
Quotidian respondents whose attitudes toward marriage reflect assimilationist ideology. 
Such attitudes do not signal a subversive deviance, but a tendency to conform to the social 
expectations governing sexual behavior and relationships passed along from their parents 
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and adapted to the alternative social and intimate relationships in which non-heterosexuals, 
and especially lesbians and gays, find themselves as adults. This tendency suggests that 
assimilation is more than a personal or political decision, but an intergenerational process 
that could very well be driven by a larger cultural narrative or political movement. 
The Quest for Quotidian survey results show only that the demand for same-sex marriage 
may be related to the increased visibility of non-heterosexuals in the United States. Certainly 
as the stigma attached to homosexuality and bisexuality recedes, non-heterosexual individuals 
and couples will be more likely to protest anti-gay discrimination in family policy openly and 
publicly, but my results only indirectly reveal why assimilation through marriage is gaining 
ground as the preferred strategy for addressing social inequality among non-heterosexuals. 
I believe that the movement toward assimilation and same-sex-inclusive marriage is likely 
a consequence of the successful pro-family activism of social conservatives and right-leaning 
politicians since the 1980s. That same-sex marriage was a definitive wedge issue in the 2004 
presidential election (Lewis 2005) is one indication of this success, as is the passage of every 
single state-level constitutional amendment that defines marriage as a right available only to 
heterosexual couples. Since same-sex marriage became a possibility in Hawaii's Baehr v. Lewin 
case in 1993, anti-gay forces have busily and successfully "protected" marriage by elevating 
it in the public consciousness as the height of achievement in personal relationships. Today, 
marriage is everywhere touted by conservatives and anti-gay activists as the most revered, 
most respected and most desirable type of personal relationship, and the only one truly 
deserving of recognition by the state, despite the separate-but-equal compromises known 
as civil unions or registered domestic partnerships. Marriage as ideology is more powerful 
and compelling than it was thirty years ago. Marital status—a mark of maturity, respect and 
responsibility; a license to have children, and parent those children without undue criticism; 
and a legitimate claim to a bundle of family-affirming social and government benefits— 
remains a privilege reserved for heteroexuals largely because of the effectiveness with which 
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pro-marriage and pro-family forces have dominated discussion of marriage and family since 
the Reagan years. 
Most of the respondents in my survey have grown up inundated with pro-family and 
pro-marriage messages. They have lived through the revival of late 20th century familism 
in the United States, and were reared in families by parents who were likely unable to avoid 
being influenced by the "family values" crowd. Over the span of just over two decades, it 
is easily conceivable that the barrage of messages fired to and fro in the culture wars has 
convinced Americans—conservatives, liberals, straights and gays—that marriage is something 
worth fighting for. The movement toward assimiliation, then, should come as no surprise, 
and neither should the sustained activism on the part of lesbians and gays to secure the right 
to marry. As successful anti-gay efforts to "protect" marriage have intensified, marriage has 
come to be more highly valued, a powerful symbol of equality. The more valuable marriage 
and marital status are, the more intense will be the demand for marriage from those who 
are excluded from it, in this and future generations. Future research should explore the 
possibility that the more successfully social conservatives, religious fundamentalists and 
anti-gay activists promote marriage or marital status as the quintessential key to happiness, 
satisfaction, social stability and economic prosperity, the more strongly will gays and 
lesbians fight to participate equally in the institution, irrespective of any negative outcomes 
of legislative processes, ballot initiatives or court cases. By making marriage personally and 
politically irresistible, opponents of same-sex marriage may have guaranteed an ongoing 
culture war that can only end with their own failure. 
Limitations and Directions for Further Research 
In the meantime, policies affecting lesbians, gays and their children and families will 
continue to be implemented either (1) in the absence of knowledge about the population, 
or (2) in willful contradiction to most research findings available about the population, 
ostensibly because the samples on which these studies are based are assumed to be flawed. 
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The Quest for Quotidan sample is, unfortunately, not immune to this criticism. The most 
significant barriers to producing research on non-heterosexual individuals involve sampling. 
In this study, I was forced to use a form of non-random, "snowball" sampling to generate a 
sample of sufficient size and scope to perform my analyses. This is not an unusual strategy for 
researchers conducting online or traditional surveys of non-heterosexual populations, but the 
sampling method does have its drawbacks. 
Findings from studies that rely on chain-referral or snowball sampling methods are 
relatively easy to dismiss, primarily because non-random sampling techniques usually 
prohibit any meaningful estimates of parameters in the population. Individuals, groups and 
politicians opposed to extending rights to gays and lesbians are quick to capitalize on the 
flawed (but necessary) sampling design to discredit findings that might challenge the validity 
of conservative arguments against gay rights, including marital and parental rights (Lerner 
and Nagai 2000). Given that gay and lesbian families are neither consistently identified in 
large surveys, nor defined as a group in any way meaningful to the construction of a sampling 
frame, the problem of non-random sampling is self-perpetuating in this population. 
Future researchers might solve the problem of the absence of a sampling frame, or list 
of gays, lesbians and other non-heterosexuals from which a random sample can be drawn 
by applying the techniques described by Heckathorn (1997, 2002, 2008) and Salganik and 
Heckathorn (2004) as "Respondent-Driven Sampling" (RDS) to obtain a sample of gays and 
lesbians whose relationships to one another constitute a social network from which estimates 
of population parameters might be reliably made. RDS is a methological reconceptualization 
of traditional chain-referral sampling (or "snowball sampling," see Goodman 1961), an 
approach often used to reach hidden or otherwise hard to reach populations. RDS addresses 
a major problem inherent to studies that rely on traditional chain-referral sampling, that is, 
the inability of researchers to generalize their findings from samples of convenience to the 
study population. While RDS cannot completely close the gap between the generalizability 
of findings derived from random samples and those derived from non-random samples, 
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Heckathorn's technique does offer researchers studying marginalized or marked populations 
a systematic sampling approach and interpretive frame that improves upon traditional 
methods: 
The key idea behind the estimation procedures is that the estimates do not 
come from the sample proportions. Rather, the sample is used to make 
estimates about the network connecting the population. Then, using 
information about this network, we can derive the population proportion 
in different groups. By not attempting to estimate directly from the sample 
to the population, we avoid many of the well-known problems with chain-
referral samples. (Salganik and Heckathorn 2004:201) 
Like the use of non-random sampling methods, the use of online data collection methods 
is largely dictated by the ability to recruit a large, geographically and demographically diverse 
number of individual members of a hidden population that might only be reachable via some 
form of chain-referral sampling method. Taken together, non-random sampling and online 
recruitment and data collection strategies are methodological responses to two biases that 
influence the study of non-heterosexual populations in the United States. 
The first is a structural bias that renders research on gay and lesbian families highly 
problematic. Because queer individuals and families in die general population are uncounted 
and have historically been largely invisible to demographers and researchers, there exists 
no reliable sampling frame from which to draw a random sample of homosexuals or their 
households. Indeed, if estimates of the proportion of homosexuals in the population are 
accurate—census data suggests that as few as three percent of US households are same-sex 
households, and other researchers have published similar estimates (Laumann, et al. 1994)— 
attempting to obtain a random sample of homosexuals dirough traditional means is both 
prohibitively expensive and unreasonably time-consuming. Some researchers have been able 
to deduce samples of non-heterosexuals from existing datasets from large random sample 
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surveys, but they must still rely on a set of assumptions about respondents who have not 
necessarily identified themselves as gay or lesbian (Black, et al. 2000). 
The structural bias described here feeds a second bias, one against acknowledging that 
homosexual or non-heterosexual people—along with their friends, partners and children— 
live their lives in real families, in real communities, but in most cases without any real rights 
or protections for themselves and those they love. Without interrogating this population 
using methods and tools that are defensible against attacks on the validity and generalizability 
of findings—there can be no real discussion of the possible social effects of allowing (or 
prohibiting) same-sex marriage. 
In the end, until some mechanism by which public and legal recognition of the 
legitimate existence of homosexuals and same-sex couples is established, studies of this 
population will be less than ideal. Nevertheless, the Quest for Quotidian survey represents 
a wide cross-section of at least a portion of non-heterosexuals in America, and certainly 
demonstrates the potential of online attitude surveys to generate a significant sample in 
a relatively short time. If sampling methods were improved; that is, if techniques like 
Respondent-Driven Sampling are developed further for use in online survey sampling and 
network analysis, findings from surveys such as this one would be markedly improved, and 
potentially more influential in the policy-making process and on public opinion. 
The Future of Marriage 
In the United States in the early years of the 21st century, lesbian women and gay men, 
as well as bisexual individuals, were more likely to be treated like "normal" human beings 
than they were in the decades before—and turbulent years after—the Stonewall Riots 
announced the imminent arrival of queer public consciousness in the early 1970s. Some 
non-heterosexual people could at least imagine being in romantic relationships that followed 
a more or less "traditional" trajectory—from dating, to meeting the parents, to starting a 
family—without fear of ridicule, rejection, condemnation or isolation from the families and 
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kin-based support systems that wrap individuals into the comforting, normalizing routines 
of everyday life. What most could not expect, even under the best of circumstances, was a 
proposal, an engagement, or a wedding. 
It is these expectations that have changed so dramatically since the 1970s. If US society 
continues to relax restrictions—both formal and informal—on those who fall outside 
heteronormative categories of existence, then the historically rigid line between what is 
possible for heterosexuals and what is possible for homosexuals will gradually fade, or become 
more ambiguous. It is this state of ambiguity and flux that represents political opportunity to 
open and expand marriage as an institution to individuals who have long been excluded from 
it, including those who have believed in it and upheld its normative principles through most 
of their lives. 
Same-sex couples face uncertain outcomes in the legal and legislative battlefields of 
America's culture war, but the efforts of activists and everyday citizens to secure the right 
to marry hardly seem hopeless. The findings of the research presented here suggest many 
gays and lesbians are adopting strategies in intimate relationships that are more similar 
than different to the socially-approved strategies that too many heterosexuals believe are 
theirs alone. Gays, lesbians and bisexuals with an assimiliationist orientation appear to 
share a common language widi heterosexuals where the family is concerned, a language that 
articulates a set of core values defining marriage—love, monogamy, commitment, children, 
faith, community, and fear of divorce. Above all, the attitudinal orientations of gays and 
lesbians appear to undergird more or less traditional ways of forming relationships, building 
families, and participating in civil and political life. Empirical evidence is mounting that 
assimilation and full integration into the family system will not be achieved sometime in 
the future, but rather that it is already well underway, and that equality—in marriage, in 
families, and in society—is within reach for non-heterosexuals who believe that the quest for 
a quotidian existence, a "normal" life, ends with saying "I do." 
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